【摘要】：財(cái)政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付是中國(guó)現(xiàn)行中央對(duì)地方財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付體系中一種占有較大比重的轉(zhuǎn)移支付形式，是實(shí)現(xiàn)公共服務(wù)均等化和彌補(bǔ)財(cái)政失衡的重要政策工具。由于中國(guó)現(xiàn)行的財(cái)稅體制和中央對(duì)地方財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度還不完善，，因此在財(cái)政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付的過(guò)程中，中央政府和地方政府由于目標(biāo)函數(shù)的差異，存在動(dòng)態(tài)的合作博弈行為。在博弈中，中央基于財(cái)政體制慣性與現(xiàn)狀、全國(guó)性公共產(chǎn)品供給和引導(dǎo)地方對(duì)于公共問(wèn)題治理等基本邏輯，向地方政府撥付財(cái)政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付；而地方基于財(cái)政資源不足、官員晉升以及博弈長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益的邏輯，想方設(shè)法獲取中央財(cái)政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付。在博弈過(guò)程截面上看，中央運(yùn)用轉(zhuǎn)移支付政策法規(guī)、配套資金支付時(shí)間前置和財(cái)政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付資金監(jiān)管等策略來(lái)調(diào)動(dòng)地方財(cái)政的積極性實(shí)現(xiàn)中央的政策目標(biāo)，地方政府利用舉債、空轉(zhuǎn)以及虛假申報(bào)和配套等策略來(lái)籌措配套資金獲取中央的財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付，彌補(bǔ)地方財(cái)政缺口。財(cái)政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付過(guò)程的博弈在一定程度上提升了公共產(chǎn)品的供給水平，也派生出財(cái)政資源替代效應(yīng)、財(cái)政橫向失衡、擾亂地方在財(cái)政支出自主性，衍生出一些腐敗行為。
[Abstract]:Fiscal transfer payment is an important policy tool to realize the equalization of public services and to make up for the imbalance of public finance, which is a form of transfer payment with a large proportion in the current financial transfer payment system between the central government and the local government. Since China's current fiscal and taxation system and the central-to-local fiscal transfer payment system are still not perfect, in the process of fiscal matching transfer payment, the central government and the local government have different objective functions. There is dynamic cooperative game behavior. In the game, the central government, based on the inertia and current situation of the financial system, the supply of national public goods and the basic logic of guiding the local government to deal with public problems, allocates the fiscal matching transfer payment to the local government, while the local government is short of financial resources. Officials' promotion and the logic of game long-term interests, try to obtain the central finance supporting transfer payment. In the cross-section of the game process, the central government uses the policies and regulations of transfer payment, the supporting fund payment time leading and the financial supporting transfer payment fund supervision to mobilize the enthusiasm of local finance to achieve the central policy goal. The local government makes use of the strategies of borrowing, idling, false declaration and matching to raise the supporting funds to obtain the central financial transfer payment and make up for the gap of the local finance. The game of fiscal matching transfer payment improves the supply level of public goods to a certain extent, and also derives the substitution effect of financial resources, the horizontal imbalance of finance, disrupts the autonomy of local fiscal expenditure, and gives rise to some corrupt behaviors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南昌大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45

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