【摘要】：在建設(shè)“創(chuàng)新型國家”的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)指引下，為扶植作為技術(shù)創(chuàng)新主體的中小企業(yè)迅速發(fā)展，充分發(fā)揮財(cái)政資金的杠桿放大效應(yīng)，我國開始設(shè)立創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金。經(jīng)過幾年的運(yùn)作，創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金取得了良好效果。但是，由于創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金的運(yùn)作時(shí)間較短，有些問題越來越突出。例如創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金操作主體能力不足；各方參與人的目標(biāo)沖突；投資方向混亂；利益分配及激勵監(jiān)管機(jī)制不完善等復(fù)雜的委托代理問題。如何組建、管理創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金、提高政府對引導(dǎo)資金的使用效率是擺在我國政府面前的重要課題。在這一背景下，分析政府創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金管理中復(fù)雜的委托代理關(guān)系和性質(zhì)，考查創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金運(yùn)作過程中的各方參與人的行為特征勢在必行。 本文借助復(fù)雜性和復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)理論、委托代理理論、共同代理理論等，綜合使用理論研究、模型構(gòu)建、實(shí)證分析等方法，創(chuàng)新性的從復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)角度研究創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金委托代理機(jī)制，提出創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金委托代理系統(tǒng)這一概念。基于系統(tǒng)的角度構(gòu)建了創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金內(nèi)部管理委托代理模型，得出了內(nèi)部管理委托代理機(jī)制，并為我國當(dāng)前引導(dǎo)基金管理模式提出完善建議；同時(shí)構(gòu)建了系統(tǒng)的核心節(jié)點(diǎn)要素多任務(wù)創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)委托代理模型，，得出多任務(wù)創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的委托代理機(jī)制。此外，還以浙江省創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金為例進(jìn)行分析，為創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金的實(shí)踐運(yùn)作提供理論支撐。 通過研究，本文獲得了以下研究成果和研究結(jié)論。 （1）創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金運(yùn)作具有復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)的特征，例如多方參與主體的整體呈現(xiàn)性，結(jié)構(gòu)、目標(biāo)及時(shí)間上的多層次性，與外界環(huán)境聯(lián)系并交換的開放性、動態(tài)適應(yīng)各種變化性質(zhì)、為應(yīng)對變化而具有的自組織性等，構(gòu)成了創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金委托代理系統(tǒng)。 此系統(tǒng)的節(jié)點(diǎn)要素是政府、引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)、社會投資者、創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)、創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)五方參與主體，并且都是系統(tǒng)不可或缺的；節(jié)點(diǎn)要素之間的連接是復(fù)雜的委托代理關(guān)系；各節(jié)點(diǎn)元素有極強(qiáng)的“責(zé)任意識”，各自的行為選擇要以達(dá)到系統(tǒng)的整體目標(biāo)——促進(jìn)高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)及中小創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)發(fā)展為原則；能對外界的變化做出反應(yīng)，具有動態(tài)適應(yīng)性和自組織性。 （2）在創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金委托代理系統(tǒng)的背景下，要以實(shí)現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)整體性目標(biāo)為原則，設(shè)計(jì)合理的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金內(nèi)部管理委托代理機(jī)制。本文構(gòu)建了對稱條件下和不對稱條件下的引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)激勵機(jī)制模型。 通過分析模型得出：在對稱條件下，政府只要支付給引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)合理的工資，使得引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)努力的邊際收益等于其邊際成本，就會促使引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)采取最優(yōu)努力水平；在不對稱條件下，要對引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)形成固定報(bào)酬和浮動激勵報(bào)酬相結(jié)合的薪酬激勵機(jī)制，最優(yōu)薪酬激勵合同中的激勵強(qiáng)度受到引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)的專業(yè)能力、絕對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度、努力成本系數(shù)、創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)的收益方差、政策性投資限制等因素的影響。具體來說，當(dāng)政策性限制較少，對于專業(yè)水平較高的、富有冒險(xiǎn)精神的、處于較為穩(wěn)定環(huán)境中的、努力成本較低的引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)可提高激勵強(qiáng)度，使其積極工作，獲得最大化收益。 （3）本文從復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)的角度，對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金內(nèi)部管理模式提出改進(jìn)意見。指出無論是直接管理模式還是委托社會機(jī)構(gòu)管理模式都應(yīng)以實(shí)現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)的整體性目標(biāo)——促進(jìn)高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)及中小創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)發(fā)展為原則，設(shè)計(jì)引導(dǎo)基金管理機(jī)構(gòu)的激勵機(jī)制時(shí)要因地制宜、因情制宜，并在激勵和保險(xiǎn)之間求得平衡。 