本文選題：地方政府債務(wù) + 縱向博弈��； 參考：《當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)》2017年05期

【摘要】：本文以中央與地方間的縱向博弈和地方政府間的橫向競爭為理論框架,分析了地方政府舉借債務(wù)的動因,基于空間面板模型的實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,信息不對稱使中央政府對于地方政府的舉債行為并沒有形成強(qiáng)力有效的約束,而地方政府間的橫向競爭則進(jìn)一步加劇了債務(wù)規(guī)模的擴(kuò)張。同時,地方政府舉借債務(wù)也存在財政分權(quán)的體制因素,這集中體現(xiàn)在其舉債規(guī)模與財力狀況相關(guān),而不同財力構(gòu)成對于舉債規(guī)模影響存在異質(zhì)性:一般公共財力是正向影響,而政府性基金財力則是負(fù)向影響,顯示出地方政府主動舉債和被動舉債是同時存在的。上述論斷為地方政府舉債融資的管控治理提供了一定的啟示。
[Abstract]:Based on the vertical game between central and local governments and the horizontal competition between local governments, this paper analyzes the motivation of borrowing debt by local governments. The empirical results based on spatial panel model show that, Asymmetric information makes the central government do not form a strong and effective constraint on the borrowing behavior of local governments, and the horizontal competition between local governments further intensifies the expansion of debt scale. At the same time, there are institutional factors of fiscal decentralization in borrowing debt of local governments, which is mainly reflected in the fact that the scale of borrowing is related to the financial situation, and the influence of different financial structure on the scale of borrowing is heterogeneity: the general public finance is a positive impact. However, the financial resources of government funds have a negative impact, showing that local governments' active borrowing and passive borrowing exist at the same time. The above conclusion for the local government debt management and management of debt to provide some inspiration.
【作者單位】： 青島理工大學(xué)經(jīng)貿(mào)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社科基金一般項(xiàng)目“分類限額管理下地方政府債務(wù)防風(fēng)險與穩(wěn)增長的平衡協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制研究”(17BJY169)
【分類號】：F812.5

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本文編號：2017417