【摘要】：高管薪酬與公司績效之間的關(guān)系一直以來都是國內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界研究的重要課題。薪酬激勵是使得高管人員提高貢獻程度,提高公司績效,預(yù)防產(chǎn)生自利行為的重要方式。高管薪酬從根本上講是對資源的再優(yōu)化配置,反映激勵水平和方式。激勵往往能起到持續(xù)作用于對象主體的目的,高管薪酬作為激勵高管的方式,對公司績效的影響不止于當期。在經(jīng)濟管理現(xiàn)代化的今天,因系統(tǒng)環(huán)境及政策傳導(dǎo)的影響,經(jīng)濟活動主體的計劃、決策與行動往往需要一定的過程。同時經(jīng)濟變量的相關(guān)反應(yīng)會因為人們?nèi)粘Ｉ盍?xí)慣的延續(xù)以及技術(shù)條件或者制度限制而產(chǎn)生滯后現(xiàn)象,通常會發(fā)生自變量與因變量的變動關(guān)系不同步等,且這種不同步關(guān)系可能表現(xiàn)為滯后、延滯或者持續(xù)效應(yīng)。本文立足于我國獨有的經(jīng)濟制度環(huán)境,基于公司治理相關(guān)的角度,在代理理論、波特與勞勒綜合激勵理論、管理層權(quán)利理論、和錦標賽理論的基礎(chǔ)上,探討了高管薪酬從不同維度影響公司績效的關(guān)聯(lián)過程和作用機理。并結(jié)合我國滬深A(yù)股上市公司的實踐,研究高管薪酬對公司績效的影響,從高管薪酬的水平、結(jié)構(gòu)、差距三個方面分別探究其對公司績效的影響。與現(xiàn)有研究不同的是,本研究不但關(guān)注的高管薪酬對公司當期績效的影響,還關(guān)注這種影響的動態(tài)性、持續(xù)性,即當年的高管薪酬對后續(xù)年份公司績效的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)高管薪酬水平對公司績效具有持續(xù)的促進作用,隨著高管薪酬水平的提高,公司當期和未來績效都會積極反應(yīng)。而薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)中的短期激勵方式貨幣,對當年的公司績效具有正向促進作用,但這種作用不會持續(xù)到后續(xù)年份。另外,在貨幣薪酬基礎(chǔ)上加入了高管持股和在職消費的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),相較于只有貨幣薪酬的結(jié)構(gòu)對公司績效的影響更弱;薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)中的股權(quán)激勵在當期并沒有表現(xiàn)出對公司績效的影響,而在與未來績效的關(guān)系中卻顯著,呈現(xiàn)出滯后性。高管薪酬差距也具有持續(xù)促進公司績效的作用,并且呈現(xiàn)出動態(tài)的提高。因此公司在設(shè)置高管薪酬時,應(yīng)充分考慮其對公司績效的影響,合理提高薪酬水平、注重結(jié)構(gòu)中的貨幣薪酬與在職消費,并進一步挖掘股權(quán)的長期激勵作用和適當?shù)脑O(shè)置主要高管與普通高管之間的薪酬差距,使其能夠在最大程度上激勵高管們?yōu)楣镜陌l(fā)展貢獻力量。
[Abstract]:The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has always been an important topic in academic circles at home and abroad. Salary incentive is an important way for executives to improve their contribution, improve corporate performance and prevent self-interest behavior. Executive compensation is fundamentally the re-optimization of the allocation of resources, reflecting the level and mode of incentive. Incentive often plays a continuous role in the object of the purpose, executive compensation as a way to motivate executives, the impact on corporate performance is not only in the current period. In today's modernization of economic management, due to the influence of system environment and policy transmission, the planning, decision-making and action of the main body of economic activities often need a certain process. At the same time, the related reactions of economic variables will lag because of the continuation of people's daily living habits and the limitations of technical conditions or institutions. Usually, the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables will not be synchronized, and this out-of-sync relationship may show lag, delay or continuous effect. Based on the unique economic system environment of our country, based on the angle of corporate governance, on the basis of agency theory, Porter and Laughler's comprehensive incentive theory, management right theory and tournament theory, this paper discusses the related process and mechanism of executive compensation affecting corporate performance from different dimensions. Combined with the practice of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China, this paper studies the influence of executive compensation on corporate performance, and explores its influence on corporate performance from three aspects: the level, structure and gap of executive compensation. Different from the existing research, this study not only pays attention to the impact of executive compensation on the current performance of the company, but also pays attention to the dynamic and sustainable impact of this impact, that is, the impact of executive compensation in that year on the performance of the company in the following years. It is found that the level of executive compensation has a continuous role in promoting corporate performance. With the improvement of executive compensation level, the current and future performance of the company will respond positively. The short-term incentive currency in the salary structure has a positive role in promoting corporate performance in that year, but this effect will not continue into subsequent years. In addition, on the basis of monetary compensation, the salary structure of executive shareholding and on-the-job consumption is added, which has a weaker influence on corporate performance than only the structure of monetary compensation. The equity incentive in the compensation structure does not show the impact on corporate performance in the current period, but in the relationship with future performance, it shows a lag. Executive pay gap also continues to promote corporate performance, and presents a dynamic improvement. Therefore, when setting up executive compensation, the company should fully consider its influence on the performance of the company, reasonably improve the salary level, pay attention to the monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption in the structure, and further excavate the long-term incentive role of equity and the pay gap between the main executives and the ordinary executives, so that it can encourage the executives to contribute to the development of the company to the greatest extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F275

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