本文選題：政府補(bǔ)助　切入點(diǎn)：高管薪酬　出處：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近些年來,上市公司高管獲取“天價(jià)薪酬”的現(xiàn)象屢屢被曝光,引起廣泛關(guān)注。最優(yōu)薪酬契約論認(rèn)為,高管薪酬的高低是和企業(yè)業(yè)績掛鉤,而且成正相關(guān)關(guān)系,所以可以有效激勵(lì)高管為公司創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。然而“窮廟富和尚”的現(xiàn)象卻已經(jīng)屢見不鮮,甚至企業(yè)業(yè)績下降高管薪酬仍然上升。眾多學(xué)者研究表明,由于內(nèi)外部監(jiān)管的缺失,高管很容易影響薪酬的制訂,攫取租金。早在2008年,國外學(xué)者研究表明高管薪酬存在粘性,即高管薪酬在企業(yè)業(yè)績上升時(shí)的邊際增長量要大于業(yè)績下降時(shí)的邊際減少量。改革開放后,我國建立了中國特色社會(huì)主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制,政府與市場之間的關(guān)系越來越緊密。政府往往通過政府補(bǔ)貼和相關(guān)政策干預(yù)企業(yè)運(yùn)行。政府補(bǔ)助的規(guī)模龐大,甚者導(dǎo)致企業(yè)扭虧為盈。政府的資金補(bǔ)貼給企業(yè)業(yè)績很大的幫助。2016年,藍(lán)思科技股份有限公司第一季度財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)顯示,除去非經(jīng)常性損益這一項(xiàng)目后歸屬于母公司凈利潤,公司虧損竟然達(dá)到了7400萬元,這個(gè)被扣除的“非經(jīng)常性損益”項(xiàng),最大的一筆為政府補(bǔ)助,總計(jì)為2.46億元。計(jì)入損益的政府補(bǔ)助作為影響企業(yè)業(yè)績的一個(gè)噪音,與經(jīng)理人的自身努力無關(guān),卻很可能在企業(yè)業(yè)績下降時(shí),被管理層操控,以增加自身利益。本文首先回顧了國內(nèi)外關(guān)于政府補(bǔ)助和高管薪酬理論的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),重點(diǎn)將研究放在政府補(bǔ)助和薪酬粘性的關(guān)系上;其次,在分析政府補(bǔ)助與薪酬的關(guān)系時(shí)提出假設(shè);運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)和回歸分析的方法,選取了2011年至2015年滬深A(yù)股上市公司為樣本,檢驗(yàn)了高管薪酬與政府補(bǔ)助的相關(guān)性是否會(huì)受到企業(yè)業(yè)績調(diào)節(jié)的影響以及高管薪酬粘性和政府補(bǔ)助之間的關(guān)系。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示:(1)公司業(yè)績下降時(shí),高管薪酬與政府補(bǔ)助的相關(guān)關(guān)系更加顯著;(2)政府補(bǔ)助與公司高管薪酬粘性正相關(guān);(3)管理層權(quán)力可以調(diào)節(jié)政府補(bǔ)助和高管薪酬粘性之間的關(guān)系。政府補(bǔ)助是與經(jīng)理人自身努力無關(guān)且影響企業(yè)利潤的一個(gè)噪音,尤其是在企業(yè)業(yè)績下降時(shí),管理層為了維持收益的穩(wěn)定,更有可能操縱政府補(bǔ)助,由此加大上市公司高管薪酬的粘性特征;同時(shí)管理層擁有企業(yè)的經(jīng)營權(quán)和部分事務(wù)的決策權(quán),政府和薪酬粘性的關(guān)系受管理層權(quán)力大小的調(diào)節(jié)。通過結(jié)果分析,本文提出試圖解決公司高管薪酬粘性和規(guī)范政府補(bǔ)助使用的建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, executives of listed companies to obtain "salary" phenomenon has been exposed, causing widespread concern. The optimal compensation contract theory, the level of executive compensation is linked to corporate performance, and positive correlation, so it can encourage executives to create value for the company. However, the "poor rich Temple monks" phenomenon is already It is often seen., even the decline in business performance of executive compensation still rise. Many scholars show that due to the lack of internal and external supervision, it is easy to affect the formulation of executive compensation, the rent. As early as 2008, foreign scholars research shows that the existence of executive compensation viscous, namely the marginal growth of executive pay rise in the amount of enterprise performance to reduce the amount of more than marginal decline in performance when. After the reform and opening up, China has established China characteristics of socialist market economy system, the relationship between the government and the market increasingly close political. The government often through government subsidies and related policy intervention in the operation of enterprise. The scale of government subsidies, what causes the enterprise profitability. Government subsidies to the enterprise performance is of great help for.2016 years, LAN Si Polytron Technologies Inc first quarter financial data, excluding non recurring gains and losses of the project after the net profit attributable to the parent company. The loss has reached 74 million yuan, the deduction of non recurring gains and losses, the largest sum of government grants, amounting to 246 million yuan. The government subsidies included in the profit and loss as a noise impact on business performance, and managers of their own efforts but not is likely to decline in corporate performance, is management control, in order to increase their interests. This paper reviews the related literature on government subsidies and compensation theory at home and abroad, will focus on research on government subsidies and compensation Viscous relations; secondly, in the analysis of the relationship between government subsidies and compensation of the proposed hypothesis; using the method of descriptive statistics and regression analysis, from 2011 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as a sample, to test whether the correlation between executive compensation and government subsidies will be subject to influence the relationship between corporate performance and executive compensation regulation viscous and government subsidies. The empirical results show that: (1) the performance of the company declined, correlation between executive compensation and government subsidies are more significant; (2) the government grants and executive compensation viscous positive correlation; (3) the management authority can regulate the relationship between government subsidies and executive compensation. The government subsidy is a viscous a noise and the manager's own efforts is irrelevant and the impact of corporate profits, especially the decline in corporate performance management, in order to maintain the stability of income, are more likely to be manipulated by government subsidies. This increases the viscous characteristics of executive compensation of listed companies; at the same time the enterprise management has the right to operate and part of the business decision-making power, the relationship between the government and the compensation stickiness is regulated by the size of the power management. Through the analysis of the results presented in this paper, trying to solve the government grants the use of the proposed company executive compensation viscous and norms.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F812.45

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