本文選題：簡(jiǎn)政放權(quán) + 放管結(jié)合��； 參考：《財(cái)經(jīng)研究》2017年04期

【摘要】："簡(jiǎn)政放權(quán)、放管結(jié)合"是深化行政體制改革、轉(zhuǎn)變政府職能的重要內(nèi)容之一。"放權(quán)"政策體現(xiàn)了政府的權(quán)力分配模式從集權(quán)向分權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)變,其本質(zhì)是一種"行政性分權(quán)"。文章從提高經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行效率即最大化中央政府效用的視角,以建模方式——建立了一個(gè)三層次政府的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,給出了集權(quán)與分權(quán)的邊界,揭示"放權(quán)"政策的邏輯,從而試圖為研究政府最優(yōu)行政分權(quán)提供一種可行的思路,并嘗試用這一模型為"放權(quán)"政策提供合理的解釋。模型分析結(jié)果表明,(1)分權(quán)能夠在不改變社會(huì)福利水平的情況下,通過(guò)減少中央政府的信息成本負(fù)擔(dān)提升了經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行的效率,這也是"放權(quán)"政策的主要目的。同時(shí),權(quán)力的下放可能導(dǎo)致下級(jí)政府"尋租"的隱患,需要加大對(duì)這一行為的懲罰力度。"權(quán)力清單"制度的建立,通過(guò)明確規(guī)定中間政府的權(quán)力范圍,加強(qiáng)了對(duì)中間政府行使權(quán)力的監(jiān)督,減弱了其濫用權(quán)力的動(dòng)機(jī)。(2)具有以下特征的權(quán)力,分權(quán)往往比集權(quán)更優(yōu):下級(jí)政府的成本負(fù)擔(dān)輕、連帶懲罰力度小;權(quán)力實(shí)施時(shí)底層政府追求的目標(biāo)差異程度小、彼此之間相互影響程度小。與歷次國(guó)發(fā)文中下放的權(quán)力做了比對(duì)后發(fā)現(xiàn),這些被下放的權(quán)力能夠用上述的特征進(jìn)行較好的解釋。(3)各因素影響分權(quán)最優(yōu)性的強(qiáng)弱關(guān)系是:信息成本和對(duì)中間政府濫用權(quán)力的懲罰力度這兩個(gè)因素強(qiáng)于權(quán)力本身的若干特征,即帶給下級(jí)政府的成本負(fù)擔(dān)、連帶懲罰程度;政策實(shí)施時(shí)底層政府追求的目標(biāo)差異程度、外部性大小。
[Abstract]:The "decentralization of power and the combination of management" is one of the important contents of deepening the reform of the administrative system and changing the functions of the government. The "decentralization" policy embodies the transformation of the government's power distribution pattern from centralization to decentralization. Its essence is a kind of "administrative decentralization". The article is based on the perspective of improving the efficiency of economic operation, that is, maximizing the utility of the central government, and using modeling methods. A dynamic game model of three levels of government is established, the boundary of centralization and decentralization is given, and the logic of "decentralization" is revealed. Thus, it tries to provide a feasible way of thinking for the study of the optimal administrative decentralization of the government, and tries to provide a reasonable explanation for the "decentralization" policy. The results of the model analysis show that (1) decentralization can be found. Without changing the social welfare level, by reducing the cost burden of the central government to improve the efficiency of the economic operation, it is also the main purpose of the "decentralization" policy. At the same time, the decentralization of power may lead to the hidden danger of the lower government "Rent-seeking", and the punishment of this act should be strengthened. The establishment of the "power list" system is established. It has clearly defined the power range of the middle government, strengthened the supervision of the exercise of power in the middle government and weakened the motive for its abuse of power. (2) the power which has the following characteristics is often better than the centralization of power: the lower cost of the government is light, and the strength of the joint punishment is small; and the level of the goals pursued by the bottom government is small in the implementation of the power force, and each other is small. The degree of mutual influence is small. It is found that the delegated power can be explained better with the above characteristics. (3) the strong and weak relations between the factors which affect the optimality of decentralization are: the two factors are stronger than the power itself, the cost of information and the punishment of the abuse of power in the middle government. Several characteristics, namely, the cost burden to the lower government, the degree of joint punishment, and the magnitude of the objective difference pursued by the lower level governments in the implementation of policies.
【作者單位】： 中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)中國(guó)財(cái)政發(fā)展協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心;中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)金融學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目(15CJL020) 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金委員會(huì)科學(xué)部主任基金項(xiàng)目(71350020)
【分類號(hào)】：D630
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本文編號(hào)：2049189