【摘要】：就公司內(nèi)部人的股票交易行為而言,行為財務(wù)學(xué)傳統(tǒng)的爭論主要集中于他們是否使用信息優(yōu)勢圖利自己,但在研究方法以及相應(yīng)結(jié)論和政策建議上并未取得共識。近期的文獻(xiàn)表明,內(nèi)部人并不像經(jīng)濟(jì)模型預(yù)期的那樣理性:他們不僅沒有成功擇機(jī)買賣股票,甚至錯失良機(jī)。本文使用內(nèi)部人持股數(shù)量和持股比例的變化來度量內(nèi)部人的交易行為,使用退市公司這一獨(dú)特樣本來避免方法論上的爭議,以檢驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型階段我國上市公司的內(nèi)部人交易行為特征。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,我國退市公司的大股東從退市前兩年開始便存在超賣現(xiàn)象,而退市公司高管人員則一直到退市當(dāng)年才出現(xiàn)超賣現(xiàn)象。結(jié)論表明,退市公司的大股東有通過信息優(yōu)勢圖利自己的傾向;而退市公司高管人員則往往表現(xiàn)出對公司未來過度樂觀的傾向。
[Abstract]:As far as the stock trading behavior of company insiders is concerned, the traditional debate of behavioral finance mainly focuses on whether they use information advantage to benefit themselves, but there is no consensus on the research methods, the corresponding conclusions and policy recommendations. Recent literature has shown that insiders are not as rational as economic models expect: not only have they not succeeded in buying and selling stocks, but they have even missed opportunities. This paper uses the change of the number and proportion of insiders to measure the trading behavior of insiders, and uses the unique sample of delisting companies to avoid methodological disputes in order to test the characteristics of insider trading behavior of listed companies in China in the stage of economic transformation. The empirical results show that the major shareholders of delisting companies in China have oversold since two years before delisting, while the executives of delisting companies did not oversell until the year of delisting. The conclusion shows that the major shareholders of delisting companies tend to benefit themselves through information advantages, while the executives of delisting companies tend to be overly optimistic about the future of the company.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【分類號】：F832.51

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