本文選題：財政 + 債務　； 參考：《財政部財政科學研究所》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：近幾年地方政府債務規(guī)�？焖贁U張,債務風險日益凸顯,引起各級政府、國內(nèi)外理論界、實務界以及社會公眾的高度關注,2013年中央經(jīng)濟工作會議也把化解地方政府債務風險作為2014年的重要工作。在城鎮(zhèn)化加快發(fā)展、地方政府事權不斷擴大和債務風險逐步暴露的背景下,能否建立有效的地方政府性債務風險約束機制,無論對防范風險本身還是對維持地方融資和區(qū)域經(jīng)濟增長的可持續(xù)性,都至關重要；對帶動新一輪財稅改革、跨越中等收入陷阱,保持國民經(jīng)濟健康發(fā)展和國家長治久安也具有重要的意義。 在地方政府性債務風險研究領域存在三方面不足：一是現(xiàn)有研究多基于中央和地方財權事權不對等以及地方經(jīng)濟競爭等方面揭示地方債務的成因,從地方財政可持續(xù)性視角研究地方政府性債務風險,而從風險約束視角全面系統(tǒng)地研究地方政府性債務風險的文獻不多。二是從風險約束角度研究地方債務風險的文獻,也主要集中于對外部監(jiān)督機制的研究,幾乎未涉及地方政府性債務風險的內(nèi)在約束機制。更沒有將財政約束、市場約束和民意約束納入到一個統(tǒng)一的分析框架中,探討地方政府性債務風險約束問題。三是對于防范和化解地方政府性債務風險的措施方面,現(xiàn)有文獻多移植成熟國家經(jīng)驗,強調(diào)采用市場約束機制解決中國地方政府性債務風險。但以中國為代表的轉(zhuǎn)軌國家,在短期內(nèi),大政府小市場的現(xiàn)狀難以改變、預算軟約束問題難以根除、政府破產(chǎn)機制難以構建,所以基于市場約束機制設計的地方政府性債務風險解決方案對我國的適用性不強。 當前我國正處于轉(zhuǎn)方式、調(diào)結(jié)構、加速推進新型城鎮(zhèn)化建設的關鍵時刻,面對規(guī)模龐大的地方政府性債務和日益凸顯的地方債務風險,本文力圖解決以下三個方面的問題：一是從更為宏觀的機制設計層面上,從債務規(guī)模約束角度厘清地方政府事權邊界；二是在兼顧融資可得性和債務風險約束的條件下,從增強融資主體自身的風險約束激勵出發(fā),構建融資可得性、外部監(jiān)督和風險約束之間激勵相容的地方政府融資機制；三是基于激勵相容原則,構建市場、財政和民意三重約束相結(jié)合的地方政府性債務約束框架。 本文運用歸納演繹、對比及數(shù)理分析方法,首先從對地方政府性債務管理的基本內(nèi)涵和基礎理論分析入手,剖析我國地方政府性債務風險的現(xiàn)狀及成因,并對我國地方政府性債務風險狀況做出總體評價。其次,從財政約束、市場約束和民意約束三個層面對我國地方政府性債務風險約束機制做了分析,并著重從制度層面剖析了我國地方政府性債務風險約束機制軟化的原因。第三,基于我國地方政府性債務風險的生成邏輯、發(fā)展路徑以及約束形式,提出了地方政府性債務風險約束有效性的三個標準。在此基礎上,基于地方政府目標函數(shù),構建了地方債務風險自我激勵約束理論模型,并以此作為完善我國地方政府性債務風險約束機制的理論依據(jù)。第四,從財政體制、融資模式、破產(chǎn)機制視角,對比分析主要國家地方債務風險約束機制的特點及其有效性,以期為化解我國地方政府性債務風險問題提供借鑒。最后,基于本文的理論分析框架,借鑒國外經(jīng)驗,立足于我國經(jīng)濟體制、財政體制和社會發(fā)展目標,本著通過設計激勵相容機制,增強融資主體自身風險約束動力的思路,在現(xiàn)行體制格局大體不變的前提下,提出完善我國地方政府性債務風險約束機制的政策建議。主要包括,通過設計政績考核、土地出讓金留存比例、自主發(fā)債、上級轉(zhuǎn)移支付等與地方政府性債務風險掛鉤的激勵機制,增強地方政府償債意愿和風險約束的自覺性。同時,通過完善地方債風險處置機制、強化地方資本預算管理等財政措施,以及資產(chǎn)證券化等風險防范和隔離措施,作為地方政府自我風險約束的補充。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于： 一是研究視角創(chuàng)新。1)本文不僅僅局限于探討如何防范地方債務風險,而是著重從更為宏觀的機制設計層面上,研究如何從債務約束角度厘清地方政府事權邊界。2)在兼顧融資可得性和風險約束的基礎上,從增強融資主體自身的風險約束激勵出發(fā),構建融資可得性、外部監(jiān)督和風險約束之間激勵相容的地方政府融資機制,避免單一的外部約束(上級財政和金融監(jiān)管當局)的不足。3)以動力機制設計為基礎,通過必要的外部約束和市場監(jiān)管,解決地方政府性債務風險的外部性和信息不對稱性問題,并設計了地方政府性債務約束的市場、財政和民意約束三重框架。 二是研究觀點創(chuàng)新。1)在現(xiàn)行體制基礎上,基于激勵約束相容原則,提出強化預算管理、限制地方政府性債務規(guī)模、增強地方政府償債意愿、約束債務風險、完善風險處置的政策建議。2)基于理論模型的結(jié)果,本文認為要改變當前地方政府盲目追求經(jīng)濟增長目標的偏好,必須改革片面注重經(jīng)濟指標的地方政府官員考核機制；地方政府只有退出產(chǎn)出彈性較大的競爭性投資領域,才有動力增加產(chǎn)出彈性較小的經(jīng)常性投資支出,增加公共產(chǎn)品供給；削弱地方政府對土地的控制權、降低土地抵押貸款的杠桿率、削弱地方政府對土地財政的依賴,能更好地抑制地方政府投資沖動,減少地方政府性債務風險。 三是研究方法創(chuàng)新。本文采用優(yōu)化分析法剖析地方政府行為�；诩钕嗳莸臋C制設計思路,通過構建地方政府行為目標函數(shù),將財政約束、市場約束作為外生變量嵌入地方政府行為目標函數(shù),然后在此基礎上求解基于地方政府利益最大化的風險約束機制。