本文選題：上市銀行　切入點：高管薪酬　出處：《中國地質(zhì)大學(北京)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：知識經(jīng)濟逐漸發(fā)展成為主流,促使人力資本在企業(yè)中的重要性不斷提高,作為企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理者的高級管理人員是企業(yè)重要的人力資源,同時能夠提升企業(yè)的核心競爭力。而委托代理問題的提出致使企業(yè)所有者通常會為了追求自身利益的最大化而采取較高的薪酬對高管人員實施激勵。近年來,國內(nèi)外頻繁曝出銀行高管千萬年薪的消息使得銀行高管的薪酬問題不僅被社會廣泛關(guān)注,更是帶動了學術(shù)界對此進行研究的熱情。黨的十八大報告中指出,金融市場體系不斷完善的核心任務之一是必須深化對銀行體系的改革,當前已經(jīng)有16家商業(yè)銀行已經(jīng)在滬、深證券交易所完成上市,同時還有幾家股份制銀行在籌備上市過程中。金融改革棋至中局,高管薪酬激勵體系改革勢在必行。因此,研究銀行業(yè)的高管薪酬與經(jīng)營績效的關(guān)系,分析在高管人員的薪酬制定時哪些因素是關(guān)鍵影響因素,不僅對于銀行的持續(xù)發(fā)展具有理論和現(xiàn)實意義,而且能夠為銀行體系的深化改革提供重要依據(jù)。論文的研究方法主要有文獻研究法、定性分析方法以及定量分析方法三種。研究樣本涵蓋當前我國全部16家上市銀行,整理了2013年至2016年共計4年的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),利用SPSS20.0軟件進行實證分析。其中,相關(guān)性分析中初步得出高管薪酬與每股收益正相關(guān),與不良貸款率負相關(guān)的結(jié)論,同時驗證了各績效指標變量之間的多重共線性問題不存在。回歸分析將高管薪酬作為被解釋變量,銀行經(jīng)營績效作為解釋變量,并通過4個指標來衡量,分別是能夠代表銀行盈利性水平的加權(quán)平均凈資產(chǎn)收益率和每股收益,能夠衡量銀行資產(chǎn)安全性的不良貸款率,能夠體現(xiàn)銀行資產(chǎn)流動性的資本充足率,并以銀行的總資產(chǎn)規(guī)模作為控制變量。實證結(jié)果表明,高管薪酬與加權(quán)平均凈資產(chǎn)收益率、不良貸款率和資本充足率負相關(guān),與每股收益顯著正相關(guān),與銀行的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模微弱正相關(guān),得出上市銀行經(jīng)營績效能夠解釋高管薪酬約55%變異情況的結(jié)論。最后提出了進一步優(yōu)化國有控股上市銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、建立完善銀行經(jīng)營績效考核指標、完善與經(jīng)營績效掛鉤的長期薪酬激勵制度的相關(guān)建議。
[Abstract]:Knowledge economy has gradually developed into the mainstream, which promotes the importance of human capital in the enterprise. As a senior manager, senior managers are the important human resources of the enterprise. At the same time, it can enhance the core competitiveness of the enterprise. And the principal-agent problem makes the business owners usually take higher compensation to encourage the executives in order to maximize their own interests. The frequent disclosure at home and abroad of the 10 million annual salary of bank executives makes the issue of bank executives' salaries not only receive widespread attention in the society, but also stimulate the enthusiasm of the academic community to study this. The report of the 18th National Congress of the CPC pointed out that. Ren Wuzhi, the core of the continuous improvement of the financial market system, first, must deepen the reform of the banking system. At present, there are already 16 commercial banks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. At the same time, there are also several joint-stock banks in the process of preparing for the listing. The reform of the executive compensation incentive system is imperative in the financial reform to the Central Bureau. Therefore, the relationship between the executive compensation and the operating performance of the banking industry is studied. It is not only of theoretical and practical significance to analyze which factors are the key influencing factors in the formulation of executive compensation, but also to the sustainable development of banks. And it can provide an important basis for deepening the reform of the banking system. There are three main research methods in this paper: literature research, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. The study sample covers all 16 listed banks in China. This paper collates the relevant data of four years from 2013 to 2016 and makes empirical analysis with SPSS20.0 software. Among them, the correlation analysis shows that executive compensation is positively correlated with earnings per share and negatively correlated with non-performing loan rate. At the same time, it is verified that there is no multiple collinearity between the performance indicators. The regression analysis takes executive compensation as the explained variable, the bank performance as the explanatory variable, and measures it by four indicators. They are the weighted average ROE and EPS which represent the profitability level of the bank, the non-performing loan ratio, which can measure the security of the bank's assets, and the capital adequacy ratio of the bank's asset liquidity. The empirical results show that executive compensation is negatively correlated with weighted average net asset return, non-performing loan ratio and capital adequacy ratio, and positively correlated with earnings per share. The conclusion that the operating performance of listed banks can explain the variation of executive compensation is about 55%. Finally, the paper puts forward to further optimize the corporate governance structure of state-owned holding listed banks. To establish and improve the performance evaluation index of banks, and improve the long-term salary incentive system linked to the performance of the relevant suggestions.
【學位授予單位】：中國地質(zhì)大學(北京)
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F830.42;F832.3

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