【摘要】：能源是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要支撐，在環(huán)境保護(hù)、資源供應(yīng)等多重壓力下，新能源成為全球各國(guó)不約而同的選擇，近年來中國(guó)新能源特別是風(fēng)電、光伏等產(chǎn)業(yè)呈爆發(fā)式發(fā)展。2010年9月8日，原國(guó)務(wù)院總理溫家寶主持召開國(guó)務(wù)院常務(wù)會(huì)議，審議并通過《國(guó)務(wù)院關(guān)于加快培育和發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略性新興產(chǎn)業(yè)的決定》，將新能源、節(jié)能環(huán)保、新一代信息技術(shù)、生物、高端裝備制造、新材料和新能源汽車7個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)列為現(xiàn)階段的重點(diǎn)發(fā)展對(duì)象。金融危機(jī)發(fā)生后，中央大刀闊斧投入4萬億資金推動(dòng)投資，瞬間燃起了地方政府的投資建設(shè)熱情，各地的新能源基地如同雨后春筍般涌現(xiàn)。一些地方政府和新能源企業(yè)，對(duì)新能源產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展之路多少都懷著“騎驢看唱本”的心態(tài)，新能源的投資建設(shè)偏重制造性，，忽視技術(shù)研發(fā)，缺乏核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，資源浪費(fèi)嚴(yán)重，產(chǎn)能過剩的預(yù)期已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)。以風(fēng)電產(chǎn)業(yè)為例，2011年我國(guó)年度新增1893萬千瓦風(fēng)電，占據(jù)全球新增裝機(jī)容量的一半，至此，我國(guó)風(fēng)電產(chǎn)業(yè)已累計(jì)完成裝機(jī)容量6237萬千瓦，繼續(xù)保持全球最大風(fēng)電國(guó)家的地位。但由于裝機(jī)過快增長(zhǎng)及并網(wǎng)技術(shù)未解決，造成風(fēng)機(jī)閑置嚴(yán)重，僅2011年新增的裝機(jī)容量就有近30%因未能上網(wǎng)而被浪費(fèi)。新能源上市公司作為新能源行業(yè)發(fā)展的主力軍，其過度投資行為不僅會(huì)影響新能源產(chǎn)業(yè)的持續(xù)、健康、穩(wěn)定發(fā)展，還會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)自身的成長(zhǎng)產(chǎn)生不利影響，最終侵害廣大股東的利益。研究新能源上市公司的過度投資程度，分析該行為產(chǎn)生的原因并探討如何防治過度投資行為，是確保新能源產(chǎn)業(yè)健康發(fā)展的現(xiàn)實(shí)需要。 本文主要采用規(guī)范研究方法，以定性和定量相結(jié)合的手段對(duì)我國(guó)新能源上市公司的過度投資問題進(jìn)行分析。本文的寫作思路是：從上市公司過度投資的一般理論入手，分析我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資的表現(xiàn)，并進(jìn)行數(shù)量估算，通過分析我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資行為產(chǎn)生的原因，提出抑制我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資的思路和相關(guān)對(duì)策。 本文除引言外共分三章探討我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資問題，其框架如下： 第一章是新能源上市公司過度投資行為的一般理論概述。主要包括新能源、新能源上市公司、過度投資、新能源上市公司過度投資的基本概念約定，解釋新能源上市公司過度投資的理論基礎(chǔ)。 第二章是我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資的現(xiàn)實(shí)分析。首先，闡述了我國(guó)新能源上市公司發(fā)展的一般概況。其次，分析了其過度投資的表現(xiàn)，包括三個(gè)方面：盲目投資，行業(yè)發(fā)展不平衡；投資效率低，資源浪費(fèi)嚴(yán)重；投資項(xiàng)目集中，產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈不完整。再次，對(duì)新能源上市公司過度投資進(jìn)行數(shù)量估計(jì)。最后，從內(nèi)部和外部?jī)煞矫鎸?duì)該行為產(chǎn)生的原因進(jìn)行分析。外部原因有：新能源產(chǎn)業(yè)促進(jìn)制度不完善；新能源行業(yè)本身尚未形成嚴(yán)格的準(zhǔn)入制度；地方政府助推新能源重復(fù)投資；我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)融資制度不健全，資本市場(chǎng)中小投資者利益缺乏制度保護(hù)。內(nèi)部原因有：新能源產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)要求高；股東、經(jīng)理和債權(quán)人之間的代理沖突；新能源上市公司內(nèi)部權(quán)力制衡難如人意；經(jīng)營(yíng)者過度自信，片面迎合投資者預(yù)期；對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的激勵(lì)方式單一，激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制不完善。 第三章為防治我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資行為的建議。主要包括防治我國(guó)新能源上市公司過度投資的整體設(shè)想和防治上市公司過度投資行為的具體建議。具體建議包括以下幾個(gè)方面：規(guī)范政府對(duì)新能源上市公司的行政指導(dǎo)行為；改革地方官員考核制度，弱化政府不適當(dāng)?shù)母深A(yù)動(dòng)機(jī)；完善與上市公司投融資相關(guān)的法律制度；進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)新能源上市公司信息披露的透明度；規(guī)范新能源上市公司投資決策程序；形成有利于抑制過度投資的新能源上市公司人才激勵(lì)機(jī)制；優(yōu)化新能源上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，強(qiáng)化戰(zhàn)略投資者在公司治理中的作用；提高新能源上市公司董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性。
[Abstract]:Energy is the important support of modern economy. Under the pressure of environmental protection and resource supply, new energy has become the same choice in the world. In recent years, China's new energy, especially wind power, photovoltaic and other industries, has been developing rapidly in September 8th. The Prime Minister of the State Council, Wen Jiabao, held the standing meeting of the State Council to consider and pass it. "The State Council's decision to speed up the cultivation and development of strategic emerging industries, the new energy, energy conservation and environmental protection, the new generation of information technology, biological, high-end equipment manufacturing, new materials and new energy vehicles 7 industries are listed as the focus of development at the present stage. After the financial crisis, the central government invested 4 trillion funds to promote investment in a flash. With the enthusiasm of local government investment and construction, new energy bases have sprung up like bamboo shoots after the rain. Some local governments and new energy enterprises have the mentality of "riding a donkey to watch", and the investment and construction of new energy is more manufacturing, neglecting technology research and development, lack of core competitiveness and waste of resources. In the wind power industry, in 2011, China added 18 million 930 thousand KW wind