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the scale of local government debt has expanded rapidly, and the debt risk has become increasingly prominent. It has aroused the high attention of governments at all levels, the theoretical circles at home and abroad, the practice community and the public. In 2013, the central economic work conference also took the local government debt risk as an important work in 2014. In the context of expansion and gradual exposure of debt risk, it is essential to establish an effective local government debt risk constraint mechanism, whether to prevent risk itself or to maintain the sustainability of local financing and regional economic growth, to promote a new round of fiscal and tax reform, to cross the Middle Income Trap and maintain a healthy national economy. The exhibition and the long-term stability of the country are also of great significance.
There are three shortcomings in the research field of local government debt risk: first, the existing research is based on the causes of local debt in the areas of central and local financial rights and local economic competition, and local economic competition, and the study of local government debt risk from the perspective of local financial sustainability, and from the perspective of risk constraints. There are few literature on the risk of local government debt. Two is the literature of the study of local debt risk from the perspective of risk constraints, and it is mainly focused on the study of external supervision mechanism, and it does not involve the internal constraint mechanism of local government debt risk. It has not included financial constraints, market constraints and public opinion constraints into a unified division. In the framework of the framework, we discuss the problem of local government debt risk constraints. Three is to prevent and resolve local government debt risk measures, the existing literature transplants more mature country experience, emphasizes the use of market constraint mechanism to solve the risk of local government debt in China. However, the transitional country represented by China, in the short term, the big government The current situation of small market is difficult to change, the problem of soft budget constraint is difficult to be eradicated, and the government bankruptcy mechanism is difficult to build, so the local government debt risk solution based on the market constraint mechanism is not applicable to our country.
