本文選題：政治關(guān)聯(lián) + 股權(quán)集中度　； 參考：《武漢金融》2017年12期

【摘要】：本文利用2006-2013年的數(shù)據(jù)分析我國(guó)上市銀行董事長(zhǎng)、總經(jīng)理各自的政治關(guān)聯(lián)以及銀行股權(quán)集中度對(duì)銀行業(yè)績(jī)的影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明:上市銀行董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理的政治關(guān)聯(lián)對(duì)銀行業(yè)績(jī)的影響各不相同,董事長(zhǎng)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)顯著提高銀行的績(jī)效,而總經(jīng)理的政治關(guān)聯(lián)則與之相反;上市銀行的業(yè)績(jī)隨著股權(quán)集中度的上升而逐步提高,同時(shí),股權(quán)集中度在一定程度上抑制了政治關(guān)聯(lián)所起的作用。將銀行樣本劃分為"一股獨(dú)大"和"股權(quán)制衡"兩種類型后,上述結(jié)論仍然成立。
[Abstract]:Based on the data from 2006 to 2013, this paper analyzes the political connections of chairman and general manager of listed banks in China and the influence of bank equity concentration on bank performance. The empirical results show that the political connection of the chairman of the listed bank and the general manager have different effects on the bank performance. The political association of the chairman of the board of directors significantly improves the bank performance, while the political association of the general manager is the opposite. The performance of listed banks increases gradually with the increase of equity concentration, and at the same time, the degree of equity concentration restrains the function of political association to a certain extent. After the bank sample is divided into two types: "one share" and "equity balance", the above conclusion still holds.
【作者單位】： 北京大學(xué);江西公路開(kāi)發(fā)總公司;
【基金】：教育部哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)研究重大課題攻關(guān)項(xiàng)目“我國(guó)商業(yè)養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)制度體系與運(yùn)行機(jī)制研究”(14JZD027)
【分類號(hào)】：D0;F832.3

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本文編號(hào)：2007216