本文選題：逆向合同外包 + 交易成本��； 參考：《東南學(xué)術(shù)》2016年05期

【摘要】：與西方國(guó)家治理邏輯不同的是,交易成本和官僚組織中的激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)是我國(guó)公共服務(wù)"逆向合同外包"的組織基礎(chǔ)和制度邏輯。在合同外包階段,吸引社會(huì)私人資金進(jìn)入公共服務(wù)領(lǐng)域、回應(yīng)上級(jí)政府的偏好是地方政府選擇合同外包方式的主要原因,合同外包成為下級(jí)政府爭(zhēng)奪上級(jí)政府注意力的有效策略,地方政府行為的制度性激勵(lì)來自于官僚體制的晉升激勵(lì);在逆向合同外包階段,上級(jí)政府偏好的轉(zhuǎn)移使得合同外包不再具有晉升激勵(lì),合同外包過程中出現(xiàn)的承包商依據(jù)高專用性資產(chǎn)"坐地起價(jià)"、合同設(shè)計(jì)中的"道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)"以及承包商的"監(jiān)管綁架",地方政府績(jī)效改革后所產(chǎn)生的財(cái)政激勵(lì),共同促使地方政府實(shí)施公共服務(wù)逆向合同外包。交易成本和激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)共同塑造了地方政府公共服務(wù)供給模式的選擇,但激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)起著更為基礎(chǔ)性的作用。
[Abstract]:Different from the governance logic of western countries, transaction cost and incentive structure in bureaucracy are the organizational basis and institutional logic of "reverse contract outsourcing" in China's public service. In the stage of contract outsourcing, the main reason for local governments to choose the way of outsourcing contracts is to attract private social funds into the field of public services, and to respond to the preferences of higher levels of government. Contract outsourcing has become an effective strategy for lower government to compete for the attention of higher government. The institutional incentive of local government behavior comes from the promotion incentive of bureaucratic system. The shift of preference on the part of the superior government makes the contract outsourcing no longer have the promotion incentive, In the process of contract outsourcing, the contractor is based on the "starting price" of high-specific assets, the "moral hazard" in the contract design, the "regulatory kidnapping" of the contractor, and the financial incentives resulting from the performance reform of the local government. Jointly promote the local government to implement the public service reverse contract outsourcing. Transaction cost and incentive structure together shape the choice of local government public service supply mode, but incentive structure plays a more basic role.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)法學(xué)院;華僑大學(xué)政治與公共管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：福建省社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目“我國(guó)公用事業(yè)民營(yíng)化政府規(guī)制研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2010B058) 華僑大學(xué)研究生科研創(chuàng)新能力培育計(jì)劃資助項(xiàng)目
【分類號(hào)】：D630

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前3條

1 沈榮法;;制度創(chuàng)新:探索源頭反腐敗[J];黨政干部文摘;2001年12期

2 沈榮法;;制度創(chuàng)新:探索源頭反腐敗[J];內(nèi)部文稿;2001年19期

3 ;[J];;年期

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前1條

1 南京師范大學(xué)教科院教育領(lǐng)導(dǎo)與管理研究所副研究員 姚繼軍;發(fā)展教育首當(dāng)調(diào)整政府激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)[N];中國(guó)教育報(bào);2013年

，

本文編號(hào)：2004123