【摘要】：中國(guó)作為世界上最大的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)起步較晚，資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展不成熟，與國(guó)外成熟的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)相比存在很大差別。而作為我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的支柱和經(jīng)濟(jì)參與主體——國(guó)有控股上市公司，存在許多不同于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的公司治理問(wèn)題。 一方面，公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)有缺陷。國(guó)有控股上市公司大多經(jīng)國(guó)企或政府部門(mén)改制而成，國(guó)有股“一股獨(dú)大”，國(guó)有股東“所有者缺位”，且行政氣息濃厚，使公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)與現(xiàn)代公司制度相比“形似神不似”；另一方面，公司外部治理不健全。我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)由計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)變而來(lái)，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)起步較晚，股票市場(chǎng)、證券市場(chǎng)等資本市場(chǎng)不健全。而這兩方面的公司治理問(wèn)題最終將反映在經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行效率上，因此研究我國(guó)國(guó)有控股上市公司投資行為對(duì)于保證國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)投資效率，節(jié)約資源能源和提高資金利用率，保障國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展，具有極其重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文的研究工作主要有以下幾個(gè)方面： 本文以2008年以來(lái)我國(guó)國(guó)有控股上市公司及其投資的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ)，首先對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有控股上市公司過(guò)度投資背景及因素進(jìn)行分析；其次，建立理論分析模型，并對(duì)模型進(jìn)行構(gòu)建和推導(dǎo)，，對(duì)模型的經(jīng)濟(jì)意義進(jìn)行分析；最后，在以上基礎(chǔ)上，建立實(shí)證研究模型，對(duì)其進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，并對(duì)實(shí)證模型的經(jīng)濟(jì)意義進(jìn)行分析。 本文的創(chuàng)新性主要體現(xiàn)在以下方面： 本文在現(xiàn)有相關(guān)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,以我國(guó)國(guó)有控股上市公司為背景,在假設(shè)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者存在股權(quán)激勵(lì)和控制權(quán)私利、且在項(xiàng)目融資決策中存在股權(quán)融資和銀行債務(wù)融資選擇的條件下，建立數(shù)學(xué)模型和實(shí)證研究模型，從理論上和實(shí)證上，研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)、銀行債務(wù)約束和控制權(quán)私利對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有上市公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者過(guò)度投資行為的影響機(jī)理。 本文的理論研究結(jié)果表明，公司的過(guò)度投資行為隨著公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者控制權(quán)私利的增加而趨于嚴(yán)重，隨著經(jīng)營(yíng)者持股比例的增加和銀行債務(wù)的增加而減弱。 實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明，公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者擁有的控制權(quán)影響公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的過(guò)度投資行為；股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者過(guò)度投資行為有抑制作用，但不顯著；而銀行債務(wù)加劇了公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的過(guò)度投資行為。
[Abstract]:As the largest emerging economy in the world, China's market economy starts late and the capital market is immature, which is quite different from that of foreign mature market economy. However, as the mainstay of our national economy and the main body of economic participation, there are many problems in corporate governance which are different from those in developed countries. On the one hand, the company's internal governance structure has defects. Most of the state-controlled listed companies have been restructured by state-owned enterprises or government departments. The state-owned shares are "dominant in one share", and the state-owned shareholders "owners are absent," and there is a strong administrative atmosphere. Compared with the modern corporate system, the internal corporate governance structure is similar to God, on the other hand, the external governance of the company is not perfect. The market economy of our country changes from planned economy, market economy starts late, the capital market such as stock market, stock market is not perfect. These two aspects of corporate governance will ultimately be reflected in the efficiency of economic operation. Therefore, the study of the investment behavior of state-owned holding listed companies will ensure the efficiency of national economic and social investment, save resources and energy, and improve the utilization of funds. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to ensure the healthy and stable development of national economy. The research work of this paper mainly includes the following aspects: this paper is based on the relevant data of state-owned holding listed companies and their investments since 2008. Firstly, the background and factors of excessive investment of state-owned holding listed companies in China are analyzed; secondly, the theoretical analysis model is established, and the model is constructed and deduced, and the economic significance of the model is analyzed. Finally, on the basis of above, The empirical research model is established, and the economic significance of the empirical model is analyzed. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following aspects: based on the existing relevant research results, this paper assumes that the company managers have equity incentives and private interests of control rights, taking the state-owned holding listed companies as the background. Under the condition of equity financing and bank debt financing choice in project financing decision, the mathematical model and empirical research model are established to study equity incentive theoretically and empirically. The influence mechanism of bank debt restraint and private interest of control right on overinvestment behavior of managers of state-owned listed companies in China. The theoretical results of this paper show that the excessive investment behavior of the company tends to be serious with the increase of the private interests of the control rights of the company managers, and weakens with the increase of the proportion of the managers' shareholding and the increase of the bank debts. The empirical results show that the control rights owned by the company managers affect the overinvestment behavior of the company managers, the equity incentive has a restraining effect on the over-investment behavior of the company managers, but it is not significant. But the bank debt intensifies the overinvestment behavior of the company manager.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F832.4;F224

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