本文關(guān)鍵詞： 中央政策 執(zhí)行阻滯 地方利益 利益博弈　出處：《安徽大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來,我國在經(jīng)濟、政治等各方面都取得了重大成就,這與公共政策的正確制定和有效實施是分不開的。但是,政策的制定到政策的有效實施及政策目標(biāo)的實現(xiàn)之間還有一段相當(dāng)長的距離,政策在貫徹落實的過程中往往會出現(xiàn)“有令不行、有禁不止”,“上有政策、下有對策”等政策執(zhí)行阻滯,導(dǎo)致政策目標(biāo)難以實現(xiàn)、中央的宏觀調(diào)控難以落實、損害了公共利益,也削弱了黨和政府的權(quán)威性。如何治理中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯是公共政策研究中的重要問題。影響政策實施效果的因素是多方面的,包括政策本身的質(zhì)量(如政策的完備性、科學(xué)性、可行性等)、政策執(zhí)行主體、政策目標(biāo)群體、政策資源、政策執(zhí)行環(huán)境等。筆者認(rèn)為政策執(zhí)行主體是影響政策有效實施的最重要因素。計劃經(jīng)濟體制向市場經(jīng)濟體制的轉(zhuǎn)型促使人們利益意識覺醒,非制度化的放權(quán)讓利擴大了地方政府的自主權(quán),地方政府日益成為獨立的行為主體和利益主體,地方利益顯性化并日益膨脹。地方利益對于推進地方經(jīng)濟社會快速發(fā)展起到了積極的作用,但是過度追求地方利益就會導(dǎo)致地方保護主義、“短視效應(yīng)”等現(xiàn)象。受逐利動機的驅(qū)使,在中央政策的執(zhí)行過程中,當(dāng)中央政策與地方利益沖突時,地方政府就會變通執(zhí)行,導(dǎo)致中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯。本文運用利益分析法和博弈分析法,以地方政府和中央政府作為行為主體對中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯現(xiàn)象進行研究,探析問題產(chǎn)生的原因,并試圖提出治理中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯的對策。論文分為五章,主要內(nèi)容如下：第一章：緒論。首先介紹了本文的選題背景、梳理了國內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界相關(guān)研究綜述,接著介紹了本文的研究思路與研究方法,最后介紹論文的主要內(nèi)容與結(jié)構(gòu)安排。第二章：中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯的主要表現(xiàn)形式及其危害性。首先介紹了政策執(zhí)行的概念及其在政策運行過程中的地位和重要作用,然后結(jié)合實踐中存在的事例分析中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯的表現(xiàn)形式及其危害。第三章：利益博弈視角下的中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯。首先界定利益及博弈的概念和內(nèi)涵,然后選取地方政府和中央政府作為博弈主體,分析地方政府與中央政府之間的利益博弈和地方政府間的利益博弈。第四章：中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯產(chǎn)生的原因分析。中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯產(chǎn)生的根本原因是地方政府的自利性,而地方利益消極作用的發(fā)揮在很多情況下是現(xiàn)行體制不健全和制度供給缺失使然。第五章：治理中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯的基本對策。本章結(jié)合前面的原因分析提出幾點治理中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯的基本對策。治理中央政策執(zhí)行阻滯首先應(yīng)該對不同利益主體間的利益進行整合,促進合作博弈；同時,應(yīng)健全職能配置,合理分配中央和地方利益,做到責(zé)權(quán)利相一致,減少利益沖突；再次,應(yīng)完善制度,優(yōu)化博弈規(guī)則,限制地方利益消極作用的發(fā)揮；最后應(yīng)培育執(zhí)行文化,弱化地方政府的逐利動機。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China has made great achievements in economy, politics and so on, which is inseparable from the correct formulation and effective implementation of public policy. There is still a long distance between the formulation of policies and the effective implementation of policies and the realization of policy objectives. The implementation of policies such as countermeasures has been blocked, which has led to the difficulty of achieving the policy objectives, and the difficulty of implementing the central macro-control and control, thus harming the public interests. It also weakens the authority of the Party and the government. How to manage the block of central policy implementation is an important issue in the public policy research. The factors that affect the effect of policy implementation are various. Including the quality of the policy itself (such as policy completeness, science, feasibility and so on), policy implementation of the main body, policy target groups, policy resources. The author thinks that the main body of policy implementation is the most important factor that affects the effective implementation of policy. The transition from planned economy system to market economy system promotes people's interest awareness. The non-institutionalized devolution of power has enlarged the autonomy of local government, which has become an independent subject of action and interest. Local interests are becoming dominant and expanding day by day. Local interests have played a positive role in promoting the rapid development of local economy and society, but excessive pursuit of local interests will lead to local protectionism. The phenomenon of "short-sighted effect" is driven by the motive of banishing interest. In the process of implementing the central policy, when the central policy conflicts with the local interests, the local government will carry out the policy adaptively. This paper uses interest analysis and game analysis to study the phenomenon of central policy execution block with local government and central government as the main body to explore the causes of the problems. The paper is divided into five chapters, the main content is as follows: chapter one: introduction. First, introduced the background of this paper, combed the domestic and foreign academic circles related research summary. Then it introduces the research ideas and methods of this paper. Finally, the main contents and structure of the thesis are introduced. Chapter two:. The main forms of the central policy execution block and its harmfulness. Firstly, the concept of policy implementation and its position and important role in the process of policy operation are introduced. Then it analyzes the manifestation and harm of the central policy execution block in the light of practical examples. Chapter three: the central policy execution block from the perspective of interest game. Firstly, define the concept and connotation of interest and game. Then choose the local government and the central government as the main game. Analysis of the interest game between the local government and the central government and the interest game between the local government. Chapter 4th:. The root cause of the central policy execution block is the self-interest of the local government. In many cases, the negative effects of local interests are caused by the unsound system and the lack of institutional supply. Chapter 5th:. In this chapter, the author puts forward some basic countermeasures for managing the block of central policy implementation in combination with the reasons mentioned above. First of all, the management of central policy execution block should be directed against the different interest parties in the first place. The interests are integrated. Promoting cooperative game; At the same time, the allocation of functions should be improved, the central and local interests should be allocated rationally, the responsibility and rights should be consistent, and the conflicts of interests should be reduced. Thirdly, we should perfect the system, optimize the game rules and limit the negative effects of local interests. Finally, the executive culture should be cultivated and the local government's motive of pursuing profit should be weakened.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D630

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