無(wú)知之幕下的“虛擬社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)”方案
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-06-27 16:29
本文選題:羅爾斯 + 海薩尼。 參考:《世界哲學(xué)》2017年01期
【摘要】:理性選擇理論與倫理學(xué)的結(jié)合被研究者們從不同進(jìn)路加以發(fā)展。羅爾斯與海薩尼主要是從無(wú)知之幕或不確定條件下理性選擇的角度出發(fā)來(lái)證成正義原則。但是,他們從一個(gè)相似的選擇背景卻得出了不同的結(jié)論———羅爾斯的平等主義與海薩尼的平均功利主義。本文的目的則是在理性選擇理論的框架下發(fā)展出一套"虛擬社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)"方案來(lái)解決這二者之間的分歧。筆者將論證,如果無(wú)知之幕下的各方將海薩尼主張的預(yù)期效用最大化原則作為決策規(guī)則,他們會(huì)選擇加入一個(gè)"虛擬社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)",即達(dá)成一個(gè)要求將所有基本善進(jìn)行平等分配的羅爾斯原則。
[Abstract]:The combination of rational choice theory and ethics has been developed in different ways. Rawls and Heisani mainly from the perspective of ignorance or rational choice under uncertain conditions to prove the principle of justice. However, they draw different conclusions from a similar background-Rawls' egalitarianism and Heisani's average utilitarianism. The purpose of this paper is to develop a "virtual social insurance" scheme under the framework of rational choice theory to resolve the difference between the two. The author will argue that if the parties under the veil of ignorance take the principle of maximizing expected utility advocated by Heisani as the decision-making rule, They would choose to add a "virtual social insurance", a Rawls principle requiring the equal distribution of all basic good.
【作者單位】: 中國(guó)人民大學(xué)哲學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】:C934
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本文編號(hào):2074525
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