本文選題：中德證券 + 高管變更　； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：高級(jí)管理人員的變更,作為公司股東或董事會(huì)做出的最重要決策之一,長期以來受到國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的關(guān)注。隨著我國資本市場(chǎng)的進(jìn)一步對(duì)外開放,合資證券公司逐漸成為我國證券市場(chǎng)的重要組成部分。在合資券商的發(fā)展過程中,連續(xù)數(shù)年業(yè)績慘淡,合資經(jīng)營表現(xiàn)不佳,致使合資券商高管變更頻頻發(fā)生。那么我國合資證券公司高管變更會(huì)對(duì)合資證券公司的經(jīng)營績效產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響,高管變更導(dǎo)致經(jīng)營績效變動(dòng),其背后更深層的原因是什么,這些是論文最主要的研究議題。論文以合資券商重新啟動(dòng)審批后首個(gè)高管變更事件,中德證券高管變更為案例,采用綜合性的評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo),從盈利能力、經(jīng)營增長、償債能力、資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量四個(gè)方面,與對(duì)照企業(yè)進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,來考察高管變更前后的經(jīng)營績效表現(xiàn)。雷達(dá)圖分析以及財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)反映的結(jié)果顯示:高管變更前,中德證券經(jīng)營績效整體表現(xiàn)較差,這也是造成其高管發(fā)生變更的直接原因。而高管變更的確會(huì)影響其經(jīng)營績效表現(xiàn),并在一定程度上對(duì)績效產(chǎn)生正向的影響。同時(shí),論文還對(duì)高管變更導(dǎo)致的經(jīng)營績效變動(dòng)背后的原因進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步分析,得出高管變更對(duì)股權(quán)與控制權(quán)均衡、及業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)與業(yè)務(wù)戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整以及合資目的協(xié)調(diào)等的影響,是造成中德證券高管變更后經(jīng)營績效變動(dòng)的主要原因。在此基礎(chǔ)上,論文從協(xié)調(diào)雙方資源,構(gòu)建共同戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo);優(yōu)化業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu),調(diào)整業(yè)務(wù)戰(zhàn)略;平衡雙方利益,提升中方控制權(quán)三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行改進(jìn),為合資證券公司擺脫經(jīng)營困境提出了具體可行的解決方案。論文與以往研究多針對(duì)大樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證統(tǒng)計(jì)不同,論文以高管變更為要素,從實(shí)務(wù)出發(fā),通過對(duì)單個(gè)案例進(jìn)行深度研究,來探析高管變更與經(jīng)營績效的關(guān)系,并對(duì)高管變更引起績效變動(dòng)的原因進(jìn)行分析總結(jié),加強(qiáng)了研究的創(chuàng)新意義,豐富了高管變更與經(jīng)營績效的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:As one of the most important decisions made by the shareholders of the company or the board of directors, the change of senior managers has long been paid attention by scholars both at home and abroad. With the further opening of the capital market in China, the joint venture securities company has gradually become an important component of the securities market in China. Poor performance and poor performance of joint ventures have led to frequent changes in the joint venture executives. Then, what is the effect of the change of senior executives on the performance of the joint venture securities companies, the change of executive performance and the deeper causes behind the change of executive performance, which are the main research topics in the paper. This paper restarts the first executive change event after approval by joint venture broker. China Germany securities executives change into a case, using comprehensive evaluation index, from four aspects of profitability, business growth, debt paying ability and asset quality, and comparing with the control enterprise to examine the performance performance of senior executives before and after the change. And the results of the financial data show that the overall performance of the Chinese and German securities performance is poor before the executives change, which is the direct cause of the change of the senior executives, and the executive change does affect its performance performance and has a positive impact on the performance to a certain extent. The reasons behind the changes in the performance of the camp are further analyzed, and the effect of the balance of the executive change to the ownership and control rights, the business structure and business strategy adjustment and the joint purpose coordination are the main reasons for the change of the management performance after the change of the Chinese and German securities executives. The strategic objective: to optimize the business structure, to adjust the business strategy, to balance the interests of the two sides, to improve the three aspects of China's control, and to put forward a concrete and feasible solution for the joint venture securities companies to get rid of their management difficulties. Through a deep study of a single case, the relationship between executive change and performance is analyzed, and the reasons for the change in performance are analyzed and summarized, which strengthens the innovation significance of the research and enriches the related literature of executive change and management performance.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.39

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條

1 潘越;戴亦一;魏詩琪;;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與上市公司“合謀”了嗎:基于高管非自愿變更與繼任選擇事件的分析[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2011年02期

2 陳崢嶸;;證券公司經(jīng)營模式和監(jiān)管政策的“順周期效應(yīng)”分析[J];中國科技投資;2011年02期

3 鄭藝;;合資企業(yè)中方母公司合資目的與控制權(quán)配置的研究[J];中國集體經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年34期

4 梁蕓;;公司業(yè)績與高管變更的關(guān)系研究[J];武漢大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2010年06期

5 朱琪;;上市公司控股股東和高管變更是否改善了企業(yè)績效?[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2010年01期

，

本文編號(hào)：1797352