其中，實(shí)行事業(yè)性質(zhì)單位管理模式的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金，要形成固定報(bào)酬和浮動激勵報(bào)酬相結(jié)合的薪酬激勵機(jī)制，以防止代理人不努力和尋租行為發(fā)生；對實(shí)行國有公司管理模式的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金，要注意掌握和調(diào)整設(shè)立方式、收益分配方式，對國有公司施以必要的約束和監(jiān)管，以防止忽略“政策性策略”行為發(fā)生；實(shí)行委托社會機(jī)構(gòu)管理的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金，要根據(jù)具體情況確定不同的激勵強(qiáng)度，并保證激勵強(qiáng)度所在區(qū)間為（0,1），以防止嚴(yán)重的委托代理問題出現(xiàn)。 （4）創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)有投資政策扶植企業(yè)和投資高收益性企業(yè)雙重替代性任務(wù)，通過構(gòu)建投資者與多任務(wù)創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的委托代理模型可得：兩種任務(wù)的替代性弱化了多任務(wù)報(bào)酬機(jī)制的激勵效果。同樣的激勵程度，會使創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)降低對可觀測度低的任務(wù)——投資政策扶植企業(yè)任務(wù)的努力水平，也即創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金的“政策性目標(biāo)”常被忽視。通過弱化創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的任務(wù)替代性，或?qū)?chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的替代關(guān)系任務(wù)變?yōu)榛パa(bǔ)關(guān)系任務(wù)，對達(dá)成系統(tǒng)整體性目標(biāo)有極大的促進(jìn)作用。 （5）本文從有利于創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金委托代理系統(tǒng)有序運(yùn)行的角度，基于弱化創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的任務(wù)替代性，或?qū)?chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的替代關(guān)系任務(wù)變?yōu)榛パa(bǔ)關(guān)系任務(wù)的原則，提出多任務(wù)的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機(jī)構(gòu)委托代理機(jī)制。 具體包括：優(yōu)質(zhì)投資項(xiàng)目的識別與培育機(jī)制、具有產(chǎn)業(yè)特色的創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)遴選機(jī)制、資金分期到位的參股約束機(jī)制、客觀和主觀方法相結(jié)合的多任務(wù)創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)績效評價(jià)機(jī)制、合理的多任務(wù)創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管機(jī)制以及多任務(wù)創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Under the guidance of the strategic goal of building a "innovative country", in order to foster the rapid development of small and medium-sized enterprises as the main body of technological innovation and give full play to the leverage amplification effect of financial funds, China began to set up a guidance fund for venture capital. After several years of operation, the venture investment guidance fund has achieved good results. The operation time of the guidance fund is short, and some problems are becoming more and more prominent. For example, the ability of the operating main body of the venture capital guidance fund is insufficient; the parties involved in the target conflict; the investment direction is confused; the interests distribution and the incentive supervision mechanism are not perfect. How to form, manage the venture capital guidance fund and improve the government The efficiency of the government's use of guided funds is an important issue in front of our government. In this context, it is imperative to analyze the complex principal-agent relationship and nature of the government venture capital guidance fund management, and to examine the behavior characteristics of all parties involved in the operation of the venture capital guidance fund.
This paper, with the help of complexity and complex system theory, principal-agent theory, common agent theory, comprehensive use of theoretical research, model construction, empirical analysis and other methods, innovatively study the principal-agent mechanism of venture capital guidance fund from the perspective of complex system, and put forward the concept of the principal-agent system of venture investment guidance fund. The model of internal management Principal-agent of venture capital guidance fund is constructed, and the internal management principal-agent mechanism is obtained, and the suggestions are put forward for the current guide fund management model in China. At the same time, the principal agent model of the system's core element multi task venture capital organization is constructed, and the multi task venture capital institution is obtained. In addition, the paper takes Zhejiang Venture Capital Guidance Fund as an example to provide theoretical support for the practical operation of the Venture Capital Guidance Fund.
