品牌家紡企業(yè)多渠道選擇與協(xié)調(diào)機制研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-05 21:37
【摘要】：在全球化競爭的網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟時代,電子商務(wù)成為制造企業(yè)的發(fā)展平臺與生存方式,為中國制造企業(yè)的發(fā)展帶來了新的契機；但在傳統(tǒng)零售與網(wǎng)上直銷并存的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中,制造商既是傳統(tǒng)零售商的供應(yīng)商同時又是其直接競爭者,致使渠道沖突成為關(guān)注的焦點問題；不僅如此,電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下營銷渠道的選擇與協(xié)調(diào)又在很大程度上決定著供應(yīng)鏈的成功與否。鑒于此,本文在渠道和諧與利潤最大化的雙重要求下,以品牌家紡企業(yè)為核心,運用博弈論、運籌學、市場學及產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟學等學科的理論和方法,基于品牌家紡企業(yè)營銷渠道的特點,研究了在傳統(tǒng)零售渠道基礎(chǔ)上引入網(wǎng)上直銷渠道時,定價策略與補償激勵對營銷渠道選擇的影響；在傳統(tǒng)零售與在線直銷并存的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中,研究了如何設(shè)計合同以實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)并保證渠道成員雙贏。 本文首先從供應(yīng)鏈渠道沖突的角度出發(fā),通過對品牌家紡企業(yè)多渠道銷售模式現(xiàn)狀的掃描,引出多渠道沖突問題,并分別從定義、產(chǎn)生的原因以及應(yīng)對策略等方面綜述了國內(nèi)外學者對多渠道沖突的研究情況。接著以企業(yè)實施多渠道策略的動機為分類以及,對渠道選擇的視角進行了分類與總結(jié)。最后從價格協(xié)調(diào)策略、庫存協(xié)調(diào)策略、信息共享協(xié)調(diào)策略、縱向契約協(xié)調(diào)策略和渠道橫行協(xié)調(diào)策略五個方面對現(xiàn)有的多渠道協(xié)調(diào)策略分別進行了總結(jié)。 然后,構(gòu)建了零售商在線下零售渠道為顧客提供銷售努力,制造商補償其銷售努力投入的線上線下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模型,分析了基于銷售努力補償策略下的兩種定價權(quán)策略(零售商有線下定價權(quán)與零售商無線下定價權(quán))對供應(yīng)鏈利潤的影響。在此基礎(chǔ)上,又分析了兩階段博弈與三階段博弈(即線上線下定價的先后順序)對供應(yīng)鏈利潤的影響。通過分析發(fā)現(xiàn),在一定條件下,線上線下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)零售商與制造商收益的改進。并且總結(jié)出品牌家紡企業(yè)制造商最優(yōu)的渠道模式與策略為：兩階段博弈(即零售商在制造商確定其線上直銷價格后再制定其線下分銷價格)下,給予零售商線下渠道定價權(quán)和銷售努力進行補償?shù)木�上線下雙渠道模式。 最后,在確定了品牌家紡企業(yè)制造商最優(yōu)的渠道模式與策略的基礎(chǔ)上,通過進一步的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),銷售努力補償合同雖然能夠改善制造商與供應(yīng)鏈的利潤,但 此時零售商的利潤卻明顯下降了,導致零售商沒有動力與制造商簽訂銷售努力補償合同來優(yōu)化雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的整體效益。并在分析了導致零售商利潤下降的具體原因的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了相應(yīng)的協(xié)調(diào)策略。結(jié)果表明：銷售努力補償與線上收益共享的組合合同不能是供應(yīng)鏈達到協(xié)調(diào)；銷售努力補償與線上線下返利的組合合同在一定的條件下能夠協(xié)調(diào)并保證渠道成員雙贏；銷售努力補償與再補償?shù)慕M合合同能夠協(xié)調(diào)并保證渠道成員雙贏。
[Abstract]:In the era of global competition network economy, electronic commerce has become the development platform and survival mode of manufacturing enterprises, which brings a new opportunity for the development of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, but in the dual channel supply chain where traditional retail and online direct sales coexist, The manufacturer is not only the supplier of the traditional retailer but also its direct competitor, which causes the channel conflict to be the focus of attention. The choice and coordination of marketing channels in the environment of e-commerce determines the success of supply chain to a great extent. In view of this, under the dual requirements of channel harmony and profit maximization, this paper takes the brand home textile enterprises as the core, applies the theories and methods of game theory, operational research, market science and industrial economics, etc. Based on the characteristics of marketing channels of brand textile enterprises, this paper studies the influence of pricing strategy and compensation incentives on the choice of marketing channels when the traditional retail channels are introduced into online direct selling channels. In the dual channel supply chain in which the traditional retail and online direct sales coexist, this paper studies how to design the contract to realize the coordination of the supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of the channel members. This paper starts from the angle of supply chain channel conflict, through scanning the current situation of multi-channel sales mode of brand home textile enterprise, leads to the problem of multi-channel conflict, and defines it separately. The causes and coping strategies are reviewed in this paper. Then, it classifies and summarizes the perspective of channel selection based on the motivation of implementing multi-channel strategy. Finally, the existing multi-channel coordination strategies are summarized from five aspects: price coordination strategy, inventory coordination strategy, information sharing coordination strategy, vertical contract coordination strategy and channel horizontal coordination strategy. Then, the online and off-line supply chain model of retailers providing customers with off-line retail channels and manufacturers compensating for their investment in sales efforts is constructed. This paper analyzes the influence of two pricing power strategies (retailers' wired pricing power and retailer's wireless pricing power) on the profit of supply chain based on the compensation strategy of sales effort. On this basis, the influence of two-stage game and three-stage game (i.e. the order of online and offline pricing) on the profit of supply chain is analyzed. It is found that under certain conditions, both online and offline supply chains can improve the profit of retailers and manufacturers. And it concludes that the optimal channel mode and strategy for manufacturers of brand textile enterprises are two-stage game (that is, retailers determine their online direct selling prices before setting their off-line distribution prices). Give retailers offline pricing power and sales efforts to compensate the above-line and off-line dual-channel mode. Finally, on the basis of determining the optimal channel mode and strategy for the manufacturers of brand textile enterprises, through further research, it is found that although the contract of