本文選題：集體土地　切入點：征收拆遷沖突　出處：《浙江財經(jīng)大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：當前在新型城鎮(zhèn)化建設深入推進的過程中,農(nóng)業(yè)人口短時間內(nèi)大規(guī)模轉移與城鎮(zhèn)大范圍開發(fā)建設促使全國各地對土地的需求量大增。隨著國有土地供給逐漸飽和,通過對集體土地的征收為新城擴建供給土地滿足城鎮(zhèn)發(fā)展需要,則成為縱深推進城鎮(zhèn)化的一條重要現(xiàn)實路徑。然而在此路徑中,對集體土地的征收拆遷也伴隨著大量的征收拆遷沖突問題,嚴重影響社會的和諧與穩(wěn)定。為此政府不斷完善相關政策,學術界也展開了大量研究。現(xiàn)有研究主要基于結構主義路徑,并多限于靜態(tài)的規(guī)范性研究以及個案分析與經(jīng)驗的主觀性總結層面上,缺少對征收拆遷沖突自下而上的演化規(guī)律建模和定量的系統(tǒng)性研究,從而造成相關政策建議缺乏微觀執(zhí)行效果且治理績效不佳的情況。本文首先從文獻梳理和實地調(diào)研入手對集體土地征收拆遷沖突利益相關者及其博弈策略進行界定,在此基礎上構建了集體土地上征收拆遷沖突二維對稱與非對稱演化博弈理論模型和仿真實驗流程。然后根據(jù)實際情況依據(jù)已建立的理論模型和仿真流程,進行了被征地農(nóng)民之間、被征地農(nóng)民與村委會之間、被征地農(nóng)民與地方政府之間征收拆遷沖突的演化博弈與仿真模擬研究。深入分析了各類集體土地征收拆遷沖突的博弈均衡狀態(tài)與演化趨勢。最后根據(jù)研究結果提出了具有針對性的政策建議。通過本文的研究,得出以下主要結論:(1)集體土地上征收拆遷村民之間的演化博弈存在混合策略,是發(fā)生“釘子戶”和村民對峙現(xiàn)象的主要原因。(2)征地拆遷村內(nèi)工作的不公平性與利己主義的蔓延破壞村內(nèi)和諧征拆。即村委會成員或被征地農(nóng)民通過違規(guī)手段或自身勢力,不顧集體利益地提高自身在和諧狀態(tài)時的征地收益比重,是造成集體土地征收拆遷村內(nèi)不和諧狀態(tài)的主要原因。(3)降低村委會違規(guī)操作和被征地農(nóng)民不順從的收益比重,提高相應風險和執(zhí)行成本,可有效避免集體土地征收拆遷的村內(nèi)沖突。(4)不論地方政府還是被征地農(nóng)民,相對弱勢一方發(fā)生征收拆遷官民沖突主要受高成本支出的影響,相對強勢一方發(fā)生征收拆遷官民沖突的主導因素為凈收益的高低。即通過對征地雙方有針對性地進行成本和凈收益調(diào)控,使其處于合理范圍將有效解決征地拆遷的官民沖突。(5)增大被征地農(nóng)民合作凈收益,減小地方政府違法征地凈收益增量,是集體土地上征收拆遷官民和諧的有力保證。(6)地方政府合法征地時被征地農(nóng)民合作策略初始比例越高越容易趨向于征收拆遷和諧,地方政府違法征地時被征地農(nóng)民策略抵制初始比例越高則越容易發(fā)生征收拆遷沖突。鑒于以上研究結論,從維護村內(nèi)和諧、解決官民沖突、增強失地后保障、推進征地沖突預警四個方面提出政策建議:(1)以“公平、公正、公開”為準則,堅持村民自治與加強基層民主建設為抓手,維護集體土地征收拆遷的村內(nèi)和諧。(2)以完善法規(guī)政策和制度建設為根本,改善征地補償機制和利益表達渠道為途徑,解決集體土地征收拆遷的官民沖突。(3)以“以人為本”為核心,強化集體土地征收拆遷的“軟服務”為樞紐,增強失地農(nóng)民社會保障力度。(4)以科學預測與應急為基礎,推進“科學征地”思想,構建集體土地征收拆遷沖突的預警治理機制。
[Abstract]:In the process of the construction of the new urbanization advancing in a short period of time, the agricultural population and urban development of a wide range of mass transfer across the country to build the demand for land increased. Along with the state-owned land supply gradually saturated, through the collective land expropriation for the expansion of Metro land supply meet the urban development needs, has become a push an important practical path of urbanization. However, in this path, the collective land expropriation is accompanied by the problem of demolition conflict, seriously affect social harmony and stability. So the government constantly improve the relevant policies, the academic circles also launched a lot of research. The existing research is mainly based on structuralism and multi path. Limited to static normative research and case analysis and experience summary of subjective level, the lack of the evolution of the expropriation conflicts bottom-up modeling Study on systematic and quantitative, resulting in the lack of relevant policy recommendations and implementation effect of micro governance of poor performance. This paper from the literature review and investigation of the definition of the conflicts of stakeholders and their game strategy of collective land expropriation, on the basis of the construction of collective land expropriation conflicts of two-dimensional symmetric and non symmetric evolutionary game theory model and simulation process. Theoretical model and simulation process according to the actual situation on the basis of the established, the landless farmers, landless farmers and the village committee is between the simulation of evolution game and Simulation