Through research, the following research results and conclusions are obtained.
(1) the operation of the venture capital guidance fund has the characteristics of complex system, such as the overall presentation, structure, target and time of multi party participation, the openness of connection with the external environment and the openness of exchange, dynamic adaptation to various changes of nature, and self-organization in response to the change, which constitutes the guiding foundation for venture capital. The proxy system.
The node elements of this system are government, guide the fund management organization, the social investor, the venture capital institution, the venture enterprise five parties participate in the main body, and all are the system indispensable; the connection between the node elements is the complex principal-agent relationship; each node element has the very strong "responsibility consciousness", their respective behavior choice should be reached To the overall goal of the system - to promote the development of high and new technology industries and small and medium-sized enterprises as a principle; to respond to changes in the outside world, with dynamic adaptability and self-organization.
(2) under the background of the principal-agent system of the venture capital guidance fund, the principal-agent mechanism of the internal management of the venture capital guidance fund should be designed by the principle of realizing the overall goal of the system. The incentive mechanism model of the guidance fund management institution under symmetrical conditions and asymmetric conditions is constructed in this paper.
Through the analysis of the model, it is concluded that, under the symmetrical condition, the government should pay the reasonable salary to the guidance fund management organization and make the marginal cost of the leading fund management institution equal to its marginal cost, which will urge the fund management organization to take the optimal level of effort. Under the condition of asymmetric, it is necessary to guide the management of the fund. The incentive mechanism of combination of fixed remuneration and floating incentive compensation, the incentive intensity in the optimal compensation incentive contract is influenced by the factors such as the professional ability of the fund management agency, the degree of absolute risk aversion, the cost coefficient, the variance of the investment institution, the limit of policy investment and so on. Fewer, for the higher professional level, the adventurous spirit, in a more stable environment, the lower cost of the guidance fund management institutions can improve the incentive intensity, make it work actively, to maximize the income.
(3) from the perspective of complex system, this paper puts forward some suggestions for improving the internal management model of the venture capital guidance fund in China. It is pointed out that both the direct management model and the entrusting social organization management mode should aim to achieve the overall goal of the system, the principle of promoting the development of the high-tech industry and the small and medium enterprises, and the design of the guidance fund The incentive mechanism of a management organization should be adapted to local conditions, suit for circumstances, and strike a balance between incentives and insurance.
Among them, the venture capital guidance fund, which implements the management mode of the enterprise, should form a compensation incentive mechanism combining fixed remuneration and floating incentive compensation to prevent agents from not working hard and rent-seeking behavior. The way of distribution is to impose necessary constraints and supervision on state-owned companies so as to prevent the neglect of the "policy strategy". The venture capital guidance fund, which is entrusted with the management of the social organizations, should determine the different incentive intensity according to the specific circumstances and ensure that the incentive intensity is (0,1) in order to prevent the serious principal-agent problem. Now.
(4) the venture capital institution has the dual substitution task of the investment policy and the high income enterprise. By constructing the principal agent model of the investor and the multi task venture capital institution, the substitution of the two tasks weakens the incentive effect of the multi task reward mechanism. The same incentive degree will reduce the venture capital institution. The task of low degree of observability is low: the level of the investment policy to foster the enterprise task, that is, the "policy goal" of the venture capital guidance fund is often ignored. By weakening the task substitution of the venture capital institution, or changing the replacement relationship task of the venture capital institution into the complementary relationship task, the overall goal of the system is reached. It has a great boost.
(5) from the point of view of the orderly operation of the principal-agent system of the venture capital guidance fund, based on the weakening of the task substitution of the venture capital institution, or the principle that the replacement relationship task of the venture capital institution becomes the complementary relationship task, the principal-agent mechanism of the multi task venture capital institution is proposed.
It includes: the recognition and cultivation mechanism of high quality investment projects, the selection mechanism of the venture capital organization with industrial characteristics, the participation restriction mechanism of the funds in place, the performance evaluation mechanism of the multi task venture capital organization, the rational multi task venture capital institution supervision mechanism and the reputation mechanism of the multi task venture capital organization.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.48;F224

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