發(fā)布時間：2018-05-14 21:36

  本文選題：中央企業(yè) + 高管薪酬�。� 參考：《陜西科技大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)之間的競爭,本質(zhì)上是人才的競爭。高管人員作為公司的決策中心,同時也是一種重要的人力資本,對公司的成長起著十分關(guān)鍵的作用,如何調(diào)動高管工作的積極性,對高管進行有效激勵是值得我們探討的問題。由于兩權(quán)分離,股東不直接參與公司經(jīng)營管理,而是委托高管代為經(jīng)營,兩者因為掌握的信息不一致,利益目標不同,從而出現(xiàn)了一系列代理問題,為了降低這些代理問題產(chǎn)生的成本,將高管與股東的利益相結(jié)合,就需要建立健全高管薪酬激勵制度。央企作為國民經(jīng)濟的支柱,在社會主義市場經(jīng)濟中發(fā)揮著重要作用,同時央企還承擔著一定的社會責任,其政治和經(jīng)濟地位的特殊性和重要性不言而喻。國有企業(yè)高管薪酬,尤其是大型央企的高管薪酬問題,一直以來受到社會的廣泛關(guān)注。近幾年政府連續(xù)發(fā)布了《中央管理企業(yè)負責人薪酬制度改革方案》和《關(guān)于深化國有企業(yè)改革的指導意見》,在央企高管薪酬改革的背景下,研究央企類上市公司的高管薪酬制度顯得十分迫切和必要,對推動央企的改革與發(fā)展、優(yōu)化上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)具有重大意義。本文主要采用了文獻研究法、定性與定量分析相結(jié)合、規(guī)范研究與實證研究相結(jié)合的方法。首先,回顧了國內(nèi)外關(guān)于高管薪酬與公司績效的相關(guān)文獻,界定了中央企業(yè)、高管薪酬、公司績效的基本概念,介紹了人力資本理論、委托代理理論和激勵理論三個理論基礎(chǔ)。接著分析了央企類上市公司高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀與問題,發(fā)現(xiàn)目前的現(xiàn)狀為:高管貨幣薪酬持續(xù)增長、但內(nèi)部差距較大;零持股現(xiàn)象普遍,高管持股比例偏低;不同地區(qū)和行業(yè)高管薪酬差異較大;同時高管薪酬還存在著激勵機制不健全、信息披露制度不完善、存在政府管制和獎懲缺乏過程評價等問題。然后從理論分析的角度提出三個研究假設(shè),以281家央企類上市公司為研究對象,選取2010-2015年數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,剔除不符合標準的數(shù)據(jù)后共得到1686個樣本,以衡量公司績效的資產(chǎn)收益率和每股收益為被解釋變量,以高管貨幣薪酬、高管持股比例、高管在職消費為解釋變量,以公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負債率、股權(quán)集中度、地區(qū)虛擬變量和行業(yè)虛擬變量為控制變量,構(gòu)建多元回歸模型,運用SPSS軟件對樣本數(shù)據(jù)進行分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):一高管貨幣薪酬與公司績效正相關(guān)關(guān)系顯著。說明高管薪酬激勵制度在央企上市公司初步發(fā)揮作用,高管可以通過提升公司績效的方式來提高自身收益。二高管持股比例與公司績效相關(guān)性不顯著。主要原因可能是因為我國央企上市公司實行股權(quán)激勵的時間比較晚,零持股現(xiàn)象普遍,高管持股比例偏低,高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)不合理,主要是以貨幣等短期激勵方式為主,沒有建立起有效的長期股權(quán)激勵機制,導致高管持股對公司績效的作用不明顯。三高管在職消費與公司績效負相關(guān)關(guān)系顯著。這說明我國央企上市公司存在在職消費過度現(xiàn)象,在職消費消耗的成本遠遠大于其帶來的效益增長,對公司績效具有負面影響,在職消費不能成為一種有效的激勵方式,應(yīng)該對在職消費進行適當規(guī)范。最后,根據(jù)本文研究結(jié)論,結(jié)合我國央企上市公司高管薪酬現(xiàn)狀和存在的問題,提出了包括建立多元化薪酬激勵機制,提高在職消費透明度,培育完善職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場,建立健全績效評價體系,完善高管薪酬監(jiān)督機制等相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:The competition between modern enterprises is essentially the competition of talents. As the decision center of the company, the executives are also an important human capital, which play a crucial role in the growth of the company. How to mobilize the enthusiasm of the executives and stimulate the executives effectively is a problem worthy of our discussion. Due to the separation of the two rights, the stock is a problem. The East is not directly involved in the management of the company, but is entrusted to the management of the senior executives. Because the information is inconsistent and the interest goals are different, there is a series of agency problems. In order to reduce the cost of these agency problems and combine the interests of the executives with the shareholders, it is necessary to establish and improve the executive compensation incentive system. As the pillar of the national economy, it plays an important role in the socialist market economy. At the same time, the central enterprises also bear certain social responsibilities. The particularity and importance of their political and economic status are self-evident. The salary of the executives of the state-owned enterprises, especially the large central enterprises, has been widely paid attention to by the society. Under the background of the compensation reform of the central enterprise executives, it is very urgent and necessary to study the executive compensation system of the listed companies of the central enterprises, to promote the reform and development of the central enterprises and to optimize the governance of the listed companies. This paper mainly adopts the literature research method, the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, and