本文選題：商業(yè)銀行 + 市場(chǎng)約束　； 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),世界多國(guó)爆發(fā)的金融危機(jī)讓人們逐漸意識(shí)到傳統(tǒng)金融監(jiān)管的許多局限性。為此,市場(chǎng)約束在銀行監(jiān)管中的作用開(kāi)始引人關(guān)注。在新巴塞爾協(xié)議中,市場(chǎng)約束與最低資本要求、官方監(jiān)管一起,為銀行監(jiān)管體系的三大支柱之一。 基于多方面的因素,我國(guó)投資者的市場(chǎng)約束力較弱。在此情況下,銀行管理層往往只考慮收益性而忽視安全性。銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平的高企不僅加重了監(jiān)管當(dāng)局的負(fù)擔(dān),也使得整個(gè)銀行體系面臨系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。隨著我國(guó)銀行業(yè)的對(duì)外開(kāi)放,如何提高對(duì)銀行的市場(chǎng)約束力,降低銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn),是我國(guó)監(jiān)管當(dāng)局面臨的一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題。這也是寫(xiě)作這篇論文的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義所在。 本文共分為七章。 第一章是對(duì)銀行公司治理、信息披露、存款人和次級(jí)債市場(chǎng)約束等方面的文獻(xiàn)綜述。 第二章首先在分析有關(guān)強(qiáng)制信息披露爭(zhēng)論的基礎(chǔ)上,引出了關(guān)于信息披露的各種理論觀點(diǎn)；然后通過(guò)分析銀行內(nèi)部治理和外部治理對(duì)信息披露的影響,闡明公司治理和信息披露密不可分、相互作用的關(guān)系；最后分析信息披露的評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)和市場(chǎng)約束效應(yīng),即評(píng)判何種信息披露才是有效和充分的,以及其所能產(chǎn)生的市場(chǎng)約束作用。 第三章在概述了市場(chǎng)約束的定義、研究范圍、條件等之后,分別并實(shí)證研究剖析存款人的市場(chǎng)約束“監(jiān)控”機(jī)制、次級(jí)債的市場(chǎng)約束“監(jiān)控”機(jī)制、理財(cái)客戶的市場(chǎng)約束“監(jiān)控”機(jī)制。 第四章分別從宏觀視角和微觀視角實(shí)證研究市場(chǎng)約束“影響”機(jī)制,并通過(guò)理財(cái)客戶市場(chǎng)約束“影響”機(jī)制實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),以判斷銀行對(duì)市場(chǎng)約束的實(shí)際反應(yīng)程度。 第五章分別分析市場(chǎng)約束和官方監(jiān)管的局限性和必要性,并通過(guò)兩者關(guān)系的對(duì)比分析,得出兩者應(yīng)互相配合,作為銀行監(jiān)管的組成部分,發(fā)揮各自優(yōu)勢(shì)和作用的結(jié)論。同時(shí),本章分析了官方監(jiān)管的范圍和力度的選擇,以期確立市場(chǎng)約束和官方監(jiān)管的最優(yōu)邊界。 第六章主要結(jié)合我國(guó)銀行監(jiān)管的實(shí)際,分析當(dāng)前在公司治理、信息披露、市場(chǎng)約束等方面存在的問(wèn)題,并提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策和政策建議。 第七章總結(jié)全文的主要研究結(jié)論,并提出本文研究中的不足之處,以及對(duì)未來(lái)研究方向的展望。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the financial crisis broke out in many countries in the world makes people gradually realize the limitation of traditional financial supervision. To this end, the role of market constraints in banking supervision began to attract attention. In Basel II, market constraints and minimum capital requirements, together with official regulation, are one of the three pillars of the banking regulatory system. Based on various factors, the market binding force of Chinese investors is weak. In this case, bank management often only consider profitability and neglect security. High levels of banking risk not only burden regulators, but also expose the entire banking system to systemic risk. With the opening of China's banking sector, how to improve the market binding force on banks and reduce bank risks is an important issue facing our country's regulatory authorities. This is also the practical significance of writing this paper. This paper is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is a literature review on bank corporate governance, information disclosure, depositors and subprime bond market constraints. In the second chapter, on the basis of analyzing the controversy about compulsory information disclosure, it leads to various theoretical viewpoints on information disclosure, and then analyzes the impact of internal and external governance on information disclosure. The relationship between corporate governance and information disclosure is explained. Finally, the evaluation index and market constraint effect of information disclosure are analyzed, which is to judge which information disclosure is effective and sufficient. And its ability to produce market constraints. After summarizing the definition, scope and condition of market constraint, the third chapter analyzes the market constraint "monitoring" mechanism of depositors and the market constraint "monitoring" mechanism of subprime debt, respectively. Financial management customer's market restraint "monitoring" mechanism. The fourth chapter empirically studies the market constraint "influence" mechanism from the macro and micro perspectives, and judges the actual reaction degree of the bank to the market constraint through the empirical test of the financial management customer market constraint "influence" mechanism. The fifth chapter analyzes the limitation and necessity of market restraint and official supervision, and draws the conclusion that they should cooperate with each other and play their respective advantages and functions as part of bank supervision. At the same time, this chapter analyzes the choice of the scope and intensity of official supervision in order to establish the optimal boundary between market constraint and official supervision. The sixth chapter analyzes the problems existing in the aspects of corporate governance, information disclosure and market constraints, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and policy suggestions. Chapter seven summarizes the main conclusions of this paper, and puts forward the shortcomings of this study, as well as the prospects for future research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.2

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