【摘要】：以我國上市公司2006-2012年的財務(wù)困境和非財務(wù)困境公司的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,通過考察財務(wù)困境與超額薪酬及薪酬業(yè)績敏感性之間的關(guān)系,驗證政府補(bǔ)貼對財務(wù)困境與超額薪酬及薪酬業(yè)績敏感性間的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),政府補(bǔ)貼正向調(diào)節(jié)了財務(wù)困境與超額薪酬及薪酬業(yè)績敏感性之間的關(guān)系,政府補(bǔ)貼是管理者攫取超額薪酬的途徑之一,并改變了財務(wù)困境上市公司薪酬與業(yè)績之間的敏感性。研究顯示,政府補(bǔ)貼會改變財務(wù)困境對超額薪酬的抑制作用機(jī)制,降低薪酬契約的激勵效應(yīng),這為我國進(jìn)一步完善薪酬契約和合理配置政府補(bǔ)貼提供了新的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Taking the data of financial distress and non-financial distress companies of listed companies in China from 2006 to 2012 as a sample, this paper examines the relationship between financial distress and excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation and performance by examining the relationship between financial distress and excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation performance. To verify the moderating effect of government subsidies on financial distress, excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation performance. The results show that government subsidy positively regulates the relationship between financial distress and excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation performance. Government subsidy is one of the ways for managers to grab excess compensation. And changed the financial distress of listed companies between compensation and performance sensitivity. The research shows that government subsidy can change the mechanism of restraining financial distress on excess salary and reduce the incentive effect of salary contract, which provides new empirical evidence for the further improvement of salary contract and reasonable allocation of government subsidy in China.
【作者單位】： 華東師范大學(xué)商學(xué)院;安徽建筑大學(xué)發(fā)展規(guī)劃處;
【基金】：教育部人文社會科學(xué)研究一般項目“公平偏好;參照點效應(yīng)與國企高管薪酬研究”(15YJC630087) 安徽省人文社會科學(xué)研究項目重點課題“外部治理;參照點效應(yīng)與高管薪酬研究——來自行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究”(Sk2015A300)
【分類號】：F275;F272.92;F812.45

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