歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī):最優(yōu)貨幣區(qū)理論再思考與實(shí)證
本文選題:歐元區(qū) + 主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)。 參考:《上海社會(huì)科學(xué)院》2014年博士論文
【摘要】:歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)似乎成了歐元研究的分水嶺。危機(jī)爆發(fā)之前,學(xué)者們將歐元區(qū)作為最優(yōu)貨幣區(qū)理論的最佳實(shí)踐結(jié)果,通過其運(yùn)行數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)說明單一貨幣對(duì)貨幣區(qū)的促進(jìn)作用。然而,危機(jī)爆發(fā)后,對(duì)歐元區(qū)的悲觀態(tài)度幾乎立即取代了之前的樂觀態(tài)度。認(rèn)為歐元的實(shí)驗(yàn)已宣告失敗,歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)間難以彌合的經(jīng)濟(jì)差距會(huì)使歐元區(qū)最終走向解體,認(rèn)為歐盟已衰落的觀點(diǎn)比比皆是。 實(shí)際上,主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)并沒有能夠阻止歐元區(qū)的擴(kuò)大進(jìn)程,愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞分別在危機(jī)中和危機(jī)平息后加入歐元區(qū),立陶宛則計(jì)劃于2015年加入?梢,歐元區(qū)的吸引力并沒有因債務(wù)危機(jī)而明顯下降。 那么,應(yīng)該如何客觀的理解歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)對(duì)歐元區(qū)的影響,歐元區(qū)在今后的運(yùn)行中又如何維持平穩(wěn)運(yùn)行,歐元區(qū)的發(fā)展前景如何,本文將圍繞這些問題展開研究。本文認(rèn)為,應(yīng)將歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)置于歐洲一體化的進(jìn)程中考慮,而債務(wù)危機(jī)的本質(zhì)應(yīng)從最優(yōu)貨幣區(qū)理論的深度去探索。 本文首先通過對(duì)最優(yōu)貨幣區(qū)理論的梳理,和歐元同最優(yōu)貨幣區(qū)理論關(guān)系的分析,得出單一貨幣區(qū)收益大于成本的條件,即貨幣區(qū)穩(wěn)定運(yùn)行的條件,是要么成員國(guó)間經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)稱以減少不對(duì)稱沖擊,要么建立緩沖機(jī)制以完成必要的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)整進(jìn)而應(yīng)對(duì)不對(duì)稱沖擊。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文對(duì)歐元區(qū)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)進(jìn)行回顧,指出債務(wù)危機(jī)的本質(zhì)是主權(quán)國(guó)家組成的單一貨幣區(qū)沒有滿足上述成本大于收益的條件,經(jīng)濟(jì)趨同性不足導(dǎo)致歐元區(qū)遭受不對(duì)稱沖擊,勞動(dòng)力流動(dòng)有限和缺乏財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移使其無(wú)法完成宏觀調(diào)整,導(dǎo)致債務(wù)危機(jī)不斷蔓延和升級(jí)。接下來(lái)的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)從內(nèi)生性趨同效應(yīng)的角度驗(yàn)證了趨同性不足的判斷。作為趨同性不足的后果,本文隨后分析了不對(duì)稱沖擊對(duì)歐元區(qū)運(yùn)行的影響,并運(yùn)用VAR模型對(duì)金融危機(jī)給歐元區(qū)造成的不對(duì)稱沖擊進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),分析了外部沖擊下成員國(guó)不對(duì)稱反應(yīng)導(dǎo)致貨幣區(qū)運(yùn)行成本放大并陷入危機(jī)的機(jī)理。最后,通過對(duì)財(cái)政一體化和銀行業(yè)聯(lián)盟的分析,本文指出歐盟進(jìn)行的政策調(diào)整有利于歐元區(qū)的平穩(wěn)運(yùn)行,在改革驅(qū)動(dòng)和內(nèi)生趨同的共同作用下,隨著歐元區(qū)不斷靠近最優(yōu)貨幣區(qū)的目標(biāo),其運(yùn)行成本會(huì)下降。
[Abstract]:The euro zone sovereign debt crisis seems to be a watershed in euro research. Prior to the crisis, scholars used the euro zone as the best practice of the theory of optimal currency areas, using its data to illustrate the contribution of the single currency to the currency area. After the crisis, however, pessimism about the euro zone almost immediately replaced previous optimism. Views abound that the euro's experiment has failed and that the unbridled economic gap among euro zone members will eventually lead to a break-up of the euro zone. In fact, the sovereign debt crisis did not stop the euro zone from expanding, with Estonia and Latvia joining the euro zone in the middle of the crisis and after the crisis subsided, while Lithuania plans to join in 2015. Clearly, the euro zone's attractiveness has not been significantly reduced by the debt crisis. So, how to objectively understand the impact of the euro zone sovereign debt crisis on the euro zone, how to maintain a smooth operation of the euro zone in the future, and what the future of the euro zone development prospects, this paper will focus on these issues. This paper holds that the euro zone sovereign debt crisis should be considered in the process of European integration, and the nature of the debt crisis should be explored from the depth of the optimal currency area theory. Firstly, by combing the theory of the optimal currency area and analyzing the relationship between the euro and the theory of the optimal currency area, the paper obtains the condition that the profit of the single currency area is greater than the cost, that is, the condition of the stable operation of the currency area. It is either economic symmetry among member countries to reduce asymmetric shocks, or a buffer mechanism to complete the necessary macroeconomic adjustment to deal with asymmetric shocks. On this basis, this paper reviews the euro zone sovereign debt crisis, and points out that the essence of the debt crisis is that the single currency area composed of sovereign countries does not meet the above conditions that the cost is greater than the benefit. The lack of economic convergence has caused asymmetric shocks to the euro zone, limited labour flows and a lack of fiscal transfers have prevented it from completing macroeconomic adjustments, leading to the spread and escalation of the debt crisis. The next empirical test from the point of view of endogenous convergence effect to verify the lack of convergence judgment. As a consequence of the lack of convergence, this paper then analyzes the impact of asymmetric shocks on the operation of the euro zone, and uses the VAR model to empirically test the asymmetric impact of the financial crisis on the euro zone. This paper analyzes the mechanism of asymmetric reaction of member countries under external shock, which results in the enlargement of operation cost of currency area and the crisis. Finally, through the analysis of fiscal integration and banking union, this paper points out that the policy adjustment carried out by the European Union is conducive to the smooth operation of the euro zone, under the joint role of reform drive and endogenous convergence. As the euro zone moves closer to the goal of an optimal currency area, its operating costs will fall.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:上海社會(huì)科學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F815
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