本文關(guān)鍵詞：考慮決策者行為因素的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：近年來,隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)的飛速發(fā)展,越來越多的傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)選擇開設(shè)網(wǎng)上直銷渠道來直接參與市場銷售,這就形成了傳統(tǒng)零售渠道與網(wǎng)上直銷渠道共存的混合營銷模式。這種模式大大加劇了市場競爭,使得供應(yīng)鏈變得愈加脆弱和充滿不確定性。同時,越來越多的實驗和觀察發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)理人在制定決策時,不僅僅關(guān)注自身收益最大化,而是考慮公平、風(fēng)險偏好等因素的效用最大化。因此,本文基于雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的背景設(shè)置,運用優(yōu)化理論、博弈理論等研究了決策者的公平關(guān)切行為、風(fēng)險規(guī)避行為等對廣告策略、定價策略以及渠道選擇策略的影響。首先,與現(xiàn)有大多文獻(xiàn)假設(shè)制造商是市場主導(dǎo)者不同,論文假設(shè)零售商是市場競爭主導(dǎo)者,制造商是跟隨者且采取雙渠道營銷策略。同時假設(shè)雙方均具有公平關(guān)切行為,兩方進(jìn)行合作廣告的策略問題。以制造商和零售商都沒有公平關(guān)切行為為基準(zhǔn),研究了雙方均有公平關(guān)切行為和只有一方有公平關(guān)切行為等多種情形。分析結(jié)果表明制造商、零售商的公平關(guān)切行為對廣告投入水平、合作比例以及雙方利潤都有顯著影響。數(shù)值實驗進(jìn)一步顯示了供應(yīng)鏈上相關(guān)成員的公平關(guān)切程度對利潤的影響程度。進(jìn)一步,考慮到市場需求的不確定性以及零售商的風(fēng)險承受能力,論文還研究了一條由具有風(fēng)險中性特征的制造商和一個具有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特征的零售商組成的二級供應(yīng)鏈,Stackelberg博弈的主導(dǎo)者是制造商,并采用CVaR方法來測量零售商的風(fēng)險。分別考慮了制造商僅采用傳統(tǒng)零售渠道分銷產(chǎn)品以及采用雙渠道分銷產(chǎn)品兩種經(jīng)營策略。研究了零售商風(fēng)險規(guī)避態(tài)度和市場波動程度對供應(yīng)鏈成員各自利潤以及整個渠道利潤的影響,并對兩種策略下各自利潤進(jìn)行了對比分析。最后,采用收益共享契約協(xié)調(diào)了雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈并使成員利潤達(dá)到帕累托最優(yōu)。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of Internet technology, more and more traditional enterprises choose to open online direct marketing channels to directly participate in market sales. This has formed the traditional retail channel and the online direct marketing channel coexistence of the mixed marketing model, this model greatly intensifies the market competition, makes the supply chain become more fragile and full of uncertainty. At the same time. More and more experiments and observations have found that when managers make decisions, they not only focus on maximizing their own income, but also consider the utility maximization of factors such as fairness, risk preference and so on. Based on the background setting of dual-channel supply chain, this paper uses optimization theory and game theory to study the fair concern behavior, risk aversion behavior and other advertising strategies of decision-makers. The influence of pricing strategy and channel selection strategy. First of all, the paper assumes that the retailer is the market competition leader, which is different from most existing literature hypothesis that the manufacturer is the market leader. The manufacturer is a follower and adopts a double-channel marketing strategy. At the same time, assuming that both sides have fair concern behavior, the strategic problem of the two sides carrying out cooperative advertising is based on the fact that neither manufacturer nor retailer has fair concern behavior. The analysis results show that the fair concern behavior of manufacturers and retailers to the level of advertising investment. Both the proportion of cooperation and the profit of both sides have significant influence. The numerical experiments further show the degree of concern of the relevant members of the supply chain on the profit. Considering the uncertainty of market demand and the risk tolerance of retailers, this paper also studies a two-level supply chain composed of risk-neutral manufacturers and a retailer with risk-averse characteristics. The dominant player in the Stackelberg game is the manufacturer. The CVaR method is used to measure the risk of retailers. Two strategies are considered: the manufacturers only use traditional retail channels to distribute products and the two channels are used to distribute products. The risk-averse attitude of retailers is studied. And the influence of market volatility on the profit of supply chain members and the profit of the whole channel. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is used to coordinate the two-channel supply chain and make the member profit reach Pareto optimal.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：1419952