本文選題：選擇性執(zhí)行 + 壓力型體制　； 參考：《南京師范大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：地方政府是落實(shí)公共政策的具體執(zhí)行主體,在政策實(shí)施過(guò)程中扮演著十分重要的角色,它們的決策和行動(dòng)直接影響著公共政策的實(shí)施情況以及政策執(zhí)行的結(jié)果。從現(xiàn)實(shí)來(lái)看,地方政府在執(zhí)行上級(jí)政府或部門下達(dá)的公共政策時(shí),存在著較為明顯的選擇性執(zhí)行傾向。這種傾向不僅表現(xiàn)在對(duì)不同政策的選擇上,同時(shí)也表現(xiàn)在對(duì)具體政策執(zhí)行方案的選擇上。其結(jié)果會(huì)導(dǎo)致,不僅有些政策長(zhǎng)期得不到有效的貫徹,而且即使是那些得到執(zhí)行的政策,也無(wú)法全面落實(shí)或者偏離正確軌道,和上級(jí)政府的核心精神不符。地方政府在政策實(shí)施過(guò)程中的這種行為特征,有著諸多的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)根源,但其中至為關(guān)鍵的,莫不與壓力型體制有關(guān)。壓力型體制是計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)下的產(chǎn)物,是我國(guó)特有的一種政府體制和工作方式,它是指在經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)的過(guò)程中,政府由上而下通過(guò)任務(wù)分解和指標(biāo)控制的方法,驅(qū)使下級(jí)政府積極地行動(dòng),以促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展的一種工作方式。雖然壓力型體制本身強(qiáng)調(diào)的是上級(jí)政府對(duì)下級(jí)政府行為的控制和激勵(lì),但這種通過(guò)數(shù)量化的指標(biāo)分解所形成的控制和激勵(lì)產(chǎn)生出來(lái)的結(jié)果,卻是地方政府在執(zhí)行政策時(shí)的選擇性行為：凡是有利于完成指標(biāo)的政策或任務(wù)都會(huì)積極地落實(shí),凡是與指標(biāo)任務(wù)無(wú)關(guān)的政策或任務(wù)都置之不顧,或者虛與委蛇。這種選擇性行為在以經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)為中心的總體性路線的支配之下表現(xiàn)得尤為突出。本文通過(guò)A市政府的選擇性執(zhí)行全貌描述和分析,結(jié)合壓力型體制的歷史成因與現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ),研究?jī)烧咧g的關(guān)聯(lián)。文章首先從A市的實(shí)際出發(fā),在分析政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、發(fā)展環(huán)境的基礎(chǔ)上,論述其選擇性行為的具體表現(xiàn),以及產(chǎn)生的政策后果,再引入壓力型體制理論,回溯壓力型體制的歷史、地理等影響因素,以及其經(jīng)過(guò)現(xiàn)代化改革后的變化,例如分權(quán)、綜合考評(píng)等,得出選擇性執(zhí)行的制度基礎(chǔ),再結(jié)合A市案例分析地方政府行為的特征,具有何種自主選擇的空間,涉及政策過(guò)程的哪些方面,最后得出選擇性執(zhí)行的行為機(jī)制,闡述地方政府的政策偏好,深入分析政策偏好的內(nèi)在傾向和形成特點(diǎn),受到哪些因素的影響。全文旨在理論聯(lián)系實(shí)際,描繪選擇性行為的全貌,深究其根源和特點(diǎn),分析地方政府在上級(jí)政府的控制下如何形成既自主又受到制約的雙重邏輯：一方面,考慮到地方政府作為執(zhí)行主體的積極性以及政策執(zhí)行本身的有效性,會(huì)賦予地方政府因地制宜的權(quán)力,使其在一定程度上掌握著政策實(shí)施的自主權(quán)；另一方面,為了避免地方政府的不作為并形成有效的激勵(lì),上級(jí)政府又會(huì)對(duì)地方政府進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格的指標(biāo)性監(jiān)控和考核。如果說(shuō)自主權(quán)使得地方政府選擇性執(zhí)行有了空間和制度上的可能,那么指標(biāo)性的監(jiān)控和考核就提供了這種行為的強(qiáng)激勵(lì)。
[Abstract]:The local government is the concrete executive subject of implementing public policy and plays a very important role in the process of policy implementation. Their decisions and actions directly affect the implementation of public policy and the results of policy implementation. In reality, local governments have a tendency of selective execution when executing the public policies issued by higher governments or departments. This tendency is manifested not only in the choice of different policies, but also in the choice of specific policy implementation schemes. As a result, not only some policies cannot be effectively implemented for a long time, but even those policies that have been implemented will not be fully implemented or deviated from the correct track, which is inconsistent with the core spirit of the higher government. This kind of behavior characteristic of local government in the process of policy implementation has many political and economic roots, but the most important one is related to the pressure-type system. The pressure-type system is the product of the planned economy and a unique government system and working mode in our country. It refers to the method of the government from top to bottom through task decomposition and index control in the process of economic construction. A method of working that drives lower-level governments to act positively to promote economic development. Although the pressure-type system itself emphasizes the control and incentives of the superior government over the actions of the lower government, it is the result of the control and incentive formed by the decomposition of the quantitative indicators. But it is the selective behavior of the local government in carrying out the policy: any policy or task that is favorable to the completion of the target will be carried out actively, any policy or task that has nothing to do with the target task will be ignored, or the policy or task will be ignored. This kind of selective behavior is especially prominent under the domination of the overall line centered on economic construction. Based on the description and analysis of selective execution in A municipal government and the historical causes and practical basis of the pressure-type system, this paper studies the relationship between the two. Based on the analysis of politics, economy and development environment, this paper first discusses the concrete manifestation of its selective behavior and its policy consequences, and then introduces the theory of pressure-type system to trace back the history of pressure-type system. Geography and other influencing factors, as well as its changes after modernization reform, such as decentralization, comprehensive evaluation and so on, draw the institutional basis of selective implementation, and then analyze the characteristics of local government behavior by combining the case of A city. What kind of space to choose independently, which aspects of policy process are involved, finally, the behavioral mechanism of selective implementation is obtained, the policy preference of local government is expounded, and the inherent tendency and forming characteristics of policy preference are deeply analyzed. By what factors. The purpose of this paper is to combine theory with practice, to describe the whole picture of selective behavior, to study its root causes and characteristics, and to analyze how local governments can form a dual logic of autonomy and restriction under the control of higher governments: on the one hand, Considering the initiative of the local government as the subject of implementation and the effectiveness of the policy implementation itself, local governments will be given the power to adapt to local conditions and have a certain degree of autonomy in the implementation of policies; on the other hand, In order to avoid the inaction of local government and form effective incentives, the higher government will strictly monitor and assess the local government. If autonomy makes it possible for local governments to implement selectively, then the monitoring and evaluation of indicators provide a strong incentive for this kind of behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：D63

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