本文選題：上市家族企業(yè) + 風險承擔　； 參考：《杭州電子科技大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整,家族企業(yè)粗放式的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營模式受到了日益嚴峻的挑戰(zhàn),企業(yè)所面臨的風險日益多樣化、復雜化。當家族企業(yè)經(jīng)營者由于“短視”或激進的投資決策給企業(yè)帶來不合理的風險承擔水平時,必然會影響企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效,損害公司價值。因此,家族企業(yè)風險承擔水平已成為企業(yè)持續(xù)生存的核心問題,企業(yè)只有保持合理的風險承擔水平才能健康持續(xù)的發(fā)展。企業(yè)風險承擔在很大程度上受家族企業(yè)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和薪酬激勵的影響,不同的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、不同的薪酬激勵機制都會影響管理層的風險投資決策。鑒于此,在梳理國內(nèi)外相關文獻,分析相關理論的基礎上,以我國深圳證券交易所中小板家族企業(yè)為研究對象,對所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、薪酬激勵和風險承擔間的影響關系展開研究。本文以上市家族企業(yè)連續(xù)三年資產(chǎn)收益率的波動作為衡量風險承擔的指標,以現(xiàn)金流權(quán)、兩權(quán)分離度和金字塔層級作為衡量所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的指標,以前后兩年前三名高管薪酬總額的對數(shù)和高管持股比例作為衡量薪酬激勵的指標,首先研究家族企業(yè)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、薪酬激勵分別對企業(yè)風險承擔的影響,再將所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和薪酬激勵結(jié)合起來研究對企業(yè)風險承擔的影響。最后通過新希望集團的案例分析對實證結(jié)論進行補充和解釋,從而全方面、多角度地分析各因素與企業(yè)風險承擔間的關系。本文通過實證分析及案例研究,得出如下結(jié)論:第一,我國多數(shù)上市家族企業(yè)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理,主要表現(xiàn)在兩權(quán)分離程度較高,金字塔層級數(shù)多(所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)復雜),一股獨大現(xiàn)象嚴重等,從而導致企業(yè)風險承擔水平不理想。第二,我國上市家族企業(yè)薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)不合理,股權(quán)激勵流于形式化,并未對企業(yè)高管起到有效地激勵作用。主要表現(xiàn)為貨幣薪酬激勵仍是多數(shù)企業(yè)的主要薪酬激勵方式,高層管理人員總體持股比例處于較低水平,影響高管創(chuàng)新積極性,從而導致不合理的企業(yè)風險承擔水平。第三,薪酬激勵能有效調(diào)節(jié)家族企業(yè)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)風險承擔的關系,具體表現(xiàn)在貨幣薪酬激勵能調(diào)節(jié)家族企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與企業(yè)風險承擔的負相關關系,而高管持股能有效調(diào)節(jié)家族企業(yè)兩權(quán)分離和金字塔層級與企業(yè)風險承擔的正相關關系。
[Abstract]:With the adjustment of the economic structure of our country, the extensive production and management mode of family business has been faced with more and more severe challenges, and the risks faced by enterprises are becoming more and more diversified and complicated. When family business managers bring unreasonable risk-bearing level to enterprises because of "shortsightedness" or radical investment decisions, it will inevitably affect the business performance and damage the value of the company. Therefore, the risk bearing level of family enterprises has become the core problem of the sustainable survival of enterprises. Enterprises can develop healthily and continuously only by maintaining a reasonable risk bearing level. To a great extent, the enterprise risk undertaking is influenced by the ownership structure and salary incentive of the family firm. Different ownership structure and different salary incentive mechanism will affect the management's venture capital decision. In view of this, on the basis of combing the domestic and foreign literature and analyzing the relevant theories, this paper studies the influence of ownership structure, salary incentive and risk taking on the small and medium-sized board family enterprises of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In this paper, the volatility of the return on assets of listed family firms for three consecutive years is taken as the index to measure the risk taking, the right of cash flow, the degree of separation of the two rights and the pyramid level are taken as the indicators to measure the ownership structure. Taking the logarithm of the total compensation of the three top executives before and after two years ago and the proportion of the executive stock holding as the index to measure the compensation incentive, this paper first studies the ownership structure of the family firm and the influence of the compensation incentive on the risk bearing of the enterprise. Then the ownership structure and salary incentive are combined to study the impact on enterprise risk-bearing. Finally, the empirical conclusions are supplemented and explained by the case study of New Hope Group, so as to analyze the relationship between the factors and the risk assumption of the enterprise from all angles. Through empirical analysis and case study, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the ownership structure of most listed family enterprises in China is unreasonable, mainly reflected in the high degree of separation of the two rights. There are many levels of pyramids (complex ownership structure, a dominant phenomenon and so on, which leads to the level of enterprise risk assumption is not ideal. Second, the salary structure of listed family enterprises in China is unreasonable, and equity incentive is formalized, which does not play an effective role in encouraging senior executives. The main performance is that monetary compensation incentive is still the main way of salary incentive in most enterprises, and the overall shareholding ratio of senior managers is at a low level, which affects the innovation enthusiasm of senior executives and leads to unreasonable risk-bearing level of enterprises. Thirdly, the compensation incentive can effectively regulate the relationship between the ownership structure of the family firm and the risk bearing of the enterprise, which is manifested in the negative correlation between the cash flow right of the family firm and the risk bearing of the enterprise. The executive ownership can effectively regulate the separation of the two rights of the family firm and the positive correlation between the pyramid level and the risk bearing of the enterprise.
【學位授予單位】：杭州電子科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F276.5

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