本文關(guān)鍵詞： 制造商 零售商 品牌 沖突 合作 廣告 服務(wù)　出處：《暨南大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 20世紀80年代以來,零售商通過擴大的市場勢力改變了原有制造商和零售商之間的力量對比。零售商基于短期利益(利潤)考慮,通過降價促銷或降低售后服務(wù)水平等一系列縱向控制措施,來損害制造商的長期利益(品牌)。不僅如此,許多大型的零售商通過建立自有品牌商品與制造商商品搶奪市場,使得二者的沖突更加激化。 本文認為制造商和零售商關(guān)于品牌的沖突就是零售商實施縱向控制的新表現(xiàn),其原因在于二者還持有傳統(tǒng)的對立觀念——通過損害他人利益來使自己獲利。在制造商和零售商品牌沖突的情況下,制造商應(yīng)該積極主動尋求與零售商的合作,激勵零售商參與制造商品牌的建設(shè)才是長久之計。現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)和分銷體制下,廣告和服務(wù)成為品牌的核心要素。因此,本文從這兩個要素出發(fā),來說明制造商應(yīng)該如何與零售商進行合作。 制造商和零售商針對同一產(chǎn)品所作的廣告雖不同但存在互補功能,所以制造商應(yīng)該承擔(dān)地方性廣告的部分費用以達到對零售商的激勵。本文討論了制造商和零售商的簡單合作廣告博弈模型和多階段博弈模型得出,制造商積極進行品牌建設(shè),并使零售商獲得較高的邊際利潤,同時和零售商建立長期合作關(guān)系,可以提高二者的合作廣告效率。 現(xiàn)實中,制造商無法觀測零售商對其產(chǎn)品提供的服務(wù),這樣就導(dǎo)致了二者基于服務(wù)的委托—代理關(guān)系。本文建立一個服務(wù)水平的委托—代理模型,通過對信息對稱和不對稱情況的比較發(fā)現(xiàn)信息不對稱降低了零售商的努力程度、增加了銷售增量的獎勵。所以制造商應(yīng)該激勵零售商進行信息共享,減少二者之間信息不對稱的現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:Since 1980s, the retailer has changed the balance of power between the manufacturer and the retailer by expanding the market power of retailers. Based on short-term interests (profits), through price promotions or reduce customer service service level and a series of vertical control measures, damage the long-term interests of manufacturers (brand). Moreover, many large retailers through the establishment of its own brand merchandise and merchandise manufacturers grab the market, making the two conflict intensified.
The performance of the new manufacturers and retailers on the conflict between brands is the implementation of vertical retailers control, the reason is that the two also holds the traditional concept of opposites -- through their own profit to damage the interests of others to make. In the manufacturer and the retailer brand conflict situation, manufacturers should actively seek cooperation with retailers, manufacturers of brand retailers to participate in the construction of incentive is a permanent solution. Modern production and distribution system, advertising and services become the core elements of the brand. Therefore, this article from the two elements of that manufacturer should be how to cooperate with retailers.
The manufacturer and the retailer in the same product ads are different but complementary, so manufacturers should share the expenses of local advertising to retailers. This paper discusses the incentive game model of cooperative advertising game model of manufacturer and retailer and manufacturer of active stage, brand building, and marginal profit the retailer was higher, and establish long-term cooperation relationship with retailers, the two cooperation can improve the efficiency of advertising.
In reality, manufacturers can not observe retailers servicing their products, resulting in the two principal-agent relationship service based on principal-agent model. This paper establishes a service level, by comparison of symmetric and asymmetric information asymmetry information reduces the effort of retailers, increased incremental sales reward. So manufacturers should encourage retailers to share information, reduce the information asymmetry between the two phenomena.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F273.2;F406;F717;F224

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 姜洋洋;消費者價格敏感性對其自有品牌購買傾向的影響研究[D];西北大學(xué);2011年

2 王波;基于利益相關(guān)者視角的公司治理模式選擇研究[D];安徽大學(xué);2011年

，

本文編號：1447090