【摘要】：論文以互動(dòng)學(xué)習(xí)方式為主線,以央行和社會(huì)公眾之間的高階信任、信息結(jié)構(gòu)為分析對(duì)象,論述學(xué)習(xí)行為對(duì)社會(huì)信息結(jié)構(gòu)、貨幣政策信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制和貨幣政策調(diào)控框架的影響,對(duì)我國(guó)公眾學(xué)習(xí)行為和通脹預(yù)期進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,提出相關(guān)建議。 引言部分說(shuō)明了選題背景、研究的問(wèn)題、論文結(jié)構(gòu)與研究方法、主要結(jié)論與創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。 第二章對(duì)與選題相關(guān)的國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了梳理。關(guān)于預(yù)期與預(yù)期形成、公眾與央行學(xué)習(xí)行為、貨幣政策透明度、社會(huì)信息結(jié)構(gòu)、貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制的文獻(xiàn)非常豐富,國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者從不同視角、以不同國(guó)家為分析對(duì)象進(jìn)行研究,學(xué)術(shù)成果既反映了宏觀調(diào)控理論與實(shí)踐隨時(shí)間演變的情況,也揭示了公眾行為對(duì)宏觀調(diào)控的主動(dòng)性影響增強(qiáng)。對(duì)于央行和公眾之間的互動(dòng)關(guān)系的研究成果相對(duì)較少。 第三章圍繞公眾和央行學(xué)習(xí)行為、學(xué)習(xí)機(jī)制、預(yù)期形成等方面的內(nèi)容展開(kāi)論述。最常見(jiàn)的學(xué)習(xí)方式是理性學(xué)習(xí)與適應(yīng)性學(xué)習(xí)。在互動(dòng)學(xué)習(xí)方式下,公眾和央行之間存在信息和預(yù)期互相依賴、互相影響的動(dòng)態(tài)過(guò)程。央行被認(rèn)為具有信息優(yōu)勢(shì),在公眾預(yù)期形成過(guò)程中的影響權(quán)重高。公眾預(yù)期也通過(guò)央行的決策表現(xiàn)出來(lái),反映在央行學(xué)習(xí)、決策行為的調(diào)整過(guò)程中,否則,則說(shuō)明信息傳導(dǎo)的無(wú)效率。但是,高階信任有一定的負(fù)面作用,公眾依賴央行預(yù)測(cè)結(jié)果,降低了自身進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)的動(dòng)機(jī),預(yù)期調(diào)整速度降低,對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊真實(shí)的反應(yīng)情況難以體現(xiàn)出來(lái)。公眾學(xué)習(xí)存在一個(gè)從PLM到ALM的不斷調(diào)整的過(guò)程,對(duì)央行的高階信任決定了學(xué)習(xí)的速度和對(duì)央行預(yù)測(cè)結(jié)果的接受程度�；�(dòng)學(xué)習(xí)機(jī)制說(shuō)明信息雙向傳導(dǎo)的重要性。 第四章首先分析了貨幣政策透明度“悖論”問(wèn)題,即央行和公眾預(yù)測(cè)的準(zhǔn)確程度并沒(méi)有隨之提高。央行具有信息優(yōu)勢(shì),提高了高階信任的權(quán)重,產(chǎn)生了對(duì)私人信息的“擠出效應(yīng)”。中央銀行需要選擇一個(gè)合適的信息披露程度。互動(dòng)學(xué)習(xí)使得央行和公眾有扭曲政策反應(yīng)的動(dòng)機(jī)。私人信息和公開(kāi)信息之間產(chǎn)生的相互“擠出效應(yīng)”導(dǎo)致有價(jià)值的信息量減少,信息準(zhǔn)確程度下降。公眾和央行之間是信息替代時(shí),沒(méi)有增加社會(huì)信息量。微觀主體的信息準(zhǔn)確程度影響到央行的信息來(lái)源,在信息分散的情況下,央行和公眾之間是信息互補(bǔ)的關(guān)系,社會(huì)信息總量增加。因此,保持信息的分散對(duì)于微觀主體和央行都有重要意義。 第五章論述貨幣政策信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制。貨幣政策信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制將信息與預(yù)期聯(lián)系在一起,中央銀行向社會(huì)發(fā)布公開(kāi)信息,發(fā)揮高階信任協(xié)調(diào)預(yù)期的作用,包括信息發(fā)布與信息反饋兩個(gè)過(guò)程。信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制具有雙向信息傳導(dǎo)、動(dòng)態(tài)互動(dòng)、前瞻性的特點(diǎn),說(shuō)明央行和公眾在信息傳導(dǎo)過(guò)程中的互動(dòng)關(guān)系,學(xué)習(xí)速度、公開(kāi)信息、高階信任等都具有雙刃劍的特點(diǎn)。信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制的有效性取決于央行和公眾對(duì)學(xué)習(xí)行為、公開(kāi)信息和高階信任正反兩方面作用的均衡。信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制影響貨幣政策調(diào)控框架相關(guān)內(nèi)容�；谇罢靶圆僮髋c管理預(yù)期的要求,中央銀行需要對(duì)貨幣政策規(guī)則、中介目標(biāo)、工具、信息溝通內(nèi)容等進(jìn)行相應(yīng)的調(diào)整。 第六章分析我國(guó)貨幣政策信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制的主要內(nèi)容、特點(diǎn)、存在的問(wèn)題以及造成問(wèn)題的原因。由于受到缺少量化的最終目標(biāo)、央行獨(dú)立性較弱和貨幣政策透明度不高等因素的制約,我國(guó)貨幣政策信息傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制沒(méi)有體現(xiàn)雙向信息流動(dòng)、互動(dòng)動(dòng)態(tài)的特點(diǎn),難以起到穩(wěn)定公眾預(yù)期的作用。央行與市場(chǎng)溝通互動(dòng)少,不提供前瞻性的信息,沒(méi)有彌補(bǔ)名義錨缺失的有效措施。 第七章針對(duì)我國(guó)貨幣政策的信號(hào)作用與公眾學(xué)習(xí)行為進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。對(duì)于學(xué)習(xí)能力相對(duì)較高的人群,由于對(duì)信息的反應(yīng)靈敏,增加的信息披露并沒(méi)有降低預(yù)期的不穩(wěn)定性。公眾的學(xué)習(xí)能力對(duì)于央行穩(wěn)定預(yù)期的意圖是一把“雙刃劍”。在缺乏明確的調(diào)控目標(biāo)、公眾采取適應(yīng)性學(xué)習(xí)的情況下,信心指數(shù)自身和CPI水平對(duì)預(yù)期形成的影響程度高且持續(xù),名義GDP增速的影響小于預(yù)期,公眾存在一定程度的通脹恐慌。