【摘要】：傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈管理文獻(xiàn)都是以理性人假設(shè)作為研究基礎(chǔ)。隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)和信息技術(shù)的不斷發(fā)展,舊的研究范式已經(jīng)不能夠解釋現(xiàn)實(shí)中的所有問題。近年來,有限理性理論憑借著強(qiáng)大的現(xiàn)實(shí)解釋力逐漸成為理論主流。根據(jù)有限理性的觀點(diǎn),決策者的決策行為是理性的,但會(huì)受制于知識(shí)、時(shí)間等因素造成的個(gè)人處理信息能力的局限性,而決策過程會(huì)受到?jīng)Q策者不同的行為偏好的影響。公平關(guān)切就是一種典型的行為偏好,廣泛地存在于決策者間的交互中。很多商業(yè)案例和學(xué)術(shù)研究中都可以看到它的存在。在過去的幾十年里,對(duì)公平關(guān)切行為偏好的觀察主要包括兩個(gè)維度——分配公平關(guān)切和程序公平關(guān)切。分配公平關(guān)切指人們不僅偏好更高的絕對(duì)收益,也會(huì)偏好與其他人的收益相比更高的絕對(duì)收益。而程序公平關(guān)切則是指人們追求公平過程,更在乎分配結(jié)果產(chǎn)生的程序是否公平。盡管很多的研究者通過數(shù)理模型和實(shí)證調(diào)查的方式對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中的分配公平關(guān)切行為進(jìn)行了研究,但卻少有文獻(xiàn)從供應(yīng)鏈層面上對(duì)程序公平關(guān)切進(jìn)行研究,但大量的實(shí)際案例說明程序公平與分配公平對(duì)維持供應(yīng)鏈關(guān)系同樣重要。因此,本文首次建立了程序公平關(guān)切行為供應(yīng)鏈模型,具體探討了程序公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈決策的作用機(jī)理和考慮程序公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題,并對(duì)程序公平關(guān)切和分配公平關(guān)切這兩種行為對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈的影響進(jìn)行了比較。本文的模型被設(shè)定于促銷環(huán)境中,具體研究由一個(gè)供應(yīng)商和一個(gè)具有程序公平關(guān)切的零售商組成的Stackelberg博弈問題。參考相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),我們使用參與度(engagement)來刻畫公平過程。作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,供應(yīng)商擁有決定是否使用公平過程的決策權(quán)力;作為追隨者,零售商會(huì)判斷決策程序是否公平。當(dāng)公平過程沒被使用時(shí),當(dāng)零售商的實(shí)際利潤低于程序公平參考點(diǎn)時(shí),程序公平關(guān)切會(huì)降低零售商的效用。根據(jù)建立的模型,本文可以被分為兩個(gè)部分:第三章首先分析供應(yīng)商和零售商各自的決策過程并求得了博弈均衡結(jié)果,在此基礎(chǔ)上研究了程序公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈決策和績效的作用,最后分析了程序公平關(guān)切行為供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)性。第四章比較了相同模型背景下零售商的程序公平關(guān)切行為和分配公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈決策和績效的影響。本文的主要結(jié)論如下:(1)在供應(yīng)鏈的促銷環(huán)境下,無論零售商是否具有程序公平關(guān)切,供應(yīng)商都不會(huì)使用公平過程。(2)在零售商程序公平關(guān)切行為作用下,當(dāng)零售商對(duì)程序不公平的厭惡超出一定程度時(shí),零售商并不能從程序公平關(guān)切行為中受益,但供應(yīng)鏈整體效率總能得到提高。(3)供應(yīng)商可以通過補(bǔ)貼零售商通道費(fèi)用的方式,使用一個(gè)批發(fā)價(jià)格使程序公平關(guān)切行為供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)。(4)分配公平關(guān)切行為更有益于零售商個(gè)體利潤提高,而程序公平關(guān)切行為更有利于供應(yīng)鏈整體績效提高。本文是對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中程序公平關(guān)切的初步的基礎(chǔ)性研究,同時(shí),它也與現(xiàn)實(shí)中商業(yè)運(yùn)作行為緊密相關(guān)。因此,本文不僅拓展了公平關(guān)切行為和供應(yīng)鏈關(guān)系的相關(guān)學(xué)術(shù)研究,也為現(xiàn)實(shí)中的供應(yīng)鏈決策提供了有用的管理啟示。
[Abstract]:The traditional supply chain management literature is based on the rational hypothesis. With the development of economy and information technology, the old research paradigm has not been able to explain all the problems in the reality. In recent years, the theory of limited reason has gradually become the mainstream of the theory with the powerful realistic explanation. According to the view of limited reason, the decision-making behavior of the decision-maker is rational, but is subject to the limitation of the ability of the individual to deal with the information caused by the factors such as knowledge and time, and the decision-making process can be influenced by the different behavior preference of the decision-maker. The fair concern is a typical behavior preference that is widely present in the interaction between decision-makers. It can be seen in many business cases and academic studies. Over the past few decades, the observation of the preference for equitable concern mainly includes two dimensions _ the distribution of equitable concerns and procedural fairness concerns. The distribution of fair concerns means that people not only prefer higher absolute benefits, but also have higher absolute returns than others. While procedural fairness concerns the pursuit of a fair process, more care is given to whether the process of distribution is fair. Although many researchers have studied the distribution of fair concerns in the supply chain through the way of mathematical model and empirical investigation, there is little literature to study the procedural fairness at the supply chain level, However, a large number of practical cases indicate that the fairness and distribution of the process are equally important to the maintenance of supply chain relationships. Therefore, the paper first set up a supply chain model of the procedural fairness concern behavior, and specifically discusses the role mechanism of the process fairness concern behavior on the supply chain decision and the coordination problem of the supply chain, which takes into account the fairness of the process, The effects of these two acts on the supply chain were compared and the procedural fairness concerns and the distribution of fair concerns were compared. The model of this paper is set in the promotion environment, and the Stackelberg game problem, which is composed of a supplier and a retailer with procedural fairness, is studied. With reference to the relevant literature, we use the engagement to characterize the fairness process. As a leader, the supplier has the right to decide whether to use the decision-making power of the fair process; as a follower, the retailer will judge whether the decision-making process is fair. When the fair process is not used, the procedural fairness concerns the effectiveness of the retailer when the actual profit of the retailer is lower than the program's fair reference point. Based on the established model, this paper can be divided into two parts: the third chapter first analyzes the decision-making process of the supplier and the retailer and obtains the game equilibrium result, and then studies the role of the program's fair-concern behavior on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain, Finally, the coordination of the program's fair and concerned behavior supply chain is analyzed. The fourth chapter compares the behavior of the retailer in the background of the same model and the effect on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) Under the promotion environment of the supply chain, no matter whether the retailer has the procedural fairness, the supplier will not use the fair process. (2) Under the action of the retailer's process of fairness and concern, when the retailer's aversion to the process is beyond a certain level, the retailer cannot benefit from the procedural fairness concerns, but the overall efficiency of the supply chain can always be improved. (3) The supplier can use an out-of-the-art form of subsidizing the cost of the retailer's channels to coordinate the process's equitable and concerns-driven supply chain. (4) The distribution of equitable concerns is more beneficial to the increase in the individual profits of the retailer, while the procedural fairness concerns are more conducive to the improvement of the overall performance of the supply chain. This paper is a basic research on the fairness of the process in the supply chain, and it is also closely related to the commercial operation in the real world. Therefore, this paper not only expands the relevant academic research of the relationship between the fair-concerned behavior and the supply chain, but also provides useful management inspiration for the supply chain decision-making in the real world.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：2339981