本文選題：郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府 + 征地拆遷　； 參考：《上海大學(xué)》2017年博士論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著城市化和工業(yè)化的推進,郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)、區(qū)域面積和人口規(guī)模已經(jīng)接近一個小城市的規(guī)模,與一般鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)有很大的差別。由組織結(jié)構(gòu)、權(quán)責(zé)配置和公共服務(wù)等矛盾引發(fā)的郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府的策略行為也比一般鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)更為突出。尤其是在征地拆遷這一涉及鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府關(guān)鍵財政收入來源的行動中,鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府展現(xiàn)出了更豐富、更復(fù)雜的策略行動。以往的研究關(guān)注到了鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府與上級政府和動遷村民互動的策略行為,但是鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府超越科層結(jié)構(gòu)限制的策略被簡化為不遵從制度規(guī)范的“偏離”行為,鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府與動遷村民互動的策略被簡單地歸因為土地財政和土地財產(chǎn)不明確導(dǎo)致的維護自身利益的自利行為,鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府運作隱匿的復(fù)雜問題與復(fù)雜機制被忽略了。本研究將組織決策分析引入郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府征地拆遷策略邏輯的研究中,試圖從行動者角度探究以下問題:郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府在征地拆遷行動中面臨哪些結(jié)構(gòu)性限制?它在結(jié)構(gòu)中獲取了哪些關(guān)鍵性資源?它的自由余地是什么?在結(jié)構(gòu)制約下它采取什么策略與上級政府和動遷村民談判?鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府運作的復(fù)雜機制是什么?本研究運用的組織決策分析強調(diào),雖然科層制組織的規(guī)則對行動者有制約作用,但是行動者總是可以在結(jié)構(gòu)中獲取不確定性,控制影響組織運行的不確定性領(lǐng)域,為自己保留一定的自由余地。行動者在權(quán)衡了組織環(huán)境的影響、自身決策可能帶來的后果、其他行動者可能做出的決策之后,會依據(jù)自身的自由余地和行動能力,制定、調(diào)整決策,使游戲規(guī)則變化最大程度得朝有利于自己方向發(fā)展。正是從這一理論出發(fā),本研究對上海市寶山區(qū)G鎮(zhèn)的征地拆遷實踐展開田野調(diào)查,運用了觀察法、深度訪談法和拓展個案法收集資料,運用組織環(huán)境、行動能力、自由余地和策略選擇這四個分析工具對郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府征地拆遷的策略邏輯展開研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),郊區(qū)鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府的征地拆遷策略是在征地拆遷游戲中形成的。征地拆遷將上級政府、鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府、動遷村民緊密地聯(lián)系在一起,彼此在決策上高度依賴,構(gòu)成一種可以容納行動者之間的談判、協(xié)商、討價還價、競爭與合作、沖突與妥協(xié)的游戲。G鎮(zhèn)政府受到產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型、征地政策和地方性規(guī)范的制約,同時也受到政府內(nèi)部的角色沖突、財政困局的限制。但是鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府從來不是結(jié)構(gòu)制約的被動接受者,它在環(huán)境中發(fā)現(xiàn)了機遇,并且控制了能夠影響上級政府和動遷村民的不確定性領(lǐng)域,形成信息模糊與連帶責(zé)任、政策解釋與執(zhí)行的自由余地。擁有這些自由余地意味著鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府與上級政府、動遷村民形成了一種不平等的權(quán)力關(guān)系,并且獲取了在其中占據(jù)獲利優(yōu)勢的協(xié)商能力。為了在權(quán)力關(guān)系中獲取更大的權(quán)力和利益空間,鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府想方設(shè)法地擴大自己的自由余地,縮小他人的自由余地,在考慮上級政府和動遷村民對它的行動可能做出的回應(yīng)的基礎(chǔ)上,采取不同策略與上級政府和動遷村民進行談判。針對上級政府采取的統(tǒng)一管理、日常監(jiān)督、年終考核、控制資金和政策更新的監(jiān)控策略,鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府采取政策再生產(chǎn)、協(xié)議動遷、項目動員、壓力傳遞的策略與上級政府協(xié)商。針對動遷村民使用的違規(guī)、拖、比較、強調(diào)“弱者”身份的討價還價策略,鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府選擇逐個擊破、磨、攀關(guān)系、誘民動遷、開口子、拔釘子的策略與動遷村民談判。行動者的策略行動導(dǎo)致鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府、上級政府和動遷村民圍繞征地拆遷重構(gòu)權(quán)力關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the promotion of urbanization and industrialization, the industrial structure, area and population size of the suburban villages and towns are close to the size of a small city, and there are great differences with the general towns. The strategic behavior of the rural township government, which is caused by the contradictions of the organization structure, the allocation of power and responsibility and the public service, is also more prominent than the general township. Especially in the action of land expropriation and demolition, which involves the key financial revenue sources of the township government, the township government has shown a more rich and more complex strategic action. The previous research has paid attention to the strategy behavior of the interaction between the township government and the higher government and the moving villagers, but the strategy of the township government overstepping the bureaucratic structure is simplified as a method. The strategy of the interaction