發(fā)布時間：2018-06-09 14:51

  本文選題：煤電 + 產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈��； 參考：《南京財經(jīng)大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：煤炭、電力產(chǎn)業(yè)作為我國國民經(jīng)濟的基礎性能源產(chǎn)業(yè)，兩者產(chǎn)品的價格和供給的大幅波動將波及下游相關產(chǎn)業(yè)和居民生活，阻礙國民經(jīng)濟的健康發(fā)展。隨著政府對煤炭、電力產(chǎn)業(yè)市場化改革的實施進程，以及加入WTO后經(jīng)濟高速增長對煤炭、電力能源需求的帶動，緊密相連的這兩個上下游產(chǎn)業(yè)間的矛盾愈加凸顯。自2002年起，連續(xù)幾年個別地區(qū)甚至全國范圍內(nèi)普遍爆發(fā)了“煤荒”和“電荒”，拉閘限電成為常事，煤電產(chǎn)業(yè)間的沖突越演越烈。由于我國能源消耗結構以及發(fā)電技術經(jīng)濟的限制，未來在很長一段時間內(nèi)國內(nèi)大部分的電力生產(chǎn)將仍以消耗煤炭的火力發(fā)電為主。隨著現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟發(fā)展對電力能源需求逐步提高，中國日益嚴峻的煤電沖突使較高水平的用電量無法得到滿足，這嚴重影響到中國的經(jīng)濟良性發(fā)展和百姓正常生活。 對此，政府曾先后采取多種煤電治理模式以及措施，如煤炭產(chǎn)運需銜接會、煤電價格聯(lián)動、提倡煤電企業(yè)聯(lián)營和一體化等縱向合作形式，以期緩解煤電矛盾。近年來，煤電一體化成為該產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上、下游企業(yè)之間進行縱向合作的主流。因而探討煤電矛盾形成的深層原因和煤電縱向關系的最優(yōu)選擇形式，成為近幾年學術界關注的熱點。 為徹底理清煤、電產(chǎn)業(yè)緊張關系的成因和探究合理可行的煤電矛盾治理模式，本文在總結和借鑒前人研究的基礎上，運用基于交易成本的縱向關系選擇理論、政府規(guī)制、博弈論以及定量分析等研究方法，，首先簡要回顧了煤炭、電力產(chǎn)業(yè)的市場化改革歷程，并實證分析了政策調(diào)控下煤炭和電力市場的結構、績效和價格關系的變化。其次理順了兩者緊張關系的歷史演進，并構建有限次和無限次重復博弈模型去分析煤電沖突的形成機理，結論認為煤電雙方的利益之爭和縱向價格雙軌制是煤電沖突的實質(zhì)和根本原因，由此提出煤電雙方要進行縱向合作。之后通過構建政府縱向規(guī)制背景下的模型，對比分析了電煤重點合同并軌前后的縱向一體化與縱向分離的效應，著重提出在未來電煤市場完全放開后，采用縱向一體化合作模式（尤其是電力企業(yè)后向一體化）以改善兩者的緊張關系的形勢將更為緊迫。最后提出了一些建議和展望，希望能對其他類似產(chǎn)業(yè)提供一定的借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:The coal and electric power industry is the basic energy industry of our national economy. The large fluctuation of the price and supply of the two products will affect the downstream related industries and residents' lives and hinder the healthy development of the national economy. With the implementation of the market-oriented reform of the coal and power industry, and the rapid economic growth of the coal and power energy demand, the contradiction between the two industries is becoming more and more prominent. Since 2002, "coal shortage" and "electricity shortage" have broken out in some regions and even all over the country for several years in succession. It is common to limit electricity by pulling the gate, and the conflicts between the coal and power industries are becoming more and more serious. Due to the limitation of energy consumption structure and power generation technology and economy in China, most of the domestic electric power production will still be coal-consuming thermal power generation for a long time in the future. With the development of modern economy, the demand for electricity and energy has gradually increased, and China's increasingly severe coal and electricity conflicts have made the higher level of electricity consumption unsatisfied, which has seriously affected the healthy economic development of China and the normal life of its people. The government has adopted a variety of coal and power management models and measures, such as coal production and transportation to link up, coal and electricity price linkage, promote coal and electricity enterprise association and integration and other vertical forms of cooperation, in order to alleviate the contradiction between coal and electricity. In recent years, the integration of coal and electricity has become the mainstream of vertical cooperation among downstream enterprises in the industrial chain. Therefore, the discussion of the deep causes of coal power contradiction and the optimal choice of vertical relationship between coal and electricity has become a hot topic in academic circles in recent years. On the basis of summing up and drawing lessons from previous studies, this paper applies the theory of vertical relationship selection based on transaction cost to government regulation. Game theory and quantitative analysis. Firstly, the paper briefly reviews the market-oriented reform of coal and electricity industry, and empirically analyzes the changes of the structure, performance and price relationship of coal and electricity market under policy control. Secondly, the paper straightens out the historical evolution of the tension between the two, and constructs the finite and infinite repeated game models to analyze the formation mechanism of coal power conflict. It is concluded that the conflict between coal and electricity is essentially and fundamentally caused by the conflict between coal and electricity, and the vertical cooperation between the two sides should be carried out. Then, by constructing the model under the background of government longitudinal regulation, this paper compares and analyzes the effects of vertical integration and vertical separation before and after the merger of key coal contracts, and puts forward emphatically that after the future coal market is completely liberalized, It will be more urgent to adopt the mode of vertical integration cooperation (especially backward integration of electric power enterprises) to improve the tense relationship between them. Finally, some suggestions and prospects are put forward, hoping to provide some reference for other similar industries.
【學位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F426.21;F426.61

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