【摘要】：隨著市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷發(fā)展,我國的投資機(jī)構(gòu)迎來了跨越式的發(fā)展,已經(jīng)成為資金雄厚、擁有巨大市場影響力的主體。越來越多人的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況與社會保障基金、證券投資基金等機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在資本市場中的投資經(jīng)營有關(guān)。很多學(xué)者的研究認(rèn)為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的壯大徹底改變了公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),改善了傳統(tǒng)的公司治理,成為多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)資本市場建設(shè)過程和上市公司治理進(jìn)程中不可或缺的重要力量。但是在研究中,他們通常沒有對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的身份進(jìn)行區(qū)分,與個人投資者相比,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是用別人的資金進(jìn)行投資,在信息不對稱的固有矛盾下具有雙重的委托代理的身份,這對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的投資產(chǎn)生影響。本文通過對影響機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股因素的分析,力圖研究出它們在資本市場上的表現(xiàn)和參與公司治理的程度。 首先,在理論上,本文結(jié)合委托代理、信息不對稱等基礎(chǔ)理論,分析機(jī)構(gòu)投資者特殊的雙重身份。從上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)上看,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是它的股東之一,是委托方;而對投資者而言,投資機(jī)構(gòu)主要由融資構(gòu)成,本身的所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)也是相分離的,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的管理層與資金委托人之間也具有委托代理關(guān)系,充當(dāng)代理人的角色。本文在此基礎(chǔ)上,對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股決策進(jìn)行分析,分別從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的經(jīng)紀(jì)人本質(zhì)、風(fēng)險控制、持股特性以及決策選擇四個方面進(jìn)行論述。 其次,本文在實(shí)證研究中,選取了2007—2009年度在滬、深兩市公開發(fā)行A、B、H股的上市公司共2856個作為樣本。并對這些樣本公司的財務(wù)信息、市場表現(xiàn)信息以及公司治理信息與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股的比率的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),驗(yàn)證了本文提出的假設(shè),即機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與上市公司的財務(wù)信息、市場表現(xiàn)信息以及公司治理信息存在著顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系。 最后,根據(jù)研究結(jié)論提出建議,我國在大力發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的同時,應(yīng)該不斷完善機(jī)構(gòu)投資者管理、監(jiān)督制度,加強(qiáng)對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的教育,從而抑制機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在資本市場中的投機(jī)行為,提高自身對公司治理的參與程度,發(fā)揮其在資本市場中的積極作用。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of market economy, the investment institutions in our country have ushered in the leap-forward development, and have become the main body with strong funds and great market influence. More and more people's economic situation is related to the investment and operation of institutional investors such as social security funds, securities investment funds and so on in the capital market. Many scholars think that the growth of institutional investors has completely changed the ownership structure of the company, improved the traditional corporate governance, and become an indispensable and important force in the construction process of most developed capital markets and the governance process of listed companies. However, in the study, they usually do not distinguish the identity of institutional investors. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors invest with other people's funds and have a dual principal-agent status under the inherent contradiction of asymmetric information, which has an impact on the investment of institutional investors. Based on the analysis of the factors affecting institutional investors' shareholding, this paper tries to study their performance in the capital market and the degree of their participation in corporate governance. First of all, in theory, this paper analyzes the special dual identity of institutional investors based on the basic theory of principal-agent, information asymmetry and so on. From the point of view of the governance structure of listed companies, institutional investors are one of its shareholders and entrustors; for investors, investment institutions are mainly composed of financing, their own ownership and management rights are also separated, institutional investors' management and capital principal also have principal-agent relationship, acting as an agent. On this basis, this paper analyzes the shareholding decision of institutional investors, and discusses the nature of brokers, risk control, shareholding characteristics and decision selection of institutional investors. Secondly, in the empirical study, this paper selects a total of 2856 listed companies that issue A, B and H shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2007 and 2009 as samples. This paper also empirically tests the correlation between the financial information, market performance information and corporate governance information of these sample companies and the ratio of institutional investors to institutional investors' shareholding, and verifies the hypothesis put forward in this paper, that is, there is a significant correlation between institutional investor shareholding and listed companies' financial information, market performance information and corporate governance information. Finally, according to the conclusions of the study, it is suggested that while vigorously developing institutional investors, our country should constantly improve the management and supervision system of institutional investors and strengthen the education of institutional investors, so as to restrain the speculative behavior of institutional investors in the capital market, improve their participation in corporate governance, and give full play to their positive role in the capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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