【摘要】：中國(guó)作為最大的新興市場(chǎng)國(guó)家之一,政府在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中一直扮演著重要的角色,中國(guó)的大部分上市公司由政府通過非流通股控制,盡管近20年來民營(yíng)上市公司也在不斷增加,并且民營(yíng)公司也推動(dòng)了中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),但是國(guó)有上市公司仍然占據(jù)資本市場(chǎng)的主導(dǎo)地位。近年來,越來越多的政府政策傾向于國(guó)有上市公司。在自然資源、民航、房地產(chǎn)和金融行業(yè),國(guó)有上市公司已經(jīng)將民營(yíng)公司驅(qū)逐①。因此政府持股現(xiàn)象和政府政策干預(yù)可能會(huì)影響國(guó)有上市公司相關(guān)決策的作出。在中國(guó)政府干預(yù)并不是偶然現(xiàn)象,政府可能將其政治目標(biāo)和社會(huì)職能通過干預(yù)轉(zhuǎn)嫁給受其控制的上市公司。比如已有研究表明政府會(huì)因其政治目標(biāo)、社會(huì)目標(biāo)以及政府官員的個(gè)人利益干預(yù)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)行為。本文借助企業(yè)多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略這一特征研究政府干預(yù)對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)行為以及經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的影響。政府因?yàn)橹贫纫蛩�、社�?huì)管理職能(諸如促進(jìn)就業(yè)、養(yǎng)老、稅收、維持社會(huì)穩(wěn)定等)和私人利益(政治晉升和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益)會(huì)驅(qū)使受其干預(yù)的企業(yè)新增投資,組建大型企業(yè)集團(tuán),而當(dāng)?shù)胤奖Ｗo(hù)主義嚴(yán)重時(shí),單一業(yè)務(wù)部門的企業(yè)要達(dá)到一定的規(guī)模并不容易,于是多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)成為其擴(kuò)大企業(yè)規(guī)模、實(shí)現(xiàn)政府多重目標(biāo)的選擇。但是這種違背經(jīng)濟(jì)效益原則的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng),會(huì)導(dǎo)致多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)形成的內(nèi)部資本市場(chǎng)失效、引發(fā)過度投資等問題,并且由于存在政府干預(yù)的企業(yè)的委托代理問題的特殊性,實(shí)施多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)后企業(yè)的委托代理成本也會(huì)增加,這些都最終導(dǎo)致政府干預(yù)下的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)降低了公司績(jī)效。 本文以滬市A股2009-2010年非金融保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本,涉及樣本觀測(cè)值共1190個(gè),以多元回歸分析為主要分析方法,借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外已有研究建立適合本文研究的模型。本文的研究結(jié)論主要有：(1)實(shí)際控制人為國(guó)有性質(zhì)的上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)了更多的業(yè)務(wù)部門,更傾向于實(shí)施多元化戰(zhàn)略。存在政府干預(yù)的上市公司,為了完成其社會(huì)職能以及其官員為獲得政治晉升,利用其“便利”的融資渠道和融資條件,通過多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略組建的大型企業(yè)集團(tuán)實(shí)現(xiàn)了其多重目標(biāo)；(2)這種政府干預(yù)下的上市公司多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)降低了公司績(jī)效。政府干預(yù)下的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)由于其動(dòng)機(jī)是完成其社會(huì)職能和政治目標(biāo),導(dǎo)致了多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)形成的內(nèi)部資本市場(chǎng)無效和過度投資問題,另一方面增加了公司內(nèi)部的代理成本,所以這種違背經(jīng)濟(jì)效益原則的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)損害了公司價(jià)值。本文的研究充實(shí)了轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期新興市場(chǎng)關(guān)于政府干預(yù)、多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系的研究文獻(xiàn),也有益于進(jìn)一步理順轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)期政府與企業(yè)之間的關(guān)系。 本文共包括六個(gè)部分內(nèi)容：第一部分緒論,闡述本文的研究背景、理論意義和實(shí)用價(jià)值、研究的框架以及本文可能的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)和研究的局限；第二部分回顧國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于政府干預(yù)與企業(yè)多元化以及多元化與公司績(jī)效之間關(guān)系的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),為下文的研究進(jìn)行鋪墊,作好理論界定,并對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外的已有研究進(jìn)行述評(píng)；第三部分為理論分析與研究假設(shè),主要根據(jù)國(guó)內(nèi)外的理論研究提出本文的研究假設(shè)；第四部分是研究設(shè)計(jì),主要包括樣本和變量的選擇以及定義,并進(jìn)行研究模型的構(gòu)建；第五部分對(duì)選取的樣本進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析,對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行——驗(yàn)證；第六部分為本文的研究結(jié)論與政策建議,首先總結(jié)文章的研究?jī)?nèi)容以及研究結(jié)論,然后根據(jù)在第五部分研究時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題提出具有針對(duì)性的政策建議。
[Abstract]:As one of the largest emerging market countries in China, the government has played an important role in the activities of market economy, and most of the listed companies in China are controlled by the government through non-tradable shares. China's economic growth has also been promoted by the people, but the state-owned listed companies still dominate the capital market. In recent years, more and more government policies tend to state-owned listed companies. In natural resources, civil aviation, real estate and finance, state-owned listed companies have expelled the people. Therefore, the government's holding and government policy intervention may affect the decision-making of state-owned listed companies. In the case of Chinese government intervention, it is not an accident, and the government may turn its political and social functions into a listed company under its control through intervention. For example, research has shown that the government will interfere with the operation of the enterprise due to its political objectives, social objectives and the personal interests of government officials. This paper studies the effect of government intervention on the operation and economic consequences of the enterprise by means of the characteristics of the enterprise's diversified operation strategy. The government, because of institutional factors, social management functions (such as promoting employment, pension, taxation, social stability, etc.) and private interests (political and economic interests) will drive the enterprises affected by them to increase their investment, form large-scale enterprise groups, and when local protectionism is serious, The enterprise of a single business unit needs to reach a certain scale and is not easy, so the diversified operation becomes the choice of expanding the scale of the enterprise and realizing the multi-objective of the government. However, the diversified management of the principle of economic benefit can lead to the failure of the internal capital market formed by the diversified operation and the excessive investment, etc., and because of the particularity of the commission agent problem of the enterprises in which the government intervenes, The commission agent cost of the enterprise after the implementation of the diversified operation will also increase, which will eventually lead to the diversification of the government's intervention and lower the company's performance. This paper takes stock companies listed in the non-financial insurance industry of Shanghai-Shanghai Ashare for 2009-2010 as the research sample, involving a total of 1190 samples, using the multiple regression analysis as the main analysis method, and using the existing research at home and abroad to establish a suitable study for this paper. The main results of this paper are as follows: (1) The actual control of man-made state-owned listed company has operated more business units, and is more inclined to implement diversification The strategy is a large-scale enterprise group formed by a diversified operation strategy in order to complete its social function and its officials to obtain political promotion, and to use its 鈥淐onvenient鈥，

本文編號(hào)：2317559