有約束力的調(diào)控目標(biāo)所釋放出的信號(hào)、可靠明確的價(jià)格信息對(duì)居民通脹預(yù)期有直接且持續(xù)的影響,通脹預(yù)期與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)之間互為格蘭杰原因的關(guān)系說(shuō)明了管理預(yù)期對(duì)實(shí)現(xiàn)調(diào)控目標(biāo)的重要性。 第八章首先分析了美國(guó)、通脹目標(biāo)制國(guó)家和歐洲央行的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn),他們都注重提高貨幣政策決策透明度,及時(shí)宣布央行會(huì)議的決定,公布詳細(xì)的決策過(guò)程,加強(qiáng)說(shuō)明與宣傳,減少對(duì)決策的誤讀與不解。我國(guó)央行可以采取基于規(guī)則的調(diào)控方式,既不受單一目標(biāo)限制,又可以彌補(bǔ)名義錨缺失和決策透明度不高的問(wèn)題,為公眾評(píng)價(jià)央行行為提供一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。量化物價(jià)穩(wěn)定指標(biāo),設(shè)置一個(gè)合理波動(dòng)區(qū)間,賦予物價(jià)穩(wěn)定和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)不同的權(quán)重。央行應(yīng)增加前瞻性信息的披露,提高公眾對(duì)這部分信息的學(xué)習(xí)能力。中介目標(biāo)的設(shè)置應(yīng)關(guān)注公眾預(yù)期的變化。增強(qiáng)央行和金融監(jiān)管部門(mén)分支機(jī)構(gòu)在信息收集和決策中的作用。增加信息溝通方式,加強(qiáng)貨幣政策委員會(huì)與市場(chǎng)溝通。 第九章是全文總結(jié)。
[Abstract]:The paper mainly discusses the influence of learning behavior on social information structure, monetary policy information transmission mechanism and monetary policy regulation framework based on the high-order trust between the central bank and the public, and the information structure as the main line. An empirical analysis of China's public learning behavior and inflation expectations is made, and relevant suggestions are put forward. The introduction part illustrates the background of the topic, the problems of the research, the structure of the paper and the research methods, the main conclusions and the creation New point. Chapter II is the domestic and international literature related to the subject. It has been sorted out. The literature about the expected and expected formation, the study behavior of the public and the central bank, the transparency of monetary policy, the information structure of the society and the mechanism of monetary policy transmission are very abundant. The academic achievement reflects both macro-control theory and practice over time, and also reveals the initiative of public behavior to macro-control. A study of the interaction between the central bank and the public. The third chapter centers on the public and the central bank's learning behavior, the learning mechanism, the expected formation, etc. The content of the face is discussed. The most common way of learning is rational Learning and adaptive learning. There is information and expected interdependence among the public and the central bank in a self-learning approach. A dynamic process of influence. The central bank is considered to have the advantage of information and is expected to be formed in the public The impact weight in the process is high. Public expectations are also reflected in the central bank's decision-making, reflected in the adjustment of the central bank's learning and decision-making practices, otherwise, Information transmission has no efficiency. However, higher-order trust has a certain negative effect, the public relies on the central bank forecast results, reduces the motivation of self-prediction, the expected adjustment speed is reduced, and the real reaction to the economic impact is expected. The situation is difficult to manifest. The public study has a continuous process from PLM to ALM, which determines the speed of learning and the central bank's advance Description of the results of the test: information on the learning mechanism of the students The fourth chapter analyzes the 鈥減aradox鈥，

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