發(fā)布時間：2018-04-29 14:54

  本文選題：土地所有權(quán) + 權(quán)力分配　； 參考：《財政研究》2015年03期

【摘要】：我們構(gòu)造了一個動態(tài)博弈模型對封建史上農(nóng)民的稅負(fù)進(jìn)行了研究。研究表明,在土地等生產(chǎn)要素和公權(quán)力為封建統(tǒng)治集團(tuán)壟斷下,均衡條件下,封建統(tǒng)治者的最優(yōu)稅負(fù)僅給農(nóng)民以保留效用。如遭遇重大自然災(zāi)害,農(nóng)民連保留效用都得不到,只能揭竿而起。研究還為中國封建史上周期性的王朝改朝換代、王朝更替總伴隨著周期性的農(nóng)民暴動、農(nóng)民暴動往往和重大自然災(zāi)害在時間上重舍等現(xiàn)象提供了一個理論的詮釋,為儒學(xué)的"民本"思想提供了一個合理的解釋。我們的研究對于設(shè)定當(dāng)前合理的宏觀稅負(fù)水平提供了可資借鑒的政策含義。
[Abstract]:We construct a dynamic game model to study the tax burden of farmers in feudal history. The study shows that under the monopoly of feudal ruling group such as land and public power, the optimal tax burden of feudal rulers can only be reserved for farmers. Such as major natural disasters, farmers can not even retain utility, can only rise up. The study also provides a theoretical explanation for the periodic dynasty change in the feudal history of China, which is accompanied by periodic peasant riots, peasant riots and major natural disasters in time. It provides a reasonable explanation for the thought of "people first" in Confucianism. Our research provides the policy implications for setting a reasonable macro tax burden.
【作者單位】： 中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院;廣西財經(jīng)學(xué)院;
【分類號】：F812.9
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本文編號：1820410