本文選題：政府補(bǔ)貼 + 研發(fā)投入��； 參考：《中共江蘇省委黨�！�2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：由于研發(fā)具有外溢性和高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性等特點(diǎn)，企業(yè)在研發(fā)過程中時(shí)常會(huì)遇到融資難題。政府對(duì)研發(fā)企業(yè)進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼則可以在一定程度上彌補(bǔ)企業(yè)研發(fā)資金不足的問題，從而對(duì)社會(huì)產(chǎn)生巨大收益。然而，政府資金又是有限的，單憑政府的力量顯然無法滿足整個(gè)社會(huì)的需要。因此，如何引導(dǎo)社會(huì)資金流向社會(huì)所需的研發(fā)項(xiàng)目成為了重要的研究課題。 本文認(rèn)為，政府補(bǔ)貼不僅對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入產(chǎn)生擠入或擠出，還會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)生認(rèn)證效果，從而起到向外部投資者傳遞投資信號(hào)的作用。為了準(zhǔn)確的描述政府研發(fā)補(bǔ)貼的信號(hào)效應(yīng)，深入分析背后的作用機(jī)理，本文使用信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的信號(hào)傳遞模型，在對(duì)研究項(xiàng)目分類的基礎(chǔ)上，通過設(shè)定有質(zhì)量信號(hào)的補(bǔ)貼和無質(zhì)量信號(hào)的補(bǔ)貼兩種情景，分別討論政府補(bǔ)貼與金融機(jī)構(gòu)貸款之間的相互作用過程。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果政府補(bǔ)貼僅能對(duì)項(xiàng)目做出基礎(chǔ)研究和應(yīng)用研究的區(qū)分，那么政府補(bǔ)貼的傳遞信號(hào)對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)來說就是無效的。如果政府在做出補(bǔ)貼決策之前，設(shè)置一定質(zhì)量門檻，從而向外部投資者傳遞質(zhì)量信號(hào)，那么此時(shí)的政府補(bǔ)貼就會(huì)引導(dǎo)金融機(jī)構(gòu)資金流向?qū)ι鐣?huì)有利的研發(fā)項(xiàng)目，產(chǎn)生信號(hào)效應(yīng)。 為了在經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究中對(duì)上述命題予以驗(yàn)證，本文以中國的高技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)為研究對(duì)象，使用1998~2008年的行業(yè)面板數(shù)據(jù)，運(yùn)用面板數(shù)據(jù)模型分析了政府研發(fā)補(bǔ)貼的信號(hào)效應(yīng)。行業(yè)層面的實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明，，政府研發(fā)補(bǔ)貼對(duì)企業(yè)獲得金融機(jī)構(gòu)貸款會(huì)產(chǎn)生積極作用，而且企業(yè)規(guī)模和行業(yè)技術(shù)水平均會(huì)對(duì)這種正向信號(hào)效應(yīng)產(chǎn)生積極影響，而所有權(quán)特征則會(huì)弱化信號(hào)效應(yīng)。地區(qū)層面實(shí)證研究表明，在國有企業(yè)比重較高以及市場化程度較低的地區(qū)，政府補(bǔ)貼引導(dǎo)金融機(jī)構(gòu)貸款的作用程度明顯減弱或不顯著，這說明國企改革和市場化進(jìn)程都會(huì)對(duì)本地區(qū)的資金配置效率具有重要影響。進(jìn)一步使用的面板GMM估計(jì)的檢驗(yàn)表明實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果是可靠和穩(wěn)健的。 本文的研究結(jié)論也為地方政府制定RD補(bǔ)貼政策提供了有益的參考，政府在做出補(bǔ)貼決策前，可以通過設(shè)定質(zhì)量門檻，對(duì)申請項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行篩選。經(jīng)過深入的調(diào)研和審查后，做出科學(xué)的補(bǔ)貼決策，并以公開的方式向社會(huì)傳遞信息，從而緩解企業(yè)與外部投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱問題，提高整個(gè)社會(huì)的創(chuàng)新投入和能力。
[Abstract]:Because R & D has the characteristics of spillover and high risk, enterprises often encounter financing problems in the process of R & D. The government subsidy to R & D enterprises can make up for the shortage of R & D funds to a certain extent, thus producing huge benefits to the society. However, government funds are limited, and government power alone can not meet the needs of society as a whole. Therefore, how to guide social funds to the social R & D projects has become an important research topic. This paper holds that government subsidies not only squeeze in or squeeze out the R & D input of enterprises, but also produce certification effects on enterprises, thus playing the role of transmitting investment signals to external investors. In order to accurately describe the signal effect of government R & D subsidy and analyze the mechanism behind it, this paper uses the signal transmission model in information economics to classify the research project. The interaction between government subsidies and loans from financial institutions is discussed by setting the two scenarios of subsidies with quality signals and subsidies without quality signals. It is found that if government subsidies can only distinguish between basic research and applied research, the signaling of government subsidies is ineffective for financial institutions. If the government sets a certain quality threshold before making the subsidy decision, then the government subsidy will lead the financial institutions to flow the funds to the socially beneficial R & D projects and produce signal effect. In order to verify the above proposition in the empirical study, this paper takes the high-tech industry in China as the research object, uses the industry panel data from 1998 to 2008, and analyzes the signal effect of the government R & D subsidy by using the panel data model. Empirical results at the industry level show that government R & D subsidies have a positive impact on enterprises' access to financial institutions' loans, and that both the size of enterprises and the level of industry technology will have a positive impact on this positive signal effect. Ownership features weaken the signal effect. The empirical research at the regional level shows that in the areas where the proportion of state-owned enterprises is high and the degree of marketization is low, the role of government subsidies in guiding the loans of financial institutions is obviously weakened or not significant. This shows that the state-owned enterprises reform and market-oriented process will have an important impact on the efficiency of capital allocation in the region. The further use of panel GMM estimates shows that the results of the empirical study are reliable and robust. The conclusion of this paper also provides a useful reference for local governments to formulate Rd subsidy policy. Before making subsidy decision, the government can screen the application items by setting the quality threshold. After deep investigation and examination, scientific subsidy decision is made, and information is transmitted to the society in an open way, so as to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry between enterprises and external investors, and to improve the innovation investment and ability of the whole society.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中共江蘇省委黨校
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F273.1;F812.45

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前7條

1 朱有為;徐康寧;;中國高技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)研發(fā)效率的實(shí)證研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2006年11期

2 許年行;張華;吳世農(nóng);;附加承諾具有信號(hào)傳遞效應(yīng)嗎?[J];管理世界;2008年03期

3 白俊紅;;中國的政府R&D資助有效嗎? 來自大中型工業(yè)企業(yè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(季刊);2011年04期

4 朱平芳,徐偉民;政府的科技激勵(lì)政策對(duì)大中型工業(yè)企業(yè)R&D投入及其專利產(chǎn)出的影響——上海市的實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年06期

5 解維敏;唐清泉;陸姍姍;;政府R&D資助,企業(yè)R&D支出與自主創(chuàng)新——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];金融研究;2009年06期

6 高艷慧;萬迪f ;蔡地;;政府研發(fā)補(bǔ)貼具有信號(hào)傳遞作用嗎?——基于我國高技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)面板數(shù)據(jù)的分析[J];科學(xué)學(xué)與科學(xué)技術(shù)管理;2012年01期

7 于明超;申俊喜;;區(qū)域異質(zhì)性與創(chuàng)新效率——基于隨機(jī)前沿模型的分析[J];中國軟科學(xué);2010年11期

本文編號(hào)：1813946