特許權(quán)價(jià)值、公司治理和銀行穩(wěn)健性——基于特許權(quán)價(jià)值和公司治理交互作用的視角
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-08-14 08:36
【摘要】：以2000—2012年滬深股市16家上市銀行為樣本,實(shí)證分析特許權(quán)價(jià)值、公司治理及其交互作用對(duì)銀行穩(wěn)健性的影響。結(jié)果表明:特許權(quán)價(jià)值的自律效應(yīng)能夠提高銀行穩(wěn)健性;第一大股東持股比例和股東性質(zhì)無(wú)法顯著影響銀行穩(wěn)健性,而前十大股東的持股比例卻顯著影響銀行穩(wěn)健性;完善的董事會(huì)制度能夠提高銀行穩(wěn)健性,而獨(dú)立董事制度卻無(wú)法提高銀行穩(wěn)健性;高管持股能夠提高銀行穩(wěn)健性,而高管薪酬激勵(lì)效果則不明顯;商業(yè)銀行存在"大而不倒"的規(guī)律,而杠桿效應(yīng)則不明顯;前十大股東的持股比例、高管持股與特許權(quán)價(jià)值對(duì)銀行穩(wěn)健性的影響相互替代。
[Abstract]:Taking 16 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2000 to 2012 as samples, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of concession value, corporate governance and its interaction on bank conservatism. The results show that the self-discipline effect of concession value can improve the robustness of banks, the proportion of the first largest shareholders and the nature of shareholders can not significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the proportion of the top 10 shareholders can significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the perfect board of directors system can improve the robustness of banks, while the independent director system can not improve the robustness of banks. Executive shareholding can improve bank conservatism, but executive compensation incentive effect is not obvious; commercial banks have the law of "big but not falling", but leverage effect is not obvious; the proportion of the top ten shareholders, the influence of executive shareholding and concession value on bank conservatism is replaced by each other.
【作者單位】： 上海工程技術(shù)大學(xué);東華大學(xué);北京大學(xué);威海商業(yè)銀行;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年基金項(xiàng)目“特許權(quán)價(jià)值、公司治理機(jī)制和銀行穩(wěn)健性——中美商業(yè)銀行的比較研究”(12YJC630157) 上海工程技術(shù)大學(xué)高水平培育項(xiàng)目“‘三位一體制度’對(duì)銀行穩(wěn)健性的影響研究——中國(guó)上市銀行的理論與實(shí)證研究”(2012pg33) 山東省博士后創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資金資助項(xiàng)目“后危機(jī)時(shí)代山東省城商行現(xiàn)代風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理體系再造研究——基于巴塞爾新資本協(xié)議ⅱ和ⅲ的視角”(201103017)資助
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.2;F832.51
[Abstract]:Taking 16 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2000 to 2012 as samples, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of concession value, corporate governance and its interaction on bank conservatism. The results show that the self-discipline effect of concession value can improve the robustness of banks, the proportion of the first largest shareholders and the nature of shareholders can not significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the proportion of the top 10 shareholders can significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the perfect board of directors system can improve the robustness of banks, while the independent director system can not improve the robustness of banks. Executive shareholding can improve bank conservatism, but executive compensation incentive effect is not obvious; commercial banks have the law of "big but not falling", but leverage effect is not obvious; the proportion of the top ten shareholders, the influence of executive shareholding and concession value on bank conservatism is replaced by each other.
【作者單位】： 上海工程技術(shù)大學(xué);東華大學(xué);北京大學(xué);威海商業(yè)銀行;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年基金項(xiàng)目“特許權(quán)價(jià)值、公司治理機(jī)制和銀行穩(wěn)健性——中美商業(yè)銀行的比較研究”(12YJC630157) 上海工程技術(shù)大學(xué)高水平培育項(xiàng)目“‘三位一體制度’對(duì)銀行穩(wěn)健性的影響研究——中國(guó)上市銀行的理論與實(shí)證研究”(2012pg33) 山東省博士后創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資金資助項(xiàng)目“后危機(jī)時(shí)代山東省城商行現(xiàn)代風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理體系再造研究——基于巴塞爾新資本協(xié)議ⅱ和ⅲ的視角”(201103017)資助
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.2;F832.51
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