【摘要】：中國的央地關系可視為同一個組織上下不同層級的關系。央地關系制度設計的基本任務是解決央地之間的委托代理問題,制度的基本內(nèi)容包括中央對地方的績效監(jiān)控和中央與地方之間的剩余分配。中央的績效監(jiān)控能力決定著剩余分配的趨向。中國央地關系兩千余年的發(fā)展過程,實際上就是一個剩余分配隨著中央績效監(jiān)控能力變化而相應變化的過程,其中體現(xiàn)出大國治理的制度邏輯。
[Abstract]:China's center-land relationship can be seen as a relationship at different levels of the same organization. The basic task of the design of the center-district relationship system is to solve the principal-agent problem between the central and local areas. The basic contents of the system include the performance monitoring of the central government to the local government and the residual distribution between the central and local governments. Central performance monitoring ability determines the trend of surplus distribution. The development of the relationship between central and local authorities in China for more than two thousand years is in fact a process of corresponding changes in surplus distribution with the change of central performance monitoring ability which embodies the institutional logic of great power governance.
【分類號】：D035

【相似文獻】

相關期刊論文 前3條

1 周雪光;;權威體制與有效治理:當代中國國家治理的制度邏輯[J];開放時代;2011年10期

2 鄧鎖;;雙重制度邏輯與非營利組織的運行——一個新制度主義視角的解釋[J];華東理工大學學報(社會科學版);2005年04期

3 王詩宗;宋程成;;獨立抑或自主:中國社會組織特征問題重思[J];中國社會科學;2013年05期

，

本文編號：2144004