本文選題：威懾風(fēng)險(xiǎn)　切入點(diǎn)：高收入個(gè)人　出處：《南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)前我國高收入者“為富不稅”的問題非常突出,如何對(duì)其進(jìn)行有效規(guī)制已成為稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法工作急需解決的難題。本文通過問卷調(diào)查和模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)對(duì)威懾風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下高收入者的納稅遵從決策進(jìn)行了分析,并在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)面向高收入個(gè)人最優(yōu)稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法策略的實(shí)現(xiàn)路徑進(jìn)行了探索。首先,本文運(yùn)用博弈論等相關(guān)方法,對(duì)威懾風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與納稅遵從決策之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究,論證了查獲概率和處罰率與納稅遵從之間的正相關(guān)性以及二者之間的替代性；借鑒微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中均衡分析、邊際分析等方法,論證了最優(yōu)稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法策略的實(shí)現(xiàn)路徑,即在威懾執(zhí)法的基礎(chǔ)上引入對(duì)納稅人的正面激勵(lì)措施,實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲結(jié)合的“胡蘿卜加大棒”政策。其次,本文通過問卷調(diào)查分析,對(duì)可能會(huì)影響高收入者納稅遵從的征管因素(查獲概率、處罰率、誠信激勵(lì)、納稅服務(wù))進(jìn)行了對(duì)比性的檢驗(yàn),檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明,在各因素中,查獲概率和誠信激勵(lì)對(duì)高收入者納稅遵從決策有著較高的關(guān)聯(lián)性。最后,本文進(jìn)一步通過模擬實(shí)驗(yàn),比較了高收入者與中低收入者在不同稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法策略下的納稅遵從決策。對(duì)實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果的分析表明：在各稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法因素中,查獲概率對(duì)高收入者納稅遵從度的影響最為顯著,而處罰率的影響并不顯著；在各稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法策略組合中,威懾與激勵(lì)并行的執(zhí)法策略效果雖不及高查獲概率下的,但從成本-收益原則考慮,卻要優(yōu)于其它無激勵(lì)機(jī)制的策略組合。綜合理論與實(shí)證的分析,本文認(rèn)為當(dāng)前我國面向高收入個(gè)人稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法策略的選擇,就是要使稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)在有限執(zhí)法資源的約束下,通過合理運(yùn)用查獲概率、處罰率、誠信激勵(lì)、納稅服務(wù)等威懾和激勵(lì)手段,從而最大程度地促進(jìn)納稅人對(duì)稅收法律法規(guī)的遵從。若想實(shí)現(xiàn)高收入者高水平的納稅遵從,稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)不僅要提高查獲概率對(duì)其進(jìn)行執(zhí)法威懾,而且要營造良好的納稅氛圍,通過施行優(yōu)質(zhì)的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施對(duì)其進(jìn)行正面激勵(lì)。這種強(qiáng)制與激勵(lì)并行的策略選擇,將帶來更加和諧的征納關(guān)系。結(jié)合目前我國稅收?qǐng)?zhí)法機(jī)制中存在的一些問題,本文認(rèn)為應(yīng)當(dāng)從提高稅收查獲概率、優(yōu)化稅收處罰制度、重塑納稅激勵(lì)機(jī)制等方面著手,對(duì)稅收征管工作進(jìn)行改進(jìn)和完善,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)上述目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:At present, the problem of "being rich or not taxing" among the high income earners in our country is very prominent. How to regulate it effectively has become an urgent problem in tax enforcement. This paper analyzes the tax compliance decision of high income earners under the threat of deterrence by means of questionnaire survey and simulation experiment. On this basis, the realization path of the optimal tax enforcement strategy for high-income individuals is explored. Firstly, the relationship between deterrence risk and tax compliance decision is studied by using game theory and other relevant methods. This paper demonstrates the positive correlation between the probability of seizure, the rate of punishment and tax compliance, and the substitution between them, and demonstrates the way to realize the optimal tax enforcement strategy by using the methods of equilibrium analysis and marginal analysis in microeconomics. That is, on the basis of deterrent law enforcement, the introduction of positive incentives to taxpayers, the implementation of the combination of rewards and punishments "carrot and stick" policy. Secondly, this paper through questionnaire analysis, A comparative test was conducted on the factors (detection probability, penalty rate, good faith incentive, tax service) that might affect the tax compliance of high income earners. The results showed that, among the factors, The probabilities of seizure and the incentive of honesty have a high correlation to the decision of tax compliance of high income earners. Finally, through the simulation experiment, This paper compares the decision of tax compliance between the high income group and the middle and low income group under different tax enforcement strategies. The analysis of the experimental results shows that the detection probability has the most significant influence on the tax compliance of the high income group. However, the effect of penalty rate is not significant. In each combination of tax enforcement strategies, the effect of deterrence and incentive parallel law enforcement strategy is not as good as that of high probability of seizure, but it is considered from the cost-benefit principle. However, it is better than other unmotivated strategy combinations. Based on the analysis of theory and practice, this paper argues that the choice of tax enforcement strategy for high-income individuals is to make tax authorities under the constraint of limited law enforcement resources. Through reasonable use of deterrence and incentive means such as probability of seizure, penalty rate, honesty incentive, tax service and so on, taxpayers' compliance with tax laws and regulations can be promoted to the greatest extent. If we want to achieve high level of tax compliance by high income earners, Tax authorities should not only increase the probability of seizure to deter them from enforcing the law, but also create a good tax atmosphere and give them positive incentives through the implementation of high-quality incentives. Combining with some problems existing in the current tax enforcement mechanism of our country, this paper holds that we should start from the aspects of raising the probability of tax seizure, optimizing the tax punishment system, reshaping the tax incentive mechanism, and so on. Tax collection and management work to improve and improve, so as to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F812.42

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 劉軍;信息不對(duì)稱理論與稅收征管改革[J];涉外稅務(wù);1997年10期

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本文編號(hào)：1606391