【摘要】：自我國改革開放以來,財(cái)政的縱向分權(quán)導(dǎo)致了地方政府的橫向競爭,其模式從財(cái)政包干制的轄區(qū)割據(jù)的地方保護(hù)主義模式轉(zhuǎn)化為爭奪稅基的“競”模式。為了進(jìn)一步探討財(cái)政分權(quán)縱向演化引發(fā)的地方政府橫向競爭變化的機(jī)制,我們借助企業(yè)所得稅這一資本大稅種,觀測1994年分稅制后企業(yè)所得稅稅制集權(quán)調(diào)整,對地方政府利用企業(yè)所得稅進(jìn)行稅收競爭行為的變化。 本文采用1998-2012年的省級面板數(shù)據(jù),利用空間權(quán)重和系統(tǒng)GMM動態(tài)計(jì)量方法,對地方政府間企業(yè)所得稅稅負(fù)反應(yīng)函數(shù)的變化進(jìn)行識別。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),我國省級政府利用企業(yè)所得稅進(jìn)行的稅收競爭程度,在分稅制后的4次企業(yè)所得稅集權(quán)改革時點(diǎn)上均有下降。2002年源于企業(yè)所得稅收入分成和征管權(quán)的向上集中,2006年源于“新辦企業(yè)”的新定義對企業(yè)所得稅稅收優(yōu)惠的限制。2008年兩稅合并造成的整體企業(yè)所得稅理論上稅負(fù)的下降,以及對稅收優(yōu)惠和征管的統(tǒng)一規(guī)范,對地方政府的稅收競爭行為影響程度最高。直到2009年企業(yè)所得稅的征收權(quán)略微下放,地方政府間的稅收競爭程度停止下降。 本文也對東、中、西部進(jìn)行了同樣的檢驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)東、中、西部省份都存在著明顯的稅收競爭行為。對于東部省份,在2006、2008、2009年的企業(yè)所得稅稅負(fù)反應(yīng)函數(shù)并未受到企業(yè)所得稅稅制調(diào)整的影響。中部省份的企業(yè)所得稅稅收競爭行為則在歷次企業(yè)所得稅改革中受到最大的沖擊。而西部省份的稅負(fù)反應(yīng)函數(shù)則反應(yīng)最弱。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up in China, the vertical decentralization of finance has led to horizontal competition among local governments, and its mode has changed from the mode of local protectionism which is divided by fiscal contracting and dry system into the mode of "competition" for the tax base. In order to further explore the mechanism of horizontal competition changes of local governments caused by the vertical evolution of fiscal decentralization, we observe the centralized adjustment of enterprise income tax system after 1994, with the aid of enterprise income tax, a large capital tax category. To the local government use enterprise income tax to carry on the tax revenue competition behavior change. Based on the provincial panel data from 1998 to 2012, the spatial weight and the system GMM dynamic measurement method are used to identify the changes of the income tax response function of the local government. We find that the degree of tax competition of provincial governments using enterprise income tax has declined at four times after the tax-sharing reform. In 2002, it originated from the share of income from enterprise income tax and the upward concentration of the right of collection and management. In 2006, the new definition of "new enterprise" restricted the tax preference of enterprise income tax. In 2008, the overall corporate income tax burden dropped due to the merger of two taxes, as well as the unified regulation of tax preference and tax collection. It has the highest influence on the tax competition behavior of local government. Until 2009, when corporate income tax was slightly devolved, tax competition among local governments stopped falling. This article also carries on the same test to the east, the middle and the west, and finds that the east, the middle and the western provinces all have obvious tax competition behavior. For the eastern provinces, in 2006 and 2008, the corporate income tax response function in 2009 was not affected by the adjustment of the corporate income tax system. The competition behavior of enterprise income tax in the central province is the biggest impact in the previous enterprise income tax reform. The tax response function in the western provinces is the weakest.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.42

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