本文選題：高級管理者 + 股權(quán)激勵�。� 參考：《安徽大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在知識經(jīng)濟(jì)時代,創(chuàng)新能力的強弱對企業(yè)日益重要。對于上市公司而言,想要培育本企業(yè)的核心競爭力,最為行之有效的方法就是加強公司的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力。多數(shù)上市企業(yè)會傾向于在公司內(nèi)部建立一套創(chuàng)新機(jī)制,來提高創(chuàng)新決策的正確性以及創(chuàng)新投入的回報率,但創(chuàng)新機(jī)制的建立與運行是受到激勵制度的影響,也就是說會受到企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵的影響,股權(quán)激勵的效果又跟股權(quán)集中度以及所有權(quán)性質(zhì)相關(guān)。在將股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、所有權(quán)性質(zhì)與技術(shù)創(chuàng)新績效相結(jié)合的研究上,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究并不常見,雖然在對上市公司這方面的實證研究有不少,但是,股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效之間的到底有何關(guān)系存在著分歧。因此,本文是在查閱及研讀文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,對以往學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵研究結(jié)論進(jìn)行簡單的梳理,發(fā)現(xiàn)在股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效之間的關(guān)系上,有學(xué)者認(rèn)為在上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵有助于創(chuàng)新績效的提升,但也有部分學(xué)者得出的研究結(jié)論是二者呈負(fù)相關(guān),同時仍有學(xué)者證明出二者之間是沒有明顯的相關(guān)關(guān)系的。本文在此基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合雙因素理論、委托代理理論以及人力資本理論進(jìn)行分析,然后采用傾向匹配得分法進(jìn)行實證研究,以揭示上市公司高級管理者股權(quán)激勵對創(chuàng)新績效的影響,以及加入股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、企業(yè)性質(zhì)之后,考慮股權(quán)激勵的實施對企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效提高是否有促進(jìn)作用,最后采用總資產(chǎn)收益率和凈資產(chǎn)收益率兩個指標(biāo)數(shù)據(jù)變量進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗,所得結(jié)果與文章結(jié)論基本一致。在經(jīng)過PSM模型分析后,本文認(rèn)為股權(quán)激勵的實施是有助于促進(jìn)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的提升,企業(yè)性質(zhì)和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對創(chuàng)新績效的提升作用也是有影響的,對比了國有控股企業(yè)與非國有控股企業(yè)以及股權(quán)集中企業(yè)與股權(quán)分散企業(yè)來分析高管實施股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的影響,研究得出實施股權(quán)激勵能夠提高企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新績效;在非國有控股企業(yè)中,進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的提升作用比國有企業(yè)顯著;股權(quán)集中時,對高管進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵更有助于企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的提高。通過對我國上市公司的實證分析驗證了此研究結(jié)論,為我國上市公司在完善股東對高管的約束機(jī)制、優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、健全高管激勵機(jī)制、完善股權(quán)激勵制度、培養(yǎng)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力、增強企業(yè)的競爭能力等幾個方面提供理論依據(jù)和建議。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, the strength of innovation ability is increasingly important to enterprises. For listed companies, the most effective way to cultivate their core competitiveness is to strengthen their technological innovation ability. Most listed enterprises tend to set up a set of innovation mechanism within the company to improve the correctness of innovation decision and the rate of return of innovation investment, but the establishment and operation of innovation mechanism is affected by the incentive system. That is to say, the effect of equity incentive is related to ownership concentration and ownership. In the research of combining ownership structure, ownership nature and technological innovation performance, scholars at home and abroad are not common, although there are many empirical studies on listed companies, but, There are differences in the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise innovation performance. Therefore, on the basis of consulting and studying the literature, this paper makes a brief combing of previous scholars' conclusions on equity incentive, and finds out the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise innovation performance. Some scholars believe that the implementation of equity incentives in listed companies is conducive to the improvement of innovation performance, but some scholars draw the conclusion that the two are negative correlation, while some scholars still prove that there is no obvious correlation between the two. On this basis, combined with the two-factor theory, principal-agent theory and human capital theory to analyze, and then use the tendency matching score method for empirical research. In order to reveal the impact of equity incentive on innovation performance of senior managers of listed companies, and to consider whether the implementation of equity incentive can promote the improvement of enterprise innovation performance after adding the ownership structure and the nature of the enterprise. Finally, two index data variables, total return on assets and return on net assets, are used to test the robustness, and the results are in good agreement with the conclusion of the paper. After the analysis of PSM model, this paper holds that the implementation of equity incentive is helpful to promote the improvement of enterprise innovation performance, and the nature of the enterprise and the ownership structure also have an impact on the promotion of innovation performance. Comparing the state-owned holding enterprises with non-state-owned holding enterprises, the centralized equity enterprises and the decentralized equity enterprises to analyze the impact of executive equity incentive on enterprise innovation performance, the research results show that the implementation of equity incentive can improve the innovation performance of enterprises. In non-state-owned holding enterprises, equity incentive plays a more important role than state-owned enterprises in improving innovation performance. Through the empirical analysis of the listed companies in China, this paper verifies the conclusions of this study, for the listed companies in our country to improve the shareholders' restraint mechanism, optimize the equity structure, improve the incentive mechanism of senior executives, improve the equity incentive system. Training the ability of technological innovation and enhancing the competitive ability of enterprises provide theoretical basis and suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F273.1

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