compensation for sales efforts can improve the profits of manufacturers and supply chains, However, the retailer's profit has declined significantly, resulting in the retailer has no incentive to sign a sales effort compensation contract with the manufacturer to optimize the overall benefits of the two-channel supply chain. On the basis of analyzing the specific reasons that lead to the decline of retailer profit, the corresponding coordination strategy is put forward. The results show that the combination contract of sales effort compensation and online revenue sharing cannot be the coordination of supply chain, the combination contract of sales effort compensation and online and offline return can coordinate and guarantee the win-win situation of channel members under certain conditions. Sales effort compensation and re-compensation of the combination of contracts can coordinate and ensure a win-win channel member.
【學位授予單位】：東華大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F426.86;F274;F224
本文編號：2254953
[Abstract]:In the era of global competition network economy, electronic commerce has become the development platform and survival mode of manufacturing enterprises, which brings a new opportunity for the development of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, but in the dual channel supply chain where traditional retail and online direct sales coexist, The manufacturer is not only the supplier of the traditional retailer but also its direct competitor, which causes the channel conflict to be the focus of attention. The choice and coordination of marketing channels in the environment of e-commerce determines the success of supply chain to a great extent. In view of this, under the dual requirements of channel harmony and profit maximization, this paper takes the brand home textile enterprises as the core, applies the theories and methods of game theory, operational research, market science and industrial economics, etc. Based on the characteristics of marketing channels of brand textile enterprises, this paper studies the influence of pricing strategy and compensation incentives on the choice of marketing channels when the traditional retail channels are introduced into online direct selling channels. In the dual channel supply chain in which the traditional retail and online direct sales coexist, this paper studies how to design the contract to realize the coordination of the supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of the channel members. This paper starts from the angle of supply chain channel conflict, through scanning the current situation of multi-channel sales mode of brand home textile enterprise, leads to the problem of multi-channel conflict, and defines it separately. The causes and coping strategies are reviewed in this paper. Then, it classifies and summarizes the perspective of channel selection based on the motivation of implementing multi-channel strategy. Finally, the existing multi-channel coordination strategies are summarized from five aspects: price coordination strategy, inventory coordination strategy, information sharing coordination strategy, vertical contract coordination strategy and channel horizontal coordination strategy. Then, the online and off-line supply chain model of retailers providing customers with off-line retail channels and manufacturers compensating for their investment in sales efforts is constructed. This paper analyzes the influence of two pricing power strategies (retailers' wired pricing power and retailer's wireless pricing power) on the profit of supply chain based on the compensation strategy of sales effort. On this basis, the influence of two-stage game and three-stage game (i.e. the order of online and offline pricing) on the profit of supply chain is analyzed. It is found that under certain conditions, both online and offline supply chains can improve the profit of retailers and manufacturers. And it concludes that the optimal channel mode and strategy for manufacturers of brand textile enterprises are two-stage game (that is, retailers determine their online direct selling prices before setting their off-line distribution prices). Give retailers offline pricing power and sales efforts to compensate the above-line and off-line dual-channel mode. Finally, on the basis of determining the optimal channel mode and strategy for the manufacturers of brand textile enterprises, through further research, it is found that although the contract of compensation for sales efforts can improve the profits of manufacturers and supply chains, However, the retailer's profit has declined significantly, resulting in the retailer has no incentive to sign a sales effort compensation contract with the manufacturer to optimize the overall benefits of the two-channel supply chain. On the basis of analyzing the specific reasons that lead to the decline of retailer profit, the corresponding coordination strategy is put forward. The results show that the combination contract of sales effort compensation and online revenue sharing cannot be the coordination of supply chain, the combination contract of sales effort compensation and online and offline return can coordinate and guarantee the win-win situation of channel members under certain conditions. Sales effort compensation and re-compensation of the combination of contracts can coordinate and ensure a win-win channel member.
【學位授予單位】：東華大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F426.86;F274;F224
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