發(fā)布時間：2018-03-10 00:34

  本文選題：任職期限　切入點：激勵　出處：《財經(jīng)研究》2006年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：領導任職期限制度能激勵個人在管理技能培養(yǎng)上進行投入,這有利于增加社會總剩余;然而,任職期限制度在提供激勵的同時,也造成了潛在效率的損失。領導任職期限的設置是這二者之間權衡的結果。文章通過一個兩階段博弈的分析框架,利用動態(tài)的局部均衡權衡模型,從個人收益最大化和社會總剩余最大化的相互作用中,推導出了社會最優(yōu)的領導任職期限。在此動態(tài)的局部均衡權衡模型中,個人投入水平是任職期限制度的內生產(chǎn)物。
[Abstract]:The leadership tenure system can encourage individuals to invest in the development of management skills, which helps to increase the total surplus of society; however, the tenure system provides incentives at the same time, The setting of leadership term is the result of the tradeoff between the two. This paper uses a two-stage game analysis framework to use the dynamic local equilibrium trade-off model. From the interaction between the maximization of personal income and the maximization of total social surplus, the author deduces the social optimal term of leadership, and in this dynamic partial equilibrium trade-off model, the level of personal input is the endogenous product of the tenure system.
【作者單位】： 復旦大學管理學院 復旦大學管理學院
【分類號】：C933
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本文編號：1591006