本文選題：定向增發(fā) + 折價發(fā)行　； 參考：《天津財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：定向增發(fā)作為我國股權(quán)再融資方式之一,近年來逐漸成為上市公司的主流選擇。論文以2006年到2010年我國A股市場成功實施定向增發(fā)的上市公司為樣本,理論分析了我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的折價問題及其經(jīng)濟后果。并采用描述性統(tǒng)計分析、相關(guān)分析、均值檢驗、多元線性回歸分析等方法實證檢驗理論分析結(jié)論。 在定向增發(fā)發(fā)行價格方面,論文認(rèn)為在信息不對稱的條件下,上市公司定向增發(fā)存在折價發(fā)行的偏好。盡管為了滿足《上市公司證券發(fā)行管理辦法》的溢價發(fā)行規(guī)定,上市公司都會選擇董事會決議日為定價基準(zhǔn)日,但實際上卻是按照發(fā)行公告日為基準(zhǔn)日進行折價發(fā)行,使得定向增發(fā)特定的發(fā)行對象受益。同時研究還認(rèn)為大股東或大股東關(guān)聯(lián)方作為發(fā)行對象的折價率要小于其他兩種發(fā)行對象的折價率。在定向增發(fā)經(jīng)濟后果的利益輸送方面,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)上市公司實施定向增發(fā)所產(chǎn)生的價值增值部分,將會按持股比例分別被股東瓜分,而參與定向增發(fā)的大股東和機構(gòu)投資者要想獲得更大收益一定會侵占中小股東利益。在定向增發(fā)經(jīng)濟后果的市場反應(yīng)方面,以累計超額收益率為定向增發(fā)對上市公司造成市場反應(yīng)的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)認(rèn)為,首先存在短期為正的公告效應(yīng),其次控股股東持股比例與定向增發(fā)后短期市場反應(yīng)呈負(fù)相關(guān),最后發(fā)行對象對上市公司定向增發(fā)市場反應(yīng)都沒有顯著性差別。在定向增發(fā)經(jīng)濟后果的公司反應(yīng)方面,研究結(jié)果得到上市公司實施定向增發(fā)后,不同行業(yè)會產(chǎn)生不同的公司反應(yīng)。 文章通過對定向增發(fā)定價機制的研究,在探討其是否公平的基礎(chǔ)上,找到影響定向增發(fā)價格制定的因素。同時在對經(jīng)濟后果的研究中,分析定向增發(fā)對股東之間的利益均衡影響,以及產(chǎn)生的市場反應(yīng)和公司反應(yīng)。這樣在保護廣大中小股東利益的同時,也有利于提高上市公司經(jīng)營績效和整個資本市場的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:As one of the ways of equity refinancing in China, directional placement has gradually become the mainstream choice of listed companies in recent years. This paper analyzes the discount problem and its economic consequences of China's A-share market from 2006 to 2010, taking the listed companies that successfully implemented additional directional offerings as samples. Descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, mean test, multiple linear regression analysis and other methods are used to test the theoretical analysis conclusions. In the aspect of the price of IPO, the paper thinks that under the condition of asymmetric information, the listed company has the preference of offering at a discount. Although in order to meet the premium issuance provisions of the "measures for the Administration of Securities issuance of listed companies", the listed companies will choose the date of resolution of the board of directors as the pricing base date, in fact they will issue at a discount in accordance with the date of the issuance announcement as the base date. So that targeted additional issuance of specific objects benefit. At the same time, it is considered that the discount rate of large shareholders or related parties is lower than that of the other two kinds of issuing objects. With regard to the transmission of benefits from the economic consequences of directional placement, it is found that the value added part of the listed companies will be divided according to the proportion of shares held by shareholders. The large shareholders and institutional investors who participate in the private placement must encroach on the interests of the minority shareholders if they want to gain more income. In the market response to the economic consequences of directional placement, the cumulative excess return rate is taken as the measure of the market response to the listed companies. It is considered that there is a short-term positive announcement effect. Secondly, there is a negative correlation between the proportion of controlling shareholders and the short-term market reaction after the placement, and there is no significant difference in the market response of the final issuers to the listed companies. In the aspect of corporate response to the economic consequences of directional placement, the research results show that different industries will produce different corporate responses after the listed companies implement private placement. Based on the study of the pricing mechanism and the fairness of the pricing mechanism, this paper finds out the factors that influence the pricing of the placement. At the same time, in the study of economic consequences, this paper analyzes the impact of directional placement on the interests of shareholders, as well as the market reaction and corporate response. In this way, while protecting the interests of the majority of minority shareholders, it is also conducive to improving the operating performance of listed companies and the development of the capital market as a whole.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51

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