本文關(guān)鍵詞： 新藥研發(fā)外包 套牢問題 不完全契約理論 可占用性準(zhǔn)租　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：醫(yī)藥產(chǎn)業(yè)是國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要組成部分，是目前世界上發(fā)展最快、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)最激烈的高技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)之一。在醫(yī)藥產(chǎn)業(yè)中，新藥往往是人們最為關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)，，新藥研發(fā)不僅關(guān)系著制藥企業(yè)的命運(yùn)，也影響著一個(gè)國家整個(gè)醫(yī)藥產(chǎn)業(yè)當(dāng)前及未來的生存和發(fā)展。為了降低研發(fā)成本、縮短新藥上市周期，有越來越多的制藥企業(yè)加大了與CRO的研發(fā)外包合作。然而在實(shí)際的新藥研發(fā)外包中，制藥企業(yè)會(huì)面臨許多問題和障礙，其中因合同不完全被CRO套牢的問題一直困擾著眾多的制藥企業(yè)。套牢問題的存在嚴(yán)重影響了制藥企業(yè)開展新藥研發(fā)外包的積極性和研發(fā)效果。如何建立有效的機(jī)制解決套牢問題已經(jīng)成為學(xué)術(shù)界和醫(yī)藥界探討新藥研發(fā)外包的重要課題。 本文運(yùn)用不完全契約理論、交易費(fèi)用理論、博弈論等理論工具和研究方法，并結(jié)合實(shí)際的案例，對(duì)我國制藥企業(yè)新藥研發(fā)外包的套牢問題進(jìn)行了深入地分析。文章首先對(duì)我國制藥企業(yè)新藥研發(fā)外包的特征、套牢問題的表現(xiàn)形式、產(chǎn)生的后果進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)分析，全面的認(rèn)識(shí)了新藥研發(fā)外包中的套牢問題；其次重點(diǎn)分析了我國制藥企業(yè)新藥研發(fā)外包套牢問題產(chǎn)生的原因，從微觀和宏觀兩個(gè)層面解釋了新藥研發(fā)外包中套牢問題出現(xiàn)的具體原因；最后從微觀和宏觀兩個(gè)層面提出了新藥研發(fā)外包套牢問題的解決對(duì)策，使得有機(jī)會(huì)主義傾向的CRO在契約不完全的情況下做出有利于制藥企業(yè)的選擇。 本文認(rèn)為，有限理性、新藥研發(fā)的不確定性和復(fù)雜性、高額交易成本等因素，導(dǎo)致了制藥企業(yè)與CRO外包合同具有不完全性，制藥企業(yè)會(huì)因自身的專用性資產(chǎn)投資而面臨套牢問題。文章通過借鑒買方——賣方模型，分析證實(shí)了合同不完全所產(chǎn)生的“可占用性準(zhǔn)租”是制藥企業(yè)在新藥研發(fā)外包中陷入套牢困境的根源。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文進(jìn)一步認(rèn)為新藥研發(fā)外包中出現(xiàn)套牢問題的微觀層面原因主要是因合同不完全而導(dǎo)致的制度缺陷，包括權(quán)力控制缺陷、價(jià)格契約缺陷、信任機(jī)制缺陷；宏觀層面原因包括CRO外包市場(chǎng)不成熟、法律體系與監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)不健全以及社會(huì)倫理道德缺失等。最后，本文提出了解決新藥研發(fā)外包中套牢問題的對(duì)策。微觀層面上制藥企業(yè)可以從價(jià)格控制、權(quán)利控制、信任機(jī)制三方面采取措施；宏觀層面上可以從規(guī)范CRO行業(yè)的發(fā)展、完善經(jīng)濟(jì)法律體系、建立健全監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、建立良好的社會(huì)倫理道德規(guī)范等方面做出努力。
[Abstract]:The pharmaceutical industry is an important part of the national economy and one of the fastest growing and most competitive high-tech industries in the world. In the pharmaceutical industry, new drugs are often the focus of most attention. New drug research and development is not only related to the fate of pharmaceutical enterprises, but also affects the current and future survival and development of the entire pharmaceutical industry in a country. More and more pharmaceutical enterprises have increased their cooperation in R & D outsourcing with CRO. However, in the actual new drug development outsourcing, pharmaceutical enterprises will face many problems and obstacles. Among them, many pharmaceutical enterprises have been troubled by the problem that the contract is not completely locked up by CRO. The existence of the latching problem has seriously affected the enthusiasm and effect of drug development outsourcing in pharmaceutical enterprises. How to establish an effective machine. It has become an important topic for the academia and medicine industry to discuss the outsourcing of new drug research and development. This paper uses incomplete contract theory, transaction cost theory, game theory and other theoretical tools and research methods, and combined with practical cases, This paper makes a deep analysis on the problem of drug development outsourcing in Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises. Firstly, this paper analyzes in detail the characteristics, forms and consequences of the new drug development outsourcing in Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises. Comprehensive understanding of the new drug research and development outsourcing in the issue of locking; secondly, focused on the analysis of our pharmaceutical enterprises new drug research and development outsourcing of the reasons for the problem, In this paper, the author explains the concrete reasons of the lock-in problem in the new drug research and development outsourcing from the micro and macro aspects, and finally puts forward the countermeasures to solve the problem from the micro and macro levels. The opportunistic CRO makes the choice in favor of the pharmaceutical industry when the contract is incomplete. This paper holds that limited rationality, uncertainty and complexity of new drug research and development, and high transaction costs lead to incomplete outsourcing contracts between pharmaceutical companies and CRO. Pharmaceutical enterprises will be faced with the problem of holding up because of their own specific assets investment. This paper uses the buyer-seller model for reference. The analysis proves that the "occupancy quasi lease" caused by incomplete contract is the root of the dilemma of pharmaceutical enterprises in the new drug research and development outsourcing. This paper further points out that the microcosmic reasons of the hold-up problem in the new drug research and development outsourcing are mainly the institutional defects caused by incomplete contracts, including power control defects, price contract defects, and trust mechanism defects. The macro-level reasons include immature CRO outsourcing market, imperfect legal system and regulatory bodies, and lack of social ethics and morality. Finally, This paper puts forward the countermeasures to solve the problem of locking in the outsourcing of new drug research and development. At the micro level, pharmaceutical enterprises can take measures from three aspects: price control, right control and trust mechanism; at the macro level, the development of CRO industry can be standardized. Efforts should be made to perfect the economic legal system, establish and improve the regulatory bodies, and establish good social ethics and ethics.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F273.1;F426.72

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