本文選題：上市公司 + 股權(quán)激勵(lì)　； 參考：《蘭州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論以及西方資本市場的實(shí)踐已經(jīng)證明,股權(quán)激勵(lì)可以有效防范公司管理中存在的短期行為問題。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為長期激勵(lì)的一種重要方式,可以有效地實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)公司員工的激勵(lì),從而使得公司的實(shí)際所有者、日常經(jīng)營管理者與公司的普通員工利益一致、目標(biāo)趨同,為實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化群策群力。現(xiàn)代企業(yè)想要保持長期穩(wěn)定、可持續(xù)的發(fā)展,其中一個(gè)重要的問題是能夠有效解決其自身的委托代理問題,股權(quán)激勵(lì)恰好可以幫助企業(yè)有效、妥善地處理這類問題。在我國,隨著相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的建立健全,各種適合本國發(fā)展的市場制度的不斷完善,越來越多的企業(yè)逐漸接納、研究并制定實(shí)施利于本企業(yè)發(fā)展的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的理論研究與實(shí)戰(zhàn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)日臻成熟。常山藥業(yè)股份有限公司是一家創(chuàng)業(yè)板的高新技術(shù)公司,上市一年即制定實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。其股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案在績效考核方面有一定的優(yōu)化,公司設(shè)計(jì)了雙層考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn),除對(duì)公司財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)進(jìn)行考核外,還針對(duì)不同層級(jí)、不同崗位上的激勵(lì)對(duì)象制定具體考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn),尤其是加大了對(duì)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的考核力度,這在其他公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃中是比較少見的,具有一定的研究意義。本文以常山藥業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃為研究對(duì)象,采用案例研究的方法,主要針對(duì)公司在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃前后,其經(jīng)營、治理及市場表現(xiàn)等各方面進(jìn)行分析,判定、評(píng)價(jià)此次激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施效果。本文首先對(duì)研究背景、研究意義進(jìn)行概述,并介紹本文的研究主題及框架。然后簡要介紹了常山藥業(yè)公司的基本情況和公司所處的行業(yè)情況,隨后又從激勵(lì)模式和公司板塊分布兩方面對(duì)我國的上市公司進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行簡要地分析,并具體闡述分析了常山藥業(yè)公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施方案和考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。其次從公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績、治理結(jié)構(gòu)、公司價(jià)值、市場反應(yīng)方面,得出常山藥業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施效果,并分析公司在制定實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃時(shí)的不足之處,對(duì)其股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施方案做出評(píng)價(jià)。最后,在對(duì)常山藥業(yè)公司激勵(lì)方案研究的基礎(chǔ)上得到啟發(fā),針對(duì)常山藥業(yè)及我國上市公司制定、執(zhí)行激勵(lì)計(jì)劃出現(xiàn)的普遍問題提出對(duì)策建議,最后提出本文的研究不足并展望未來。
[Abstract]:Modern enterprise theory and western capital market practice have proved that equity incentive can effectively prevent short-term behavior problems in corporate management. As an important way of long-term incentive, equity incentive can effectively realize the incentive to the employees of the company, thus making the interests of the actual owners, daily managers and ordinary employees of the company consistent, and the objectives converge. In order to realize the enterprise value maximizes the collective strategy strength. If modern enterprises want to maintain long-term stability and sustainable development, one of the important problems is to effectively solve their own principal-agent problem. Equity incentive can help enterprises to deal with such problems effectively and properly. In our country, with the establishment of relevant laws and regulations and the continuous improvement of various market systems suitable for the development of our country, more and more enterprises gradually accept, study and implement equity incentive plans conducive to the development of their own enterprises. The theoretical research and practical experience of equity incentive are becoming more and more mature. Changshan Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. is a high-tech company on the gem. Its equity incentive scheme has certain optimization in the performance appraisal, the company has designed the double layer appraisal standard, in addition to carries on the appraisal to the company financial index, but also for the different level, the different post incentive object formulates the concrete appraisal standard, Especially, it increases the assessment of technological innovation, which is relatively rare in the equity incentive plan of other companies, and has certain research significance. This paper takes the stock right incentive plan of Changshan Pharmaceutical Industry as the research object, adopts the method of case study, mainly analyzes and judges the management, governance and market performance of the company before and after the implementation of the equity incentive plan. Evaluate the effectiveness of this incentive plan. In this paper, the background and significance of the research are summarized, and the research theme and framework are introduced. Then it briefly introduces the basic situation of Changshan Pharmaceutical Company and the industry situation of the company, and then briefly analyzes the current situation of equity incentive plan of listed companies in China from the two aspects of incentive mode and company plate distribution. And elaborated and analyzed the Changshan pharmaceutical company stock right incentive plan implementation plan and the appraisal standard concretely. Secondly, from the aspects of operating performance, governance structure, company value and market reaction, the paper draws the implementation effect of the stock right incentive plan of Changshan Pharmaceutical Industry, and analyzes the shortcomings of the company in formulating and implementing the equity incentive plan. To its equity incentive implementation plan to make the appraisal. Finally, on the basis of the research on the incentive scheme of Changshan Pharmaceutical Company, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for Changshan Pharmaceutical Company and listed companies in China to formulate and execute the incentive plan. In the end, the author points out the deficiency of this paper and looks forward to the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.72;F272.92

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