發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-22 14:16

【摘要】：本文提出了動(dòng)態(tài)銀行監(jiān)管的"風(fēng)險(xiǎn)調(diào)整"規(guī)則,認(rèn)為銀行愿意承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平的變化,是銀行與儲(chǔ)蓄者、銀行與借款人、銀行與銀行、銀行與政府之間的博弈,以及宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)周期的影響所共同決定的。通過(guò)分析,構(gòu)建一個(gè)基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)視角的動(dòng)態(tài)有效銀行監(jiān)管理論分析框架。
[Abstract]:This paper puts forward the "risk adjustment" rule of dynamic banking supervision, and holds that the change of risk level that banks are willing to undertake is a game between banks and savers, banks and borrowers, banks and banks, banks and governments. And the impact of the macroeconomic cycle is determined by the common. Through analysis, a dynamic and effective theoretical analysis framework of bank supervision based on risk perspective is constructed.
【作者單位】： 東北大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F832.1

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本文編號(hào)：2349611