基于央地關(guān)系分析大國(guó)治理的制度邏輯
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-07-25 13:45
【摘要】:中國(guó)的央地關(guān)系可視為同一個(gè)組織上下不同層級(jí)的關(guān)系。央地關(guān)系制度設(shè)計(jì)的基本任務(wù)是解決央地之間的委托代理問(wèn)題,制度的基本內(nèi)容包括中央對(duì)地方的績(jī)效監(jiān)控和中央與地方之間的剩余分配。中央的績(jī)效監(jiān)控能力決定著剩余分配的趨向。中國(guó)央地關(guān)系兩千余年的發(fā)展過(guò)程,實(shí)際上就是一個(gè)剩余分配隨著中央績(jī)效監(jiān)控能力變化而相應(yīng)變化的過(guò)程,其中體現(xiàn)出大國(guó)治理的制度邏輯。
[Abstract]:China's center-land relationship can be seen as a relationship at different levels of the same organization. The basic task of the design of the center-district relationship system is to solve the principal-agent problem between the central and local areas. The basic contents of the system include the performance monitoring of the central government to the local government and the residual distribution between the central and local governments. Central performance monitoring ability determines the trend of surplus distribution. The development of the relationship between central and local authorities in China for more than two thousand years is in fact a process of corresponding changes in surplus distribution with the change of central performance monitoring ability which embodies the institutional logic of great power governance.
【分類號(hào)】:D035
本文編號(hào):2144004
[Abstract]:China's center-land relationship can be seen as a relationship at different levels of the same organization. The basic task of the design of the center-district relationship system is to solve the principal-agent problem between the central and local areas. The basic contents of the system include the performance monitoring of the central government to the local government and the residual distribution between the central and local governments. Central performance monitoring ability determines the trend of surplus distribution. The development of the relationship between central and local authorities in China for more than two thousand years is in fact a process of corresponding changes in surplus distribution with the change of central performance monitoring ability which embodies the institutional logic of great power governance.
【分類號(hào)】:D035
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