本文選題：公平偏好 + 委托模式�。� 參考：《管理工程學(xué)報(bào)》2010年01期

【摘要】：第三方物流(Third party logistics,3PL)努力工作和積極參與是融通倉有效運(yùn)作的重要因素,因此促使其努力工作是一個(gè)非常重要的問題。本文在傳統(tǒng)委托代理模型中加入"公平偏好"因素,并從是否考慮"公平偏好"因素兩個(gè)方面,研究銀行對3PL的激勵問題。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),考慮"公平偏好"因素后,銀行給3PL的固定報(bào)酬高于傳統(tǒng)委托代理模型中最優(yōu)固定支付時(shí),3PL會在最優(yōu)努力程度上再增加一定數(shù)量的額外努力以回報(bào)銀行的善意,且3PL"公平偏好"行為越強(qiáng),增加的努力數(shù)量就越多,從而使銀行收益高于傳統(tǒng)委托代理模型中3PL選擇最優(yōu)努力水平時(shí)的收益。本文意義在于銀行可以根據(jù)3PL"公平偏好"的強(qiáng)弱,合理設(shè)計(jì)報(bào)酬機(jī)制,以進(jìn)一步增加自身收益。
[Abstract]:The hard work and active participation of the third party logistic 3PLs are the important factors for the effective operation of the finance warehouse, so it is a very important problem to promote the hard work of the third party logistics (TPL). In this paper, we introduce the "fair preference" factor into the traditional principal-agent model, and study the incentive problem of the 3PL from the perspective of whether or not to consider the "fair preference" factor. It is found that after taking into account the "fair preference" factor, the fixed remuneration of 3PL is higher than that of the optimal fixed payment in the traditional principal-agent model. The 3PL will increase a certain amount of extra effort to repay the bank's goodwill in the degree of optimal effort. The stronger the behavior of "fair preference" of 3PL is, the more effort is increased, which makes the income of bank higher than that of traditional principal-agent model when 3PL chooses the optimal level of effort. The meaning of this paper is that banks can reasonably design compensation mechanism according to the strength of "fair preference" of 3PL in order to further increase their own income.
【作者單位】： 重慶大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(70872123,70572028)
【分類號】：F830.3;F272.92;F224

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本文編號：2020176