本文選題：產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰度　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)激勵　出處：《西北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：投資貢獻(xiàn)不僅基于量的增長,更注重效率的提升,而從2009年開始我國上市公司投資的效率在逐年下滑。上市公司降低代理成本的一種長效機(jī)制是人力資本的股權(quán)激勵,其發(fā)揮的效果會直接影響高管層的決策。國內(nèi)外大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)主要集中研究股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系,卻忽視了股權(quán)激勵對高管層的決策行為的影響。在管理層的決策活動中,投資決策是影響企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績的重要因素之一。另外,對于股東來說,產(chǎn)權(quán)是對企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán),實(shí)質(zhì)是資本的權(quán)益,資本的保值、增值到底是由誰來受益,而損失誰來承擔(dān),基于產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰度的國有和民營的劃分,則產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰度不同會表現(xiàn)在公司代理問題的不同,進(jìn)而對高管層的投資決策影響也不同,同時,由于產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰度不同,股權(quán)激勵實(shí)施的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、激勵的收益限制、績效的考核指標(biāo)等也不同,從而影響股權(quán)激勵對高管層的投資行為。本文以2009-2015年滬深兩市公告的實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃的492家上市公司為研究對象,以產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰度-公司類型-代理成本-管理層激勵-投資決策-企業(yè)績效這條邏輯主線,從微觀的股權(quán)激勵契約的構(gòu)成要素層面,研究基于產(chǎn)權(quán)明晰度的股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)投資效率的綜合影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),民營企業(yè)相對于國有企業(yè)的非效率投資更為顯著;對于未實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵來說,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵能夠抑制企業(yè)的非效率投資,且在國有和民營企業(yè)中效果不同;股權(quán)激勵強(qiáng)度的增加,股權(quán)激勵與過度投資存在非線性關(guān)系,而與投資不足是線性關(guān)系;在股權(quán)激勵方式的選擇上,國有企業(yè)實(shí)施限制性股票對過度投資的抑制作用更為明顯,而民營企業(yè)更傾向于選擇股票期權(quán)。
[Abstract]:Investment contribution is not only based on the increase of quantity, but also on the improvement of efficiency. Since 2009, the investment efficiency of listed companies in China has been declining year by year. A long-term mechanism to reduce agency costs of listed companies is the equity incentive of human capital. Most of the literature at home and abroad mainly focus on the relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance. However, it ignores the influence of equity incentive on executive decision-making. In the decision-making activities of management, investment decision is one of the important factors that affect the business performance. In addition, to shareholders, property right is the property right of the enterprise. The essence is the rights and interests of capital, who benefits the preservation and appreciation of capital, and who will bear the loss, and the division of state-owned and private ownership based on the clarity of property rights, then the difference of property right clarity will be manifested in the different agency problem of the company. At the same time, because of the difference of property right clarity, the regulatory agency of equity incentive implementation, the income limitation of incentive, the evaluation index of performance are also different. In order to influence the investment behavior of stock incentive to senior executives, this paper takes 492 listed companies which were announced in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009-2015 as the research object. Based on the logical thread of property right clarity, firm type, agency cost, management incentive, investment decision and enterprise performance, this paper analyzes the elements of the micro equity incentive contract. This paper studies the comprehensive influence of equity incentive based on the clarity of property right on the investment efficiency of enterprises. It is found that the non-efficient investment of private enterprises is more significant than that of state-owned enterprises. The implementation of equity incentive can restrain the inefficient investment of enterprises, and the effect is different between state-owned and private enterprises, with the increase of the intensity of equity incentive, there is a nonlinear relationship between equity incentive and overinvestment, but a linear relationship between equity incentive and insufficient investment. In the choice of equity incentive mode, the restraining effect of restricted stock on overinvestment is more obvious in state-owned enterprises, while private enterprises tend to choose stock option.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51
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本文編號：1569781