At present, our country is in the key moment of changing the way, adjusting the structure and accelerating the construction of the new urbanization. Facing the large scale of local government debt and the increasingly prominent local debt risk, this paper tries to solve the following three problems: first, from the perspective of the debt scale restriction from the perspective of the more macro mechanism design level. The boundary of the square government's power of affairs; two, under the condition that the financing availability and debt risk constraints are taken into consideration, the local government financing mechanism, which is compatible between the financing availability, the external supervision and the risk constraints, is built on the basis of enhancing the risk constraint of the financing body itself, and the three is based on the incentive compatibility principle, and the market, finance and public opinion are constructed. A local government debt constraint framework combined with three constraints.
Based on the basic connotation and basic theory of local government debt management, this paper begins with the basic connotation and basic theory of local government debt management, analyzes the current situation and causes of local government debt risk in our country, and makes a general evaluation on the state of local government debt risk in China. Secondly, from financial constraints, market constraints and people. This paper analyzes the local government debt risk constraint mechanism in our country and analyzes the reasons for the softening of local government debt risk constraint mechanism from the institutional level. Third, based on the generation logic of local government debt risk in China, the path of development and the form of restraint, the local government debt is put forward. On the basis of the three criteria of the effectiveness of risk constraints, based on the objective function of local government, a theoretical model of local debt risk self incentive constraint is constructed, which is the theoretical basis for improving the local government debt risk constraint mechanism in China. Fourth, from the financial system, financing model, bankruptcy mechanism perspective, the main comparative analysis is made. The characteristics and effectiveness of the national debt risk constraint mechanism are expected to provide a reference for solving the problem of local government debt risk in China. Finally, based on the theoretical analysis framework of this paper, using the experience of foreign countries for reference, based on our economic system, the financial system and social development goals, and in the light of the design of incentive compatibility mechanism, the financing will be enhanced. The idea of the motive force of the subject's own risk constraint is put forward on the premise that the current system pattern is largely unchanged, and puts forward the policy suggestions to improve the local government debt risk restraint mechanism in China, mainly including the design of the performance appraisal, the proportion of Jin Liucun, the independent debt Issuance and the upper level transfer payment, which are linked to the local government debt risk. Incentive mechanism will enhance local government's willingness to pay debts and risk constraints. At the same time, through improving local debt risk disposal mechanism, strengthening local capital budget management and other financial measures, as well as asset securitization risk prevention and isolation measures, as a supplement to local government self risk constraints.
The innovation of this article lies in:
One is research perspective innovation (.1). This paper is not only limited to discuss how to guard against local debt risk, but focus on how to clarify the.2 of the local government from the perspective of debt constraint from the perspective of a more macro mechanism design. On the basis of considering the availability and risk constraints of financing, the risk of the financing body is enhanced. A local government financing mechanism, which is incentive compatible between financing availability, external supervision and risk constraints, is constructed to avoid a single external constraint (the insufficient.3 of the superior financial and financial regulatory authorities), based on the design of the dynamic mechanism, and to solve the risk of local government debt through the necessary external contracts and market regulation. The problem of partial and asymmetric information is designed, and the three framework of local government debt constraint market, financial and public opinion constraint is designed.
The two is to study view innovation.1) on the basis of the current system, based on the principle of incentive and constraint compatibility, it is proposed to strengthen the budget management, restrict the local government debt scale, strengthen the local government's debt repayment will, restrict the debt risk, and improve the risk management policy recommendations.2) based on the results of the theory model, this paper believes that the current local government is to be changed. In order to pursue the goal of economic growth, it is necessary to reform the assessment mechanism of local government officials who pay more attention to economic indicators. Only when the local government withdraws from the competitive investment field with large output elasticity, the local government can increase the regular investment expenditure with less output elasticity, increase the supply of public goods, and weaken the control of the local government on the land. It can reduce the leverage ratio of land mortgage loans and weaken the dependence of local government on land finance. It can better suppress the investment impulse of local government and reduce the risk of local government debt.
The three is the research method innovation. This article uses the optimization analysis method to analyze the local government behavior. Based on the incentive compatibility mechanism design idea, the local government behavior target function is embedded by the financial constraint and market constraint as the exogenous variable by constructing the local government behavior objective function, and then on this basis, the solution is based on the local government's benefit most. The risk constraint mechanism of maximization.

【學位授予單位】：財政部財政科學研究所
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.5

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