【摘要】：薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制是商業(yè)銀行激勵(lì)機(jī)制的重要構(gòu)成部分，也是有效的公司治理的重要手段。合理的薪酬激勵(lì)制度能有效激發(fā)銀行員工的主動(dòng)性、創(chuàng)造性、積極性，充分發(fā)揮員工的潛能，為銀行的長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)健發(fā)展而奮斗。因此研究分析我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行薪酬激勵(lì)的影響因素，致力于建立科學(xué)、合理、高效的薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上，通過(guò)定性和定量分析研究了我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行薪酬水平的影響因素，剖析了我國(guó)銀行業(yè)薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制現(xiàn)存的問(wèn)題并提出了建立高效薪酬機(jī)制的思路和建議。 本文第一部分對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外薪酬激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行了綜述，主要介紹了薪酬和薪酬激勵(lì)的相關(guān)概念、類(lèi)型。介紹了薪酬激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論，，分為薪酬理論和激勵(lì)理論。薪酬理論包括均衡價(jià)格工資理論、最低工資理論、工資差別理論、分享經(jīng)濟(jì)理論、邊際生產(chǎn)力工資理論、凱恩斯理論。激勵(lì)理論包括需求層次理論、ERG理論、雙因素理論、強(qiáng)化理論、公平理論、期望理論、委托代理理論等。 第二部分通過(guò)數(shù)據(jù)表格、數(shù)據(jù)圖的使用，對(duì)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了分析，并指出現(xiàn)行商業(yè)銀行薪酬激勵(lì)存在的問(wèn)題，主要包括：薪酬與銀行業(yè)績(jī)未能完全有效掛鉤，薪酬形式單一、結(jié)構(gòu)不合理，高管與員工薪酬差距大，隱含激勵(lì)不足等。 第三部分是對(duì)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制進(jìn)行的實(shí)證研究。通過(guò)有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的搜集和整理，相關(guān)變量、模型的設(shè)定，就我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行薪酬制度的影響因素進(jìn)行回歸分析，研究表明，銀行員工平均薪酬基本上是與銀行業(yè)績(jī)相聯(lián)系，員工激勵(lì)顯著受到銀行規(guī)模的影響，但與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)無(wú)明顯聯(lián)系；高管人員的薪酬沒(méi)有與銀行業(yè)績(jī)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平呈現(xiàn)出明顯關(guān)系。 第四部分從我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行薪酬激勵(lì)的現(xiàn)狀出發(fā)，從商業(yè)銀行不同的崗位（決策類(lèi)、管理類(lèi)、專(zhuān)業(yè)技術(shù)類(lèi)、營(yíng)銷(xiāo)類(lèi)、經(jīng)辦類(lèi)）角度提出了薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的要點(diǎn)和思路。 最后，從以崗定薪、業(yè)績(jī)考核、公開(kāi)薪酬收入、調(diào)整結(jié)構(gòu)、重視長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)等方面提出了優(yōu)化銀行內(nèi)部薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的建議；從政府管理模式和法律制度方面提出了改善薪酬激勵(lì)外部環(huán)境的建議。
[Abstract]:Salary incentive mechanism is an important part of the incentive mechanism of commercial banks, and it is also an important means of effective corporate governance. A reasonable salary incentive system can effectively stimulate the initiative, creativity and enthusiasm of the bank staff, give full play to their potential, and strive for the long-term steady development of the bank. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study and analyze the influencing factors of salary incentive of commercial banks in China, and to set up a scientific, reasonable and efficient salary incentive mechanism. On the basis of previous research, this paper studies the influencing factors of salary level of commercial banks in China through qualitative and quantitative analysis. This paper analyzes on the existing problems of the salary incentive mechanism in China's banking industry and puts forward some ideas and suggestions for the establishment of an efficient compensation mechanism. The first part of this paper summarizes the related theories of compensation incentives at home and abroad, mainly introduces the related concepts and types of compensation and compensation incentives. This paper introduces the related theory of salary incentive, which is divided into two parts: compensation theory and incentive theory. Salary theory includes equilibrium price wage theory, minimum wage theory, wage difference theory, sharing economy theory, marginal productivity wage theory, Keynesian theory. Incentive theory includes demand hierarchy theory, ERG theory, two-factor theory, reinforcement theory, equity theory, expectation theory, principal-agent theory and so on. The second part analyzes the current situation of the salary incentive mechanism of commercial banks in China through the use of data tables and data charts, and points out the problems existing in the current salary incentives of commercial banks. It mainly includes: pay and bank performance is not fully linked, pay form is single, structure is unreasonable, executive and employee pay gap is large, implicit incentive is insufficient and so on. The third part is the empirical study on the compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks in China. Through the collection and arrangement of relevant data, relevant variables and model setting, this paper makes a regression analysis on the influencing factors of the compensation system of commercial banks in China. The research shows that the average salary of bank employees is basically related to the performance of banks. Employee incentive is significantly affected by the size of the bank, but has no obvious relationship with bank risk; Executive pay is not significantly related to bank performance and risk levels. In the fourth part, the main points and ideas of salary incentive mechanism design are put forward from the angle of different positions (decision-making, management, professional and technical, marketing and management) of commercial banks in view of the status quo of salary incentive of commercial banks in our country. Finally, from the aspects of fixed salary by post, performance assessment, open salary income, adjusting structure and attaching importance to long-term incentive, this paper puts forward some suggestions to optimize the internal salary incentive mechanism of the bank. This paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the external environment of salary incentive from the aspects of government management mode and legal system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.33

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本文編號(hào)：2457402