地方財政分權(quán)、勞動力選擇性轉(zhuǎn)移與農(nóng)村基礎教育投入
發(fā)布時間:2018-04-04 22:10
本文選題:地方財政分權(quán) 切入點:選擇性轉(zhuǎn)移 出處:《貴州財經(jīng)大學學報》2017年03期
【摘要】:在現(xiàn)行教育體制下,縣(市)級政府承擔著農(nóng)村基礎教育發(fā)展的主要責任,省以下財政分權(quán)對地方農(nóng)村基礎教育投入有重要影響;而農(nóng)村勞動力跨區(qū)域的選擇性轉(zhuǎn)移使得地方政府的農(nóng)村基礎教育投入具有強烈的外部性。運用2007年—2013年河南省108個縣(市)樣本的面板數(shù)據(jù),通過建立控制了地區(qū)效應和時間效應的雙向隨機效應模型實證檢驗地方財政分權(quán)、農(nóng)村勞動力選擇性轉(zhuǎn)移對縣(市)級政府農(nóng)村基礎教育支出的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),省以下財政分權(quán)顯著減少了地方政府農(nóng)村基礎教育支出,與此同時,農(nóng)村勞動力轉(zhuǎn)出規(guī)模越大,縣(市)級政府基礎教育支出越低。
[Abstract]:Under the current education system, the county (city) level government bears the main responsibility of the rural basic education development, and the fiscal decentralization below the province has an important influence on the local rural basic education investment.The selective transfer of rural labor force across regions makes the rural basic education input of local government have strong externality.Using the panel data of 108 counties (cities) in Henan Province from 2007 to 2013, this paper empirically tests the decentralization of local finance by establishing a two-way stochastic effect model which controls the regional effect and the time effect.The influence of selective transfer of rural labor force on rural basic education expenditure of county (city) government.The study found that fiscal decentralization under provincial level significantly reduced the expenditure on basic education in rural areas of local governments. At the same time, the larger the scale of rural labor force transfer, the lower the basic education expenditure of county (city) governments.
【作者單位】: 河南農(nóng)業(yè)大學農(nóng)業(yè)政策與農(nóng)村發(fā)展研究中心;
【基金】:河南省高等學校哲學社會科學應用研究重大項目(2017-YYZD-02) 河南省教育廳人文社科研究項目(2017-ZZJH-234) 中國博士后基金(2013M541978)
【分類號】:F249.27;F812.7;G521
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