本文選題：地方政府 + 治理創(chuàng)新�。� 參考：《江南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國加入世界貿(mào)易組織后,地方政府治理創(chuàng)新成為中國行政發(fā)展的大趨勢(shì),而公共服務(wù)是其最基本的立足點(diǎn)。圍繞給企業(yè)和社會(huì)提供優(yōu)質(zhì)高效的公共服務(wù),地方政府進(jìn)行了廣泛的治理創(chuàng)新,但成功的探索中伴隨著挫折和困惑,其中引人注目的是不少治理創(chuàng)新出現(xiàn)“人去政息”現(xiàn)象,損耗了大量公共資源,有悖于國家治理體系與治理能力現(xiàn)代化的改革目標(biāo)。中國地方政府治理創(chuàng)新“人去政息”現(xiàn)象是指在變革管理過程中地方政府實(shí)施的公共服務(wù)創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目,因改革領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者離去而喪失創(chuàng)新成果的現(xiàn)象。我們把具有獨(dú)創(chuàng)性、產(chǎn)生明顯社會(huì)效果并至少持續(xù)一年的治理創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目確定為研究對(duì)象。在此范圍內(nèi)以馬克思主義國家政權(quán)理論、服務(wù)型政府理論、制度變遷理論和變革管理理論為支撐,集中考察其他條件相對(duì)不變的情形下改革領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者離去后治理創(chuàng)新成果喪失的現(xiàn)象。改革受挫源于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者離去導(dǎo)致創(chuàng)新動(dòng)力結(jié)構(gòu)失衡,即延續(xù)創(chuàng)新的動(dòng)力和收益小于其阻力和成本。動(dòng)力結(jié)構(gòu)失衡主要體現(xiàn)為兩方面,主觀上領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者創(chuàng)新動(dòng)力往往來自于機(jī)會(huì)主義,包括干部考核體制的反向激勵(lì)作用、劣質(zhì)創(chuàng)新的動(dòng)力不可持續(xù)以及創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者公益需要?jiǎng)恿Σ蛔愕?客觀上源于創(chuàng)新外部動(dòng)力缺失,包括上級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)不支持、鞏固創(chuàng)新的法制化程度低以及群眾不認(rèn)可等。走出“人去政息”困境的邏輯應(yīng)當(dāng)是,提升鞏固創(chuàng)新的法制化水平,通過建立終止創(chuàng)新責(zé)任追究制度,完善激勵(lì)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新的干部考核機(jī)制;暢通群眾參與改革決策與監(jiān)督渠道,建立阻斷機(jī)會(huì)主義的創(chuàng)新糾錯(cuò)機(jī)制;通過創(chuàng)辦創(chuàng)新受益者論壇,建立與權(quán)威媒體溝通機(jī)制,開發(fā)支持創(chuàng)新者聯(lián)盟的動(dòng)力;在戰(zhàn)略策略規(guī)劃上,選擇阻力小的邊緣制度創(chuàng)新策略。歸根結(jié)底,就是使改革建立在動(dòng)力和收益大于阻力和成本的堅(jiān)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)上,才能保證創(chuàng)新成果不因領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的離去而被遺棄。
[Abstract]:After China's entry into WTO, local government governance innovation has become the main trend of China's administrative development, and public service is its most basic foothold. Local governments have carried out extensive governance innovations around providing high quality and efficient public services to enterprises and society, but the successful exploration has been accompanied by setbacks and puzzles, among which many governance innovations have appeared the phenomenon of "people go to government and information". It wastes a lot of public resources, which is contrary to the reform goal of modernization of national governance system and governance ability. The phenomenon of local government governance innovation in China refers to the public service innovation project implemented by the local government in the process of change management, which loses the innovation achievement because of the departure of the reform leader. We identified innovative governance projects that are original, have significant social effects and last at least a year. In this scope, it is supported by the Marxist theory of state power, the theory of service-oriented government, the theory of institutional change and the theory of change management. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of governance innovation loss after the departure of reform leaders under the condition that other conditions are relatively unchanged. The failure of reform is due to the imbalance of innovation power structure caused by the leader's departure, that is, the motive force and benefit of continuing innovation are smaller than their resistance and cost. The imbalance of dynamic structure is mainly reflected in two aspects. In subjective terms, the innovation power of leaders often comes from opportunism, including the reverse incentive function of cadre appraisal system. The motive force of inferior quality innovation is unsustainable and the innovation leaders need insufficient motivation for public good. Objectively it comes from the lack of external motive power of innovation, including the lack of support from superior leaders, the low degree of legalization of consolidation of innovation and the disapproval of the masses and so on. The logic of getting out of the dilemma of "people going to politics and information" should be to raise the level of legalization of consolidation and innovation, to improve the cadre assessment mechanism that encourages continuous innovation by establishing the system of accountability for the termination of innovation, and to open up channels for the masses to participate in the decision-making and supervision of reform. Establish the innovation error correction mechanism of blocking opportunism; develop the motive force to support innovator alliance by establishing innovation beneficiary forum and establishing communication mechanism with authoritative media; choose marginal institutional innovation strategy with little resistance in strategic planning. In the final analysis, it is based on the solid foundation that the power and profit outweigh the resistance and cost, so as to ensure that the innovation is not abandoned by the departure of the leader.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D630

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本文編號(hào)：2075009