本文選題：高管薪酬 + 風險承擔　； 參考：《集美大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：高管薪酬一直是理論界與實務(wù)界討論的焦點問題,如何制定合理有效的高管薪酬制度,激勵高管更好地為股東創(chuàng)造財富,實現(xiàn)股東價值最大化是公司治理研究的重要內(nèi)容。本文對高管薪酬、風險承擔與企業(yè)財務(wù)績效三者的關(guān)系以及風險承擔在高管薪酬與企業(yè)財務(wù)績效之間起到的中介效應(yīng)展開分析,旨在為促進企業(yè)長遠發(fā)展、完善公司治理機制、制定合理的高管薪酬制度提供更加切實可行的指導。本文回顧了國內(nèi)外學者對高管薪酬、風險承擔與企業(yè)財務(wù)績效相互作用機制的相關(guān)研究成果,總結(jié)出三者的相關(guān)概念和計量標準,對三者之間的理論關(guān)系進行分析和梳理,進而提出本文實證檢驗的理論假設(shè),構(gòu)建相關(guān)的實證模型。本研究選取滬、深兩市A股市場符合條件的792家上市企業(yè)(國有企業(yè)454家,非國有企業(yè)338家)跨期十年的樣本數(shù)據(jù)作為研究對象,使用EXCEL和STATA等數(shù)據(jù)處理和分析軟件對三者之間的關(guān)系和風險承擔的中介效應(yīng)進行實證檢驗。結(jié)果表明:企業(yè)風險承擔水平與高管貨幣薪酬激勵之間呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,且與國有企業(yè)相比,非國有企業(yè)高管貨幣薪酬激勵對企業(yè)風險承擔水平的影響較大;企業(yè)財務(wù)績效與高管貨幣薪酬激勵呈顯著正相關(guān),且在我國上市企業(yè)中,非國有企業(yè)高管貨幣薪酬與企業(yè)財務(wù)績效之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系與國有企業(yè)相比較強;高管股權(quán)激勵與風險承擔、企業(yè)財務(wù)績效不具有顯著相關(guān)性;企業(yè)財務(wù)績效與風險承擔水平呈顯著正相關(guān);風險承擔在高管貨幣薪酬激勵與企業(yè)財務(wù)績效之間的相互作用中起中介效應(yīng)。根據(jù)研究結(jié)果,本文提出對策建議:制定政策來管理高管薪酬的發(fā)放促進企業(yè)財務(wù)績效的提升;在設(shè)計高管薪酬制度時,應(yīng)充分考慮企業(yè)的風險承擔效用;建立完善的高管薪酬制度、有效的高管薪酬監(jiān)管體系以及合理的企業(yè)財務(wù)績效評價體系,提高企業(yè)高管薪酬披露的透明度;對高管實施薪酬激勵以提高企業(yè)財務(wù)績效時,應(yīng)合理控制企業(yè)的風險承擔水平;成立風險管理委員會、完善董事會和監(jiān)事會制度來加強對風險項目決策的內(nèi)部監(jiān)督;優(yōu)化我國公司治理機制,以提高高管薪酬、企業(yè)風險承擔水平對企業(yè)財務(wù)績效的正面促進作用,如多元化企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、擴大內(nèi)部人持股范圍等;加快我國國有企業(yè)改革步伐,完善國有企業(yè)高管聘任制度,推進國有企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)多元化。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation has always been the focus of discussion between theoretical and practical circles. How to formulate a reasonable and effective executive compensation system, encourage executives to create wealth for shareholders better and maximize shareholder value is an important content of corporate governance research. This paper analyzes the relationship among executive compensation, risk-taking and corporate financial performance, as well as the intermediary effect of risk-taking between executive compensation and corporate financial performance, in order to promote the long-term development of enterprises and improve the corporate governance mechanism. To establish a reasonable executive compensation system to provide more practical guidance. This paper reviews the research results of the interaction mechanism of executive compensation, risk-taking and corporate financial performance, summarizes the related concepts and measurement standards, and analyzes and combs the theoretical relationship between them. Then the theoretical hypothesis of empirical test is put forward, and the relevant empirical model is constructed. This study selected 792 listed enterprises (454 state-owned enterprises and 338 non-state-owned enterprises) in the A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen as the objects of study. The data processing and analysis software such as EXCEL and STATA are used to test the relationship between them and the intermediary effect of risk taking. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the risk-bearing level and the monetary compensation incentive, and the non-state-owned enterprise has a greater impact on the risk-taking level than the state-owned enterprise. The financial performance of the enterprise is positively correlated with the monetary incentive of the executive, and the correlation between the monetary compensation of the non-state-owned enterprise and the financial performance of the state-owned enterprise is stronger than that of the state-owned enterprise in the listed enterprises of our country. There is no significant correlation between corporate financial performance and corporate financial performance, but there is a significant positive correlation between corporate financial performance and risk-taking level. Risk-taking plays an intermediary role in the interaction between monetary incentive and financial performance. According to the results of the study, this paper puts forward some suggestions: making policies to manage executive compensation to promote the financial performance of enterprises, designing executive compensation system, taking full account of the risk bearing utility of enterprises; Establish a perfect executive compensation system, an effective executive compensation regulatory system and a reasonable financial performance evaluation system to improve the transparency of executive compensation disclosure; executive compensation incentive to improve corporate financial performance, Risk management committee should be set up, the board of directors and the board of supervisors should be perfected to strengthen the internal supervision of the risk project decision, the corporate governance mechanism of our country should be optimized, and the executive compensation should be improved. The positive effect of the risk-bearing level on the financial performance of enterprises, such as diversifying the ownership structure of enterprises, expanding the scope of insider ownership, speeding up the reform of state-owned enterprises, perfecting the appointment system of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, and so on. Promote the diversification of ownership structure of state-owned enterprises.
【學位授予單位】：集美大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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