power, taking up half of the new installed capacity in the world. At this point, China's wind power industry has completed the total installed capacity of 62 million 370 thousand kilowatts, and continues to maintain the status of the world's largest wind power country. In 2011, only 30% of the new installed capacity was wasted because of failure to surf the Internet. As the main force of the new energy industry, the overinvestment behavior of the new energy listed companies will not only affect the sustainable, healthy and stable development of the new energy industry, but also have a negative impact on the growth of the enterprise itself. It is the real need to ensure the healthy development of the new energy industry by studying the extent of the excessive investment of the new energy listed companies, analyzing the causes of the behavior and discussing how to prevent the excessive investment.
This paper mainly uses the normative research method to analyze the overinvestment problem of China's new energy listed companies by means of qualitative and quantitative methods. The writing idea is: starting with the general theory of overinvestment of listed companies, this paper analyzes the performance of the overinvestment of the new energy listed companies in China, and carries on the quantity estimation, through the division of the listed companies. This paper analyzes the causes of Over-investment of New Energy Listed Companies in China, and puts forward some ideas and Countermeasures to restrain Over-investment of New Energy Listed Companies in China.
In addition to the introduction, this paper is divided into three chapters to explore the problem of over investment in China's new energy listed companies. The framework is as follows:
The first chapter is the general theory of overinvestment behavior of new energy listed companies. It mainly includes the basic concepts of new energy, new energy listed companies, overinvestment and overinvestment of new energy listed companies, and explains the theoretical basis of overinvestment of new energy listed companies.
The second chapter is the actual analysis of over investment of China's new energy listed companies. First, it expounds the general situation of the development of the new energy listed companies in China. Secondly, it analyses the performance of its overinvestment, including three aspects: blind investment, unbalance of industry development, low investment efficiency, serious waste of resources, investment projects centralization, industrial chain not. Thirdly, the number of over investment of new energy listed companies is estimated. Finally, the reasons are analyzed from two aspects, both internal and external. The external reasons are: the new energy industry promotion system is not perfect; the new energy industry itself has not formed a strict access system; the local government boosts the new energy to repeat investment; China's capital market financing system is not sound, and the interests of small and medium investors in the capital market are not protected. The internal reasons are: the high technical requirements of the new energy industry, the agency conflict between the shareholders, the managers and the creditors; the internal power balance of the new energy listed companies is not so satisfactory; the overconfidence of the battalion is expected to meet the investors unilaterally; The incentives for managers are single, and the incentive and restraint mechanisms are not perfect.
The third chapter is the suggestion to prevent the overinvestment behavior of the new energy listed companies in China, including the overall idea of preventing the overinvestment of the new energy listed companies in China and the concrete proposals to prevent the overinvestment behavior of the listed companies. Reform the assessment system of local officials, weaken the improper government intervention motivation, improve the legal system related to the investment and financing of listed companies, further enhance the transparency of information disclosure of new energy listed companies, standardize the investment decision procedure of new energy listed companies, and form the talents of new energy listed companies which are favorable for overinvestment. Incentive mechanism, optimizing the ownership structure of the new energy listed companies, strengthening the role of strategic investors in corporate governance, and improving the independence of the board of directors and the board of supervisors of the new energy listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F426.2;F275;F276.6

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