the combination of normative and empirical research. First, it reviews the relevant literature about executive compensation and corporate performance at home and abroad, defines the basic concepts of central enterprises, executive compensation, corporate performance, and introduces human resources. This theory, principal-agent theory and incentive theory based on three theoretical basis, then analyzes the status and problems of executive compensation of the central enterprise listed companies, and finds that the current situation is: executive monetary compensation continues to grow, but the internal gap is large; the zero shareholding phenomenon is common, the proportion of senior executives is low; the salaries of executives in different regions and industries are very different. At the same time, the executive compensation still exists the imperfect incentive mechanism, the imperfect information disclosure system, the government regulation and the evaluation of the lack of rewards and punishments. Then three research hypotheses are put forward from the perspective of theoretical analysis, and 281 central enterprises listed companies are taken as the research object, and 2010-2015 year data are selected as the research samples to eliminate the unqualified standards. After the data, a total of 1686 samples were obtained to measure the asset returns and earnings per share of the company as explanatory variables, with executive currency pay, executive stock ratio, and executive consumption as explanatory variables, with the company size, asset liability ratio, equity concentration, regional virtual variables and industry virtual variables as control variables. The regression model is used to analyze the sample data with SPSS software. It is found that the relationship between executive monetary compensation and company performance is positively related. It shows that the executive compensation incentive system plays a preliminary role in the listed companies of central enterprises, and the senior executives can raise their own earnings by improving the company performance. Two the proportion of executive stock ownership and the performance of the company. The main reason may be that the time of equity incentive in the listed companies of China's central enterprises is relatively late, the phenomenon of zero shareholding is common, the proportion of executive stock holding is low and the salary structure of senior executives is unreasonable, mainly by short-term incentive methods such as money, which has not established an effective long-term equity incentive mechanism, leading to executive stock ownership. The role of corporate performance is not obvious. Three the negative correlation between in-service consumption and corporate performance is significant. This shows that the overconsumption phenomenon exists in the listed companies of China's central enterprises. The cost of incumbency consumption is far greater than that of its benefit growth. It has a negative impact on the performance of the company, and the on-the-job consumption can not be an effective incentive. In the end, according to the conclusion of this paper, according to the present situation and existing problems of the executive compensation of the listed companies in China's central enterprises, this paper proposes to establish a diversified salary incentive mechanism, improve the transparency of the on-the-job consumption, cultivate and perfect the market of professional managers, establish a sound performance evaluation system and perfect the high performance evaluation system. Pay supervision mechanism and other relevant policy recommendations.

【學位授予單位】：陜西科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F276.1

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本文編號：1889537