of demolition conflict between farmers and local government. The in-depth analysis of the equilibrium state and the evolution trend of all kinds of collective land acquisition demolition conflict. Finally, according to the research results put forward targeted policy recommendations. Through this research, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) mixed strategy on collective land expropriation between villagers' evolutionary game, is a major cause of the "nail house" and the villagers confrontation phenomenon. (2) the village land demolition work unfairness and egoism spread destruction. The village harmonious village levy demolition the members of the landless farmers or through illegal means or their own forces, regardless of the collective interests to improve their own in a harmonious state of the land income proportion is mainly caused by the disharmony in the village collective land expropriation and demolition. (3) reduce the village irregularities and landless farmers do not obey the proportion of the income increase, and the corresponding risk the execution cost, which can effectively avoid the conflict of the village collective land acquisition demolition. (4) whether the local government or the landless farmers, the relatively weak party clashes occurred mainly by the demolition The effect of high cost, relatively strong one party dominant factors of expropriation clashes as net income. The land both targeted for cost and net income regulation, which is in a reasonable range will effectively solve the conflicts between the government and the demolition of the land. (5) increase the land expropriated Peasants Cooperation net income, reduce local government illegal land expropriation net increment of income, is a strong guarantee of collective land expropriation public harmony. (6) local government land expropriated farmers cooperative strategy the higher initial ratio tend to levy demolition harmony, local government illegal land expropriation when landless farmers resist the higher proportion of the initial strategy the greater the expropriation prone to conflict. In view of the above conclusions, from the maintenance of a harmonious village, to solve the conflicts between the government, after losing enhanced security, promoting the four aspects of land conflict warning put forward policy Suggestions: (1) to "fair, fair, public" as the criterion, adhere to and strengthen the autonomy of villagers democratic construction at the grassroots level as the starting point, the maintenance of collective land acquisition demolition of the village harmonious. (2) to improve the policy and system construction as the fundamental improvement of land requisition compensation mechanism and benefit of channel as the way, clashes to solve the collective land expropriation. (3) to the "people-oriented" as the core, strengthen the collective land expropriation "soft service" as the hub, enhance social security system of landless peasants. (4) based on scientific prediction and emergency basis, promote the scientific construction of collective land expropriation "ideology, governance mechanism of land expropriation demolition conflict warning.

【學位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F321.1;D422.6;F224.32

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