between the township government and the moving villagers is simply attributable to the self-interest of the land finance and the undefined land property, and the complex and complex mechanism of the township government's hidden operation has been neglected. In the study of town government land expropriation and demolition strategy logic, it tries to explore the following questions from the actor's point of view: what are the structural constraints faced by the suburban township government in the land expropriation and demolition operations? What are the key resources it gets in the structure? What is its free room? What strategy it takes under the structure system and the higher government and the moving village under the structure system What is the complex mechanism of the operation of the township government? The organizational decision analysis used in this study emphasizes that although the rules of the bureaucratic organization have restrictive effects on the actors, the actors can always obtain uncertainty in the structure, control the indeterminacy fields that affect the organization's operation, and retain certain free leeway for themselves. The activist is weighing the influence of the organization environment, the possible consequences of its own decision, and after the other actors may make decisions, it will be formulated and adjusted according to their own free space and ability to act, so that the change of the rules of the game will be beneficial to the development of its own direction. The field survey of the land expropriation and demolition practice in G Town, Baoshan District, has been carried out by the observation method, the depth interview method and the expansion of the case law. The four analytical tools of the organizational environment, action ability, free space and strategy selection are used to study the strategic logic of the land expropriation and demolition of the rural township government. The demolition strategy is formed in the game of land expropriation and demolition. Land expropriation and demolition are closely linked to the governments of higher authorities, township governments and moving villagers, and they are highly dependent on each other in decision making, forming a kind of negotiation, negotiation, bargaining, competition and cooperation among the actors, and the.G government of conflict and compromise is transferred to the industrial structure. The policy of land expropriation and local regulation, but also by the role conflict within the government and the limitation of financial difficulties. However, the township government has never been a passive recipient of structural constraints. It has found opportunities in the environment and controlled the uncertain fields that can affect the higher government and the moving villagers, forming a fuzzy information and the formation of information. The free space of joint responsibility, policy interpretation and implementation. The possession of these freedoms means that the township government and the higher government, the moving villagers have formed an unequal power relationship, and obtain the consultative ability to occupy a profit advantage in it. In order to gain greater power and interest space in the power relationship, the township government wants to On the basis of the possible response of the higher government and the moving villagers to its actions, Fang took different strategies to negotiate with the higher government and the moving villagers on the basis of the possible response to the actions of the higher government and the moving villagers. The township government takes policy reproduction, the township government adopts policy reproduction, agreement migration, project mobilization, and the strategy of pressure transfer with the higher government. The strategic action of the actors led to the township government, the higher authorities and the relocation villagers to reconstruct the power relationship around the land acquisition and demolition.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D630.1